arXiv subjects

Negin Golrezaei

Publications and source records attributed to Negin Golrezaei.

34 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2023

Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraints

In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser's global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channels and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem. Finally, we argue that all our results hold for both single-item and multi-item auctions from which channels procure impressions on advertisers' behalf.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Multi-Platform Budget Management in Ad Markets with Non-IC Auctions

In online advertising markets, budget-constrained advertisers acquire ad placements through repeated bidding in auctions on various platforms. We present a strategy for bidding optimally in a set of auctions that may or may not be incentive-compatible under the presence of budget constraints. Our strategy maximizes the expected total utility across auctions while satisfying the advertiser's budget constraints in expectation. Additionally, we investigate the online setting where the advertiser must submit bids across platforms while learning about other bidders' bids over time. Our algorithm has $O(T^{3/4})$ regret under the full-information setting. Finally, we demonstrate that our algorithms have superior cumulative regret on both synthetic and real-world datasets of ad placement auctions, compared to existing adaptive pacing algorithms.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Incentive-aware Contextual Pricing with Non-parametric Market Noise

We consider a dynamic pricing problem for repeated contextual second-price auctions with multiple strategic buyers who aim to maximize their long-term time discounted utility. The seller has limited information on buyers' overall demand curves which depends on a non-parametric market-noise distribution, and buyers may potentially submit corrupted bids (relative to true valuations) to manipulate the seller's pricing policy for more favorable reserve prices in the future. We focus on designing the seller's learning policy to set contextual reserve prices where the seller's goal is to minimize regret compared to the revenue of a benchmark clairvoyant policy that has full information of buyers' demand. We propose a policy with a phased-structure that incorporates randomized "isolation" periods, during which a buyer is randomly chosen to solely participate in the auction. We show that this design allows the seller to control the number of periods in which buyers significantly corrupt their bids. We then prove that our policy enjoys a $T$-period regret of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ facing strategic buyers. Finally, we conduct numerical simulations to compare our proposed algorithm to standard pricing policies. Our numerical results show that our algorithm outperforms these policies under various buyer bidding behavior.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Learning to Price against a Budget and ROI Constrained Buyer

Internet advertisers (buyers) repeatedly procure ad impressions from ad platforms (sellers) with the aim to maximize total conversion (i.e. ad value) while respecting both budget and return-on-investment (ROI) constraints for efficient utilization of limited monetary resources. Facing such a constrained buyer who aims to learn her optimal strategy to acquire impressions, we study from a seller's perspective how to learn and price ad impressions through repeated posted price mechanisms to maximize revenue. For this two-sided learning setup, we propose a learning algorithm for the seller that utilizes an episodic binary-search procedure to identify a revenue-optimal selling price. We show that such a simple learning algorithm enjoys low seller regret when within each episode, the budget and ROI constrained buyer approximately best responds to the posted price. We present simple yet natural buyer's bidding algorithms under which the buyer approximately best responds while satisfying budget and ROI constraints, leading to a low regret for our proposed seller pricing algorithm. The design of our seller algorithm is motivated by the fact that the seller's revenue function admits a bell-shaped structure when the buyer best responds to prices under budget and ROI constraints, enabling our seller algorithm to identify revenue-optimal selling prices efficiently.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Online Learning via Offline Greedy Algorithms: Applications in Market Design and Optimization

Motivated by online decision-making in time-varying combinatorial environments, we study the problem of transforming offline algorithms to their online counterparts. We focus on offline combinatorial problems that are amenable to a constant factor approximation using a greedy algorithm that is robust to local errors. For such problems, we provide a general framework that efficiently transforms offline robust greedy algorithms to online ones using Blackwell approachability. We show that the resulting online algorithms have $O(\sqrt{T})$ (approximate) regret under the full information setting. We further introduce a bandit extension of Blackwell approachability that we call Bandit Blackwell approachability. We leverage this notion to transform greedy robust offline algorithms into a $O(T^{2/3})$ (approximate) regret in the bandit setting. Demonstrating the flexibility of our framework, we apply our offline-to-online transformation to several problems at the intersection of revenue management, market design, and online optimization, including product ranking optimization in online platforms, reserve price optimization in auctions, and submodular maximization. We also extend our reduction to greedy-like first order methods used in continuous optimization, such as those used for maximizing continuous strong DR monotone submodular functions subject to convex constraints. We show that our transformation, when applied to these applications, leads to new regret bounds or improves the current known bounds. We complement our theoretical studies by conducting numerical simulations for two of our applications, in both of which we observe that the numerical performance of our transformations outperforms the theoretical guarantees in practical instances.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

No-regret Learning in Price Competitions under Consumer Reference Effects

We study long-run market stability for repeated price competitions between two firms, where consumer demand depends on firms' posted prices and consumers' price expectations called reference prices. Consumers' reference prices vary over time according to a memory-based dynamic, which is a weighted average of all historical prices. We focus on the setting where firms are not aware of demand functions and how reference prices are formed but have access to an oracle that provides a measure of consumers' responsiveness to the current posted prices. We show that if the firms run no-regret algorithms, in particular, online mirror descent(OMD), with decreasing step sizes, the market stabilizes in the sense that firms' prices and reference prices converge to a stable Nash Equilibrium (SNE). Interestingly, we also show that there exist constant step sizesunder which the market stabilizes. We further characterize the rate of convergence to the SNE for both decreasing and constant OMD step sizes.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Contextual Bandits with Cross-learning

In the classical contextual bandits problem, in each round $t$, a learner observes some context $c$, chooses some action $i$ to perform, and receives some reward $r_{i,t}(c)$. We consider the variant of this problem where in addition to receiving the reward $r_{i,t}(c)$, the learner also learns the values of $r_{i,t}(c')$ for some other contexts $c'$ in set $\mathcal{O}_i(c)$; i.e., the rewards that would have been achieved by performing that action under different contexts $c'\in \mathcal{O}_i(c)$. This variant arises in several strategic settings, such as learning how to bid in non-truthful repeated auctions, which has gained a lot of attention lately as many platforms have switched to running first-price auctions. We call this problem the contextual bandits problem with cross-learning. The best algorithms for the classical contextual bandits problem achieve $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{CKT})$ regret against all stationary policies, where $C$ is the number of contexts, $K$ the number of actions, and $T$ the number of rounds. We design and analyze new algorithms for the contextual bandits problem with cross-learning and show that their regret has better dependence on the number of contexts. Under complete cross-learning where the rewards for all contexts are learned when choosing an action, i.e., set $\mathcal{O}_i(c)$ contains all contexts, we show that our algorithms achieve regret $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{KT})$, removing the dependence on $C$. For any other cases, i.e., under partial cross-learning where $|\mathcal{O}_i(c)|< C$ for some context-action pair of $(i,c)$, the regret bounds depend on how the sets $\mathcal O_i(c)$ impact the degree to which cross-learning between contexts is possible. We simulate our algorithms on real auction data from an ad exchange running first-price auctions and show that they outperform traditional contextual bandit algorithms.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms

We study revenue maximization through sequential posted-price (SPP) mechanisms in single-dimensional settings with $n$ buyers and independent but not necessarily identical value distributions. We construct the SPP mechanisms by considering the best of two simple pricing rules: one that imitates the revenue optimal mchanism, namely the Myersonian mechanism, via the taxation principle and the other that posts a uniform price. Our pricing rules are rather generalizable and yield the first improvement over long-established approximation factors in several settings. We design factor-revealing mathematical programs that crisply capture the approximation factor of our SPP mechanism. In the single-unit setting, our SPP mechanism yields a better approximation factor than the state of the art prior to our work (Azar, Chiplunkar & Kaplan, 2018). In the multi-unit setting, our SPP mechanism yields the first improved approximation factor over the state of the art after over nine years (Yan, 2011 and Chakraborty et al., 2010). Our results on SPP mechanisms immediately imply improved performance guarantees for the equivalent free-order prophet inequality problem. In the position auction setting, our SPP mechanism yields the first higher-than $1-1/e$ approximation factor. In eager second-price (ESP) auctions, our two simple pricing rules lead to the first improved approximation factor that is strictly greater than what is obtained by the SPP mechanism in the single-unit setting.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

LP-based Approximation for Personalized Reserve Prices

We study the problem of computing data-driven personalized reserve prices in eager second price auctions without having any assumption on valuation distributions. Here, the input is a data-set that contains the submitted bids of $n$ buyers in a set of auctions and the problem is to return personalized reserve prices $\textbf r$ that maximize the revenue earned on these auctions by running eager second price auctions with reserve $\textbf r$. For this problem, which is known to be APX-hard, we present a novel LP formulation and a rounding procedure which achieves a $(1+2(\sqrt{2}-1)e^{\sqrt{2}-2})^{-1} \approx 0.684$-approximation. This improves over the $\frac{1}{2}$-approximation algorithm due to Roughgarden and Wang. We show that our analysis is tight for this rounding procedure. We also bound the integrality gap of the LP, which shows that it is impossible to design an algorithm that yields an approximation factor larger than $0.828$ with respect to this LP.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Learning Product Rankings Robust to Fake Users

In many online platforms, customers' decisions are substantially influenced by product rankings as most customers only examine a few top-ranked products. Concurrently, such platforms also use the same data corresponding to customers' actions to learn how these products must be ranked or ordered. These interactions in the underlying learning process, however, may incentivize sellers to artificially inflate their position by employing fake users, as exemplified by the emergence of click farms. Motivated by such fraudulent behavior, we study the ranking problem of a platform that faces a mixture of real and fake users who are indistinguishable from one another. We first show that existing learning algorithms---that are optimal in the absence of fake users---may converge to highly sub-optimal rankings under manipulation by fake users. To overcome this deficiency, we develop efficient learning algorithms under two informational environments: in the first setting, the platform is aware of the number of fake users, and in the second setting, it is agnostic to the number of fake users. For both these environments, we prove that our algorithms converge to the optimal ranking, while being robust to the aforementioned fraudulent behavior; we also present worst-case performance guarantees for our methods, and show that they significantly outperform existing algorithms. At a high level, our work employs several novel approaches to guarantee robustness such as: (i) constructing product-ordering graphs that encode the pairwise relationships between products inferred from the customers' actions; and (ii) implementing multiple levels of learning with a judicious amount of bi-directional cross-learning between levels.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Dynamic Incentive-aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions

Motivated by pricing in ad exchange markets, we consider the problem of robust learning of reserve prices against strategic buyers in repeated contextual second-price auctions. Buyers' valuations for an item depend on the context that describes the item. However, the seller is not aware of the relationship between the context and buyers' valuations, i.e., buyers' preferences. The seller's goal is to design a learning policy to set reserve prices via observing the past sales data, and her objective is to minimize her regret for revenue, where the regret is computed against a clairvoyant policy that knows buyers' heterogeneous preferences. Given the seller's goal, utility-maximizing buyers have the incentive to bid untruthfully in order to manipulate the seller's learning policy. We propose learning policies that are robust to such strategic behavior. These policies use the outcomes of the auctions, rather than the submitted bids, to estimate the preferences while controlling the long-term effect of the outcome of each auction on the future reserve prices. When the market noise distribution is known to the seller, we propose a policy called Contextual Robust Pricing (CORP) that achieves a T-period regret of $O(d\log(Td) \log (T))$, where $d$ is the dimension of {the} contextual information. When the market noise distribution is unknown to the seller, we propose two policies whose regrets are sublinear in $T$.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2013

FemtoCaching: Wireless Video Content Delivery through Distributed Caching Helpers

Video on-demand streaming from Internet-based servers is becoming one of the most important services offered by wireless networks today. In order to improve the area spectral efficiency of video transmission in cellular systems, small cells heterogeneous architectures (e.g., femtocells, WiFi off-loading) are being proposed, such that video traffic to nomadic users can be handled by short-range links to the nearest small cell access points (referred to as "helpers"). As the helper deployment density increases, the backhaul capacity becomes the system bottleneck. In order to alleviate such bottleneck we propose a system where helpers with low-rate backhaul but high storage capacity cache popular video files. Files not available from helpers are transmitted by the cellular base station. We analyze the optimum way of assigning files to the helpers, in order to minimize the expected downloading time for files. We distinguish between the uncoded case (where only complete files are stored) and the coded case, where segments of Fountain-encoded versions of the video files are stored at helpers. We show that the uncoded optimum file assignment is NP-hard, and develop a greedy strategy that is provably within a factor 2 of the optimum. Further, for a special case we provide an efficient algorithm achieving a provably better approximation ratio of $1-(1-1/d)^d$, where $d$ is the maximum number of helpers a user can be connected to. We also show that the coded optimum cache assignment problem is convex that can be further reduced to a linear program. We present numerical results comparing the proposed schemes.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2013

Base-Station Assisted Device-to-Device Communications for High-Throughput Wireless Video Networks

We propose a new scheme for increasing the throughput of video files in cellular communications systems. This scheme exploits (i) the redundancy of user requests as well as (ii) the considerable storage capacity of smartphones and tablets. Users cache popular video files and - after receiving requests from other users - serve these requests via device-to-device localized transmissions. The file placement is optimal when a central control knows a priori the locations of wireless devices when file requests occur. However, even a purely random caching scheme shows only a minor performance loss compared to such a genie-aided scheme. We then analyze the optimal collaboration distance, trading off frequency reuse with the probability of finding a requested file within the collaboration distance. We show that an improvement of spectral efficiency of one to two orders of magnitude is possible, even if there is not very high redundancy in video requests.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2012

Scaling Behaviors of Wireless Device-to-Device Communications with Distributed Caching

We analyze a novel architecture for caching popular video content to enable wireless device-to-device collaboration. We focus on the asymptotic scaling characteristics and show how they depends on video content popularity statistics. We identify a fundamental conflict between collaboration distance and interference and show how to optimize the transmission power to maximize frequency reuse. Our main result is a closed form expression of the optimal collaboration distance as a function of the model parameters. Under the common assumption of a Zipf distribution for content reuse, we show that if the Zipf exponent is greater than 1, it is possible to have a number of D2D interference-free collaboration pairs that scales linearly in the number of nodes. If the Zipf exponent is smaller than 1, we identify the best possible scaling in the number of D2D collaborating links. Surprisingly, a very simple distributed caching policy achieves the optimal scaling behavior and therefore there is no need to centrally coordinate what each node is caching.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2012

Wireless Device-to-Device Communications with Distributed Caching

We introduce a novel wireless device-to-device (D2D) collaboration architecture that exploits distributed storage of popular content to enable frequency reuse. We identify a fundamental conflict between collaboration distance and interference and show how to optimize the transmission power to maximize frequency reuse. Our analysis depends on the user content request statistics which are modeled by a Zipf distribution. Our main result is a closed form expression of the optimal collaboration distance as a function of the content reuse distribution parameters. We show that if the Zipf exponent of the content reuse distribution is greater than 1, it is possible to have a number of D2D interference-free collaboration pairs that scales linearly in the number of nodes. If the Zipf exponent is smaller than 1, we identify the best possible scaling in the number of D2D collaborating links. Surprisingly, a very simple distributed caching policy achieves the optimal scaling behavior and therefore there is no need to centrally coordinate what each node is caching.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2012

Femtocaching and Device-to-Device Collaboration: A New Architecture for Wireless Video Distribution

We present a new architecture to handle the ongoing explosive increase in the demand for video content in wireless networks. It is based on distributed caching of the content in femto-basestations with small or non-existing backhaul capacity but with considerable storage space, called helper nodes. We also consider using the mobile terminals themselves as caching helpers, which can distribute video through device-to-device communications. This approach allows an improvement in the video throughput without deployment of any additional infrastructure. The new architecture can improve video throughput by one to two orders-of-magnitude.

cs.NI↗