arXiv subjects

Neil Kale

Publications and source records attributed to Neil Kale.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Personalization, Personas, and Forecasting in Value Alignment

LLM behavior may be conditioned by human identity in several ways: they may be asked to adapt to users, role-play populations, or forecast how people would answer value-laden questions. We test whether these framings are interchangeable using the World Values Survey (WVS). We evaluate GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 2.5 Flash, and Qwen3-235B on 101 WVS-derived questions across 13 language-country slices, comparing a language-only baseline with user-country, persona-country, and third-person prompts. Across 21,008 model-response rows, prompt framing is a first-order determinant of cultural alignment: country cues often shift answers substantially, but not all shifts move toward matched human response distributions. Third-person forecasting yields the strongest directional alignment for three of the four hosted models, while personalization and role-play are weaker or less stable. Alignment gains concentrate on salient value dimensions such as religiosity, gender roles, and work-oriented material values, whereas institutional trust and democracy-related questions remain difficult. These results show that prompt framing is not a cosmetic choice in cultural value elicitation; it changes both model behavior and measured alignment.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Position: Preventing AI-Generated CSAM Necessitates New Approaches to AI Safety

Modern artificial intelligence (AI) systems present profound new risks to child safety. AI is increasingly being misused to create AI-generated child sexual abuse material, facilitate child sexual exploitation, and reduce barriers to harm. In this paper, we argue that protecting children from AI-facilitated sexual abuse requires new approaches to AI safety. Existing safety techniques assume data accessibility, transparency, and evaluation practices that are incompatible with the ethical and legal constraints surrounding child sexual abuse material. We examine how these constraints create new technical challenges, such as limitations on dataset auditing, red teaming, and fine-tuning prevention. In turn, we outline *15 open problems* in online child sexual exploitation and abuse across the AI development lifecycle, from dataset curation and model design to deployment and long-term maintenance. We propose targeted recommendations for researchers, developers, and policymakers to bridge the gap between theoretical AI safety and the realities of child protection. Our work aims to reframe preventing AI-facilitated child sexual abuse as a central, safety-critical dimension for AI research, motivating work that translates responsible AI principles into concrete safeguards against the exploitation of children.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Defensive Refusal Bias: How Safety Alignment Fails Cyber Defenders

Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs), particularly for cybersecurity tasks, primarily focuses on preventing misuse. While this approach reduces direct harm, it obscures a complementary failure mode: denial of assistance to legitimate defenders. We study Defensive Refusal Bias -- the tendency of safety-tuned frontier LLMs to refuse assistance for authorized defensive cybersecurity tasks when those tasks include similar language to an offensive cyber task. Based on 2,390 real-world examples from the National Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (NCCDC), we find that LLMs refuse defensive requests containing security-sensitive keywords at $2.72\times$ the rate of semantically equivalent neutral requests ($p < 0.001$). The highest refusal rates occur in the most operationally critical tasks: system hardening (43.8%) and malware analysis (34.3%). Interestingly, explicit authorization, where the user directly instructs the model that they have authority to complete the target task, increases refusal rates, suggesting models interpret justifications as adversarial rather than exculpatory. These findings are urgent for interactive use and critical for autonomous defensive agents, which cannot rephrase refused queries or retry. Our findings suggest that current LLM cybersecurity alignment relies on semantic similarity to harmful content rather than reasoning about intent or authorization. We call for mitigations that analyze intent to maximize defensive capabilities while still preventing harmful compliance.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Mitigating Modal Imbalance in Multimodal Reasoning

Foundation models (FMs) deployed in real-world tasks such as computer-use agents must integrate diverse modalities. How good are FMs at performing joint reasoning, simultaneously reasoning over multiple modalities, especially when the modalities interact and relate to each other to form cross-modal context? To better understand this problem, we study FMs on cross-modal conflicts: scenarios where conflicting evidence is presented across modalities. This allows us to examine whether FMs prioritize one modality over another or reason jointly to reconcile the conflict. Our experiments reveal that FMs can recognize conflicts in unimodal contexts, composed of a single modality, 90% of the time, but the ratio falls as low as 3% when evidence is split across modalities -- similar observations hold in cross-lingual contexts, composed of multiple languages. We trace this failure to cross-modal attention imbalance, showing that FMs exhibit extreme asymmetry in attention scores, disproportionately prioritizing certain modalities. We show that cross-modal attention imbalance does not go away by simply scaling up multimodal or multilingual datasets blindly, since they lack training examples that explicitly require cross-modal reasoning. We demonstrate that even a simple and scalable method of explicitly combining multiple modalities within each training instance significantly reduces attention imbalance. Reduced attention imbalance directly translates to improved downstream performance on several vision-language benchmarks. Our findings underscore the importance of systematically addressing cross-modal contexts to build reliable foundation models.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Reliable Weak-to-Strong Monitoring of LLM Agents

We stress test monitoring systems for detecting covert misbehavior in autonomous LLM agents (e.g., secretly sharing private information). To this end, we systematize a monitor red teaming (MRT) workflow that incorporates: (1) varying levels of agent and monitor situational awareness; (2) distinct adversarial strategies to evade the monitor, such as prompt injection; and (3) two datasets and environments -- SHADE-Arena for tool-calling agents and our new CUA-SHADE-Arena, which extends TheAgentCompany, for computer-use agents. We run MRT on existing LLM monitor scaffoldings, which orchestrate LLMs and parse agent trajectories, alongside a new hybrid hierarchical-sequential scaffolding proposed in this work. Our empirical results yield three key findings. First, agent awareness dominates monitor awareness: an agent's knowledge that it is being monitored substantially degrades the monitor's reliability. On the contrary, providing the monitor with more information about the agent is less helpful than expected. Second, monitor scaffolding matters more than monitor awareness: the hybrid scaffolding consistently outperforms baseline monitor scaffolding, and can enable weaker models to reliably monitor stronger agents -- a weak-to-strong scaling effect. Third, in a human-in-the-loop setting where humans discuss with the LLM monitor to get an updated judgment for the agent's behavior, targeted human oversight is most effective; escalating only pre-flagged cases to human reviewers improved the TPR by approximately 15% at FPR = 0.01. Our work establishes a standard workflow for MRT, highlighting the lack of adversarial robustness for LLMs and humans when monitoring and detecting agent misbehavior. We release code, data, and logs to spur further research.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Membership Inference Attacks for Unseen Classes

A key tool in developing safe AI models is \emph{data auditing}, i.e., using statistical tools to determine whether harmful content may have been used in the training data of a black-box model. Unfortunately, most \emph{membership inference attacks} (MIAs) used to perform this type of auditing themselves assume \emph{access} to examples of harmful content from the same distribution as the query data. In real-world auditing scenarios, auditors often face legal and ethical restrictions preventing them from accessing a representative set of samples of harmful content to train MIA models effectively. We abstract and formalize this setting into a new data access model, the ``unseen class'' setting, and show that the state of the art MIAs fail due to the lack of access to the full target distribution. We show in this setting, \emph{quantile regression attacks} outperform approaches typically considered to be SoTA. We demonstrate this both empirically and theoretically, showing that quantile regression attacks achieve up to \textbf{11$\times$ the TPR} of shadow model-based approaches in practice, and providing a theoretical model that outlines the generalization properties required for this approach to succeed. Our work identifies an important failure mode in existing MIAs and provides a cautionary tale for practitioners that aim to directly use existing tools for real-world applications of AI safety.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

BLUR: A Benchmark for LLM Unlearning Robust to Forget-Retain Overlap

Machine unlearning has the potential to improve the safety of large language models (LLMs) by removing sensitive or harmful information post hoc. A key challenge in unlearning involves balancing between forget quality (effectively unlearning undesirable information) and retain quality (maintaining good performance on other, general tasks). Unfortunately, as we show, current LLM unlearning benchmarks contain highly disparate forget and retain sets -- painting a false picture of the effectiveness of LLM unlearning methods. This can be particularly problematic because it opens the door for benign perturbations, such as relearning attacks, to easily reveal supposedly unlearned knowledge once models are deployed. To address this, we present $\texttt{BLUR}$: a benchmark for LLM unlearning that provides more realistic scenarios of forget-retain overlap. $\texttt{BLUR}$ significantly expands on existing unlearning benchmarks by providing extended evaluation tasks, combined forget/retain queries, and relearning datasets of varying degrees of difficulty. Despite the benign nature of the queries considered, we find that the performance of existing methods drops significantly when evaluated on $\texttt{BLUR}$, with simple approaches performing better on average than more recent methods. These results highlight the importance of robust evaluation and suggest several important directions of future study. Our benchmark is publicly available at: https://huggingface.co/datasets/forgelab/BLUR

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Position: LLM Unlearning Benchmarks are Weak Measures of Progress

Unlearning methods have the potential to improve the privacy and safety of large language models (LLMs) by removing sensitive or harmful information post hoc. The LLM unlearning research community has increasingly turned toward empirical benchmarks to assess the effectiveness of such methods. In this paper, we find that existing benchmarks provide an overly optimistic and potentially misleading view on the effectiveness of candidate unlearning methods. By introducing simple, benign modifications to a number of popular benchmarks, we expose instances where supposedly unlearned information remains accessible, or where the unlearning process has degraded the model's performance on retained information to a much greater extent than indicated by the original benchmark. We identify that existing benchmarks are particularly vulnerable to modifications that introduce even loose dependencies between the forget and retain information. Further, we show that ambiguity in unlearning targets in existing benchmarks can easily lead to the design of methods that overfit to the given test queries. Based on our findings, we urge the community to be cautious when interpreting benchmark results as reliable measures of progress, and we provide several recommendations to guide future LLM unlearning research.

cs.CL↗