arXiv subjects

Nguyen Kim Thang

Publications and source records attributed to Nguyen Kim Thang.

25 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2014

Lagrangian Duality based Algorithms in Online Scheduling

We consider Lagrangian duality based approaches to design and analyze algorithms for online energy-efficient scheduling. First, we present a primal-dual framework. Our approach makes use of the Lagrangian weak duality and convexity to derive dual programs for problems which could be formulated as convex assignment problems. The duals have intuitive structures as the ones in linear programming. The constraints of the duals explicitly indicate the online decisions and naturally lead to competitive algorithms. Second, we use a dual-fitting approach, which also based on the weak duality, to study problems which are unlikely to admit convex relaxations. Through the analysis, we show an interesting feature in which primal-dual gives idea for designing algorithms while the analysis is done by dual-fitting. We illustrate the advantages and the flexibility of the approaches through problems in different setting: from single machine to unrelated machine environments, from typical competitive analysis to the one with resource augmentation, from convex relaxations to non-convex relaxations.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2014

Throughput Maximization in Multiprocessor Speed-Scaling

We are given a set of $n$ jobs that have to be executed on a set of $m$ speed-scalable machines that can vary their speeds dynamically using the energy model introduced in [Yao et al., FOCS'95]. Every job $j$ is characterized by its release date $r_j$, its deadline $d_j$, its processing volume $p_{i,j}$ if $j$ is executed on machine $i$ and its weight $w_j$. We are also given a budget of energy $E$ and our objective is to maximize the weighted throughput, i.e. the total weight of jobs that are completed between their respective release dates and deadlines. We propose a polynomial-time approximation algorithm where the preemption of the jobs is allowed but not their migration. Our algorithm uses a primal-dual approach on a linearized version of a convex program with linear constraints. Furthermore, we present two optimal algorithms for the non-preemptive case where the number of machines is bounded by a fixed constant. More specifically, we consider: {\em (a)} the case of identical processing volumes, i.e. $p_{i,j}=p$ for every $i$ and $j$, for which we present a polynomial-time algorithm for the unweighted version, which becomes a pseudopolynomial-time algorithm for the weighted throughput version, and {\em (b)} the case of agreeable instances, i.e. for which $r_i \le r_j$ if and only if $d_i \le d_j$, for which we present a pseudopolynomial-time algorithm. Both algorithms are based on a discretization of the problem and the use of dynamic programming.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2012

Smooth Inequalities and Equilibrium Inefficiency in Scheduling Games

We study coordination mechanisms for Scheduling Games (with unrelated machines). In these games, each job represents a player, who needs to choose a machine for its execution, and intends to complete earliest possible. Our goal is to design scheduling policies that always admit a pure Nash equilibrium and guarantee a small price of anarchy for the l_k-norm social cost --- the objective balances overall quality of service and fairness. We consider policies with different amount of knowledge about jobs: non-clairvoyant, strongly-local and local. The analysis relies on the smooth argument together with adequate inequalities, called smooth inequalities. With this unified framework, we are able to prove the following results. First, we study the inefficiency in l_k-norm social costs of a strongly-local policy SPT and a non-clairvoyant policy EQUI. We show that the price of anarchy of policy SPT is O(k). We also prove a lower bound of Omega(k/log k) for all deterministic, non-preemptive, strongly-local and non-waiting policies (non-waiting policies produce schedules without idle times). These results ensure that SPT is close to optimal with respect to the class of l_k-norm social costs. Moreover, we prove that the non-clairvoyant policy EQUI has price of anarchy O(2^k). Second, we consider the makespan (l_infty-norm) social cost by making connection within the l_k-norm functions. We revisit some local policies and provide simpler, unified proofs from the framework's point of view. With the highlight of the approach, we derive a local policy Balance. This policy guarantees a price of anarchy of O(log m), which makes it the currently best known policy among the anonymous local policies that always admit a pure Nash equilibrium.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2011

Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games

In a scheduling game, each player owns a job and chooses a machine to execute it. While the social cost is the maximal load over all machines (makespan), the cost (disutility) of each player is the completion time of its own job. In the game, players may follow selfish strategies to optimize their cost and therefore their behaviors do not necessarily lead the game to an equilibrium. Even in the case there is an equilibrium, its makespan might be much larger than the social optimum, and this inefficiency is measured by the price of anarchy -- the worst ratio between the makespan of an equilibrium and the optimum. Coordination mechanisms aim to reduce the price of anarchy by designing scheduling policies that specify how jobs assigned to a same machine are to be scheduled. Typically these policies define the schedule according to the processing times as announced by the jobs. One could wonder if there are policies that do not require this knowledge, and still provide a good price of anarchy. This would make the processing times be private information and avoid the problem of truthfulness. In this paper we study these so-called non-clairvoyant policies. In particular, we study the RANDOM policy that schedules the jobs in a random order without preemption, and the EQUI policy that schedules the jobs in parallel using time-multiplexing, assigning each job an equal fraction of CPU time.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2010

Tile Packing Tomography is NP-hard

Discrete tomography deals with reconstructing finite spatial objects from lower dimensional projections and has applications for example in timetable design. In this paper we consider the problem of reconstructing a tile packing from its row and column projections. It consists of disjoint copies of a fixed tile, all contained in some rectangular grid. The projections tell how many cells are covered by a tile in each row and column. How difficult is it to construct a tile packing satisfying given projections? It was known to be solvable by a greedy algorithm for bars (tiles of width or height 1), and NP-hardness results were known for some specific tiles. This paper shows that the problem is NP-hard whenever the tile is not a bar.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2009

Online Scheduling of Bounded Length Jobs to Maximize Throughput

We consider an online scheduling problem, motivated by the issues present at the joints of networks using ATM and TCP/IP. Namely, IP packets have to broken down to small ATM cells and sent out before their deadlines, but cells corresponding to different packets can be interwoven. More formally, we consider the online scheduling problem with preemptions, where each job j is revealed at release time r_j, has processing time p_j, deadline d_j and weight w_j. A preempted job can be resumed at any time. The goal is to maximize the total weight of all jobs completed on time. Our main result are as follows: we prove that if all jobs have processing time exactly k, the deterministic competitive ratio is between 2.598 and 5, and when the processing times are at most k, the deterministic competitive ratio is Theta(k/log k).

cs.DS↗

arXiv2007

Nash equilibria in Voronoi games on graphs

In this paper we study a game where every player is to choose a vertex (facility) in a given undirected graph. All vertices (customers) are then assigned to closest facilities and a player's payoff is the number of customers assigned to it. We show that deciding the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a given graph is NP-hard which to our knowledge is the first result of this kind for a zero-sum game. We also introduce a new measure, the social cost discrepancy, defined as the ratio of the costs between the worst and the best Nash equilibria. We show that the social cost discrepancy in our game is Omega(sqrt(n/k)) and O(sqrt(kn)), where n is the number of vertices and k the number of players.

cs.GT↗