arXiv subjects

Nick Feamster

Publications and source records attributed to Nick Feamster.

At least 91 records · Page 5Linked to original sources

arXiv2018

A Developer-Friendly Library for Smart Home IoT Privacy-Preserving Traffic Obfuscation

The number and variety of Internet-connected devices have grown enormously in the past few years, presenting new challenges to security and privacy. Research has shown that network adversaries can use traffic rate metadata from consumer IoT devices to infer sensitive user activities. Shaping traffic flows to fit distributions independent of user activities can protect privacy, but this approach has seen little adoption due to required developer effort and overhead bandwidth costs. Here, we present a Python library for IoT developers to easily integrate privacy-preserving traffic shaping into their products. The library replaces standard networking functions with versions that automatically obfuscate device traffic patterns through a combination of payload padding, fragmentation, and randomized cover traffic. Our library successfully preserves user privacy and requires approximately 4 KB/s overhead bandwidth for IoT devices with low send rates or high latency tolerances. This overhead is reasonable given normal Internet speeds in American homes and is an improvement on the bandwidth requirements of existing solutions.

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arXiv2018

Automatically Generating a Large, Culture-Specific Blocklist for China

Internet censorship measurements rely on lists of websites to be tested, or "block lists" that are curated by third parties. Unfortunately, many of these lists are not public, and those that are tend to focus on a small group of topics, leaving other types of sites and services untested. To increase and diversify the set of sites on existing block lists, we use natural language processing and search engines to automatically discover a much wider range of websites that are censored in China. Using these techniques, we create a list of 1125 websites outside the Alexa Top 1,000 that cover Chinese politics, minority human rights organizations, oppressed religions, and more. Importantly, $\textit{none of the sites we discover are present on the current largest block list}$. The list that we develop not only vastly expands the set of sites that current Internet measurement tools can test, but it also deepens our understanding of the nature of content that is censored in China. We have released both this new block list and the code for generating it.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2018

How Do Tor Users Interact With Onion Services?

Onion services are anonymous network services that are exposed over the Tor network. In contrast to conventional Internet services, onion services are private, generally not indexed by search engines, and use self-certifying domain names that are long and difficult for humans to read. In this paper, we study how people perceive, understand, and use onion services based on data from 17 semi-structured interviews and an online survey of 517 users. We find that users have an incomplete mental model of onion services, use these services for anonymity and have varying trust in onion services in general. Users also have difficulty discovering and tracking onion sites and authenticating them. Finally, users want technical improvements to onion services and better information on how to use them. Our findings suggest various improvements for the security and usability of Tor onion services, including ways to automatically detect phishing of onion services, more clear security indicators, and ways to manage onion domain names that are difficult to remember.

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arXiv2018

Elmo: Source-Routed Multicast for Cloud Services

We present Elmo, a system that addresses the multicast scalability problem in multi-tenant data centers. Modern cloud applications frequently exhibit one-to-many communication patterns and, at the same time, require sub-millisecond latencies and high throughput. IP multicast can achieve these requirements but has control- and data-plane scalability limitations that make it challenging to offer it as a service for hundreds of thousands of tenants, typical of cloud environments. Tenants, therefore, must rely on unicast-based approaches (e.g., application-layer or overlay-based) to support multicast in their applications, imposing overhead on throughput and end host CPU utilization, with higher and unpredictable latencies. Elmo scales network multicast by taking advantage of emerging programmable switches and the unique characteristics of data-center networks; specifically, the symmetric topology and short paths in a data center. Elmo encodes multicast group information inside packets themselves, reducing the need to store the same information in network switches. In a three-tier data-center topology with 27K hosts, Elmo supports a million multicast groups using a 325-byte packet header, requiring as few as 1.1K multicast group-table entries on average in leaf switches, with a traffic overhead as low as 5% over ideal multicast.

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arXiv2018

Discovering Smart Home Internet of Things Privacy Norms Using Contextual Integrity

The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices for consumer "smart" homes raises concerns about user privacy. We present a survey method based on the Contextual Integrity (CI) privacy framework that can quickly and efficiently discover privacy norms at scale. We apply the method to discover privacy norms in the smart home context, surveying 1,731 American adults on Amazon Mechanical Turk. For $2,800 and in less than six hours, we measured the acceptability of 3,840 information flows representing a combinatorial space of smart home devices sending consumer information to first and third-party recipients under various conditions. Our results provide actionable recommendations for IoT device manufacturers, including design best practices and instructions for adopting our method for further research.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2018

Detecting Compressed Cleartext Traffic from Consumer Internet of Things Devices

Data encryption is the primary method of protecting the privacy of consumer device Internet communications from network observers. The ability to automatically detect unencrypted data in network traffic is therefore an essential tool for auditing Internet-connected devices. Existing methods identify network packets containing cleartext but cannot differentiate packets containing encrypted data from packets containing compressed unencrypted data, which can be easily recovered by reversing the compression algorithm. This makes it difficult for consumer protection advocates to identify devices that risk user privacy by sending sensitive data in a compressed unencrypted format. Here, we present the first technique to automatically distinguish encrypted from compressed unencrypted network transmissions on a per-packet basis. We apply three machine learning models and achieve a maximum 66.9% accuracy with a convolutional neural network trained on raw packet data. This result is a baseline for this previously unstudied machine learning problem, which we hope will motivate further attention and accuracy improvements. To facilitate continuing research on this topic, we have made our training and test datasets available to the public.

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arXiv2018

Machine Learning DDoS Detection for Consumer Internet of Things Devices

An increasing number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices are connecting to the Internet, yet many of these devices are fundamentally insecure, exposing the Internet to a variety of attacks. Botnets such as Mirai have used insecure consumer IoT devices to conduct distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on critical Internet infrastructure. This motivates the development of new techniques to automatically detect consumer IoT attack traffic. In this paper, we demonstrate that using IoT-specific network behaviors (e.g. limited number of endpoints and regular time intervals between packets) to inform feature selection can result in high accuracy DDoS detection in IoT network traffic with a variety of machine learning algorithms, including neural networks. These results indicate that home gateway routers or other network middleboxes could automatically detect local IoT device sources of DDoS attacks using low-cost machine learning algorithms and traffic data that is flow-based and protocol-agnostic.

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arXiv2018

Cleartext Data Transmissions in Consumer IoT Medical Devices

This paper introduces a method to capture network traffic from medical IoT devices and automatically detect cleartext information that may reveal sensitive medical conditions and behaviors. The research follows a three-step approach involving traffic collection, cleartext detection, and metadata analysis. We analyze four popular consumer medical IoT devices, including one smart medical device that leaks sensitive health information in cleartext. We also present a traffic capture and analysis system that seamlessly integrates with a home network and offers a user-friendly interface for consumers to monitor and visualize data transmissions of IoT devices in their homes.

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arXiv2017

OCDN: Oblivious Content Distribution Networks

As publishers increasingly use Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) to distribute content across geographically diverse networks, CDNs themselves are becoming unwitting targets of requests for both access to user data and content takedown. From copyright infringement to moderation of online speech, CDNs have found themselves at the forefront of many recent legal quandaries. At the heart of the tension, however, is the fact that CDNs have rich information both about the content they are serving and the users who are requesting that content. This paper offers a technical contribution that is relevant to this ongoing tension with the design of an Oblivious CDN (OCDN); the system is both compatible with the existing Web ecosystem of publishers and clients and hides from the CDN both the content it is serving and the users who are requesting that content. OCDN is compatible with the way that publishers currently host content on CDNs. Using OCDN, publishers can use multiple CDNs to publish content; clients retrieve content through a peer-to-peer anonymizing network of proxies. Our prototype implementation and evaluation of OCDN show that the system can obfuscate both content and clients from the CDN operator while still delivering content with good performance.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2017

Why (and How) Networks Should Run Themselves

The proliferation of networked devices, systems, and applications that we depend on every day makes managing networks more important than ever. The increasing security, availability, and performance demands of these applications suggest that these increasingly difficult network management problems be solved in real time, across a complex web of interacting protocols and systems. Alas, just as the importance of network management has increased, the network has grown so complex that it is seemingly unmanageable. In this new era, network management requires a fundamentally new approach. Instead of optimizations based on closed-form analysis of individual protocols, network operators need data-driven, machine-learning-based models of end-to-end and application performance based on high-level policy goals and a holistic view of the underlying components. Instead of anomaly detection algorithms that operate on offline analysis of network traces, operators need classification and detection algorithms that can make real-time, closed-loop decisions. Networks should learn to drive themselves. This paper explores this concept, discussing how we might attain this ambitious goal by more closely coupling measurement with real-time control and by relying on learning for inference and prediction about a networked application or system, as opposed to closed-form analysis of individual protocols.

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arXiv2017

Characterizing and Improving the Reliability of Broadband Internet Access

In this paper, we empirically demonstrate the growing importance of reliability by measuring its effect on user behavior. We present an approach for broadband reliability characterization using data collected by many emerging national initiatives to study broadband and apply it to the data gathered by the Federal Communications Commission's Measuring Broadband America project. Motivated by our findings, we present the design, implementation, and evaluation of a practical approach for improving the reliability of broadband Internet access with multihoming.

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arXiv2017

Spying on the Smart Home: Privacy Attacks and Defenses on Encrypted IoT Traffic

The growing market for smart home IoT devices promises new conveniences for consumers while presenting new challenges for preserving privacy within the home. Many smart home devices have always-on sensors that capture users' offline activities in their living spaces and transmit information about these activities on the Internet. In this paper, we demonstrate that an ISP or other network observer can infer privacy sensitive in-home activities by analyzing Internet traffic from smart homes containing commercially-available IoT devices even when the devices use encryption. We evaluate several strategies for mitigating the privacy risks associated with smart home device traffic, including blocking, tunneling, and rate-shaping. Our experiments show that traffic shaping can effectively and practically mitigate many privacy risks associated with smart home IoT devices. We find that 40KB/s extra bandwidth usage is enough to protect user activities from a passive network adversary. This bandwidth cost is well within the Internet speed limits and data caps for many smart homes.

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arXiv2017

A Smart Home is No Castle: Privacy Vulnerabilities of Encrypted IoT Traffic

The increasing popularity of specialized Internet-connected devices and appliances, dubbed the Internet-of-Things (IoT), promises both new conveniences and new privacy concerns. Unlike traditional web browsers, many IoT devices have always-on sensors that constantly monitor fine-grained details of users' physical environments and influence the devices' network communications. Passive network observers, such as Internet service providers, could potentially analyze IoT network traffic to infer sensitive details about users. Here, we examine four IoT smart home devices (a Sense sleep monitor, a Nest Cam Indoor security camera, a WeMo switch, and an Amazon Echo) and find that their network traffic rates can reveal potentially sensitive user interactions even when the traffic is encrypted. These results indicate that a technological solution is needed to protect IoT device owner privacy, and that IoT-specific concerns must be considered in the ongoing policy debate around ISP data collection and usage.

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arXiv2017

Closing the Blinds: Four Strategies for Protecting Smart Home Privacy from Network Observers

The growing market for smart home IoT devices promises new conveniences for consumers while presenting novel challenges for preserving privacy within the home. Specifically, Internet service providers or neighborhood WiFi eavesdroppers can measure Internet traffic rates from smart home devices and infer consumers' private in-home behaviors. Here we propose four strategies that device manufacturers and third parties can take to protect consumers from side-channel traffic rate privacy threats: 1) blocking traffic, 2) concealing DNS, 3) tunneling traffic, and 4) shaping and injecting traffic. We hope that these strategies, and the implementation nuances we discuss, will provide a foundation for the future development of privacy-sensitive smart homes.

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arXiv2017

Sonata: Query-Driven Network Telemetry

Operating networks depends on collecting and analyzing measurement data. Current technologies do not make it easy to do so, typically because they separate data collection (e.g., packet capture or flow monitoring) from analysis, producing either too much data to answer a general question or too little data to answer a detailed question. In this paper, we present Sonata, a network telemetry system that uses a uniform query interface to drive the joint collection and analysis of network traffic. Sonata takes the advantage of two emerging technologies---streaming analytics platforms and programmable network devices---to facilitate joint collection and analysis. Sonata allows operators to more directly express network traffic analysis tasks in terms of a high-level language. The underlying runtime partitions each query into a portion that runs on the switch and another that runs on the streaming analytics platform iteratively refines the query to efficiently capture only the traffic that pertains to the operator's query, and exploits sketches to reduce state in switches in exchange for more approximate results. Through an evaluation of a prototype implementation, we demonstrate that Sonata can support a wide range of network telemetry tasks with less state in the network, and lower data rates to streaming analytics systems, than current approaches can achieve.

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arXiv2017

Counter-RAPTOR: Safeguarding Tor Against Active Routing Attacks

Tor is vulnerable to network-level adversaries who can observe both ends of the communication to deanonymize users. Recent work has shown that Tor is susceptible to the previously unknown active BGP routing attacks, called RAPTOR attacks, which expose Tor users to more network-level adversaries. In this paper, we aim to mitigate and detect such active routing attacks against Tor. First, we present a new measurement study on the resilience of the Tor network to active BGP prefix attacks. We show that ASes with high Tor bandwidth can be less resilient to attacks than other ASes. Second, we present a new Tor guard relay selection algorithm that incorporates resilience of relays into consideration to proactively mitigate such attacks. We show that the algorithm successfully improves the security for Tor clients by up to 36% on average (up to 166% for certain clients). Finally, we build a live BGP monitoring system that can detect routing anomalies on the Tor network in real time by performing an AS origin check and novel detection analytics. Our monitoring system successfully detects simulated attacks that are modeled after multiple known attack types as well as a real-world hijack attack (performed by us), while having low false positive rates.

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arXiv2016

The Effect of DNS on Tor's Anonymity

Previous attacks that link the sender and receiver of traffic in the Tor network ("correlation attacks") have generally relied on analyzing traffic from TCP connections. The TCP connections of a typical client application, however, are often accompanied by DNS requests and responses. This additional traffic presents more opportunities for correlation attacks. This paper quantifies how DNS traffic can make Tor users more vulnerable to correlation attacks. We investigate how incorporating DNS traffic can make existing correlation attacks more powerful and how DNS lookups can leak information to third parties about anonymous communication. We (i) develop a method to identify the DNS resolvers of Tor exit relays; (ii) develop a new set of correlation attacks (DefecTor attacks) that incorporate DNS traffic to improve precision; (iii) analyze the Internet-scale effects of these new attacks on Tor users; and (iv) develop improved methods to evaluate correlation attacks. First, we find that there exist adversaries who can mount DefecTor attacks: for example, Google's DNS resolver observes almost 40% of all DNS requests exiting the Tor network. We also find that DNS requests often traverse ASes that the corresponding TCP connections do not transit, enabling additional ASes to gain information about Tor users' traffic. We then show that an adversary who can mount a DefecTor attack can often determine the website that a Tor user is visiting with perfect precision, particularly for less popular websites where the set of DNS names associated with that website may be unique to the site. We also use the Tor Path Simulator (TorPS) in combination with traceroute data from vantage points co-located with Tor exit relays to estimate the power of AS-level adversaries who might mount DefecTor attacks in practice.

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arXiv2016

Revealing Utilization at Internet Interconnection Points

Recent Internet interconnection disputes have sparked an in- creased interest in developing methods for gathering and collecting data about utilization at interconnection points. One mechanism, developed by DeepField Networks, allows Internet service providers (ISPs) to gather and aggregate utilization information using network flow statistics, standardized in the Internet Engineering Task Force as IPFIX. This report (1) provides an overview of the method that DeepField Networks is using to measure the utilization of various interconnection links between content providers and ISPs or links over which traffic between content and ISPs flow; and (2) surveys the findings from five months of Internet utilization data provided by seven participating ISPs---Bright House Networks, Comcast, Cox, Mediacom, Midco, Suddenlink, and Time Warner Cable---whose access networks represent about 50% of all U.S. broadband subscribers. The dataset includes about 97% of the paid peering, settlement-free peering, and ISP-paid transit links of each of the participating ISPs. Initial analysis of the data---which comprises more than 1,000 link groups, representing the diverse and substitutable available routes---suggests that many interconnects have significant spare capacity, that this spare capacity exists both across ISPs in each region and in aggregate for any individual ISP, and that the aggregate utilization across interconnects interconnects is roughly 50% during peak periods.

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