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Nick Gabrieli

Publications and source records attributed to Nick Gabrieli.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

How Do AI Companies "Fine-Tune" Policy? Examining Regulatory Capture in AI Governance

Industry actors in the United States have gained extensive influence in conversations about the regulation of general-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Although industry participation is an important part of the policy process, it can also cause regulatory capture, whereby industry co-opts regulatory regimes to prioritize private over public welfare. Capture of AI policy by AI developers and deployers could hinder such regulatory goals as ensuring the safety, fairness, beneficence, transparency, or innovation of general-purpose AI systems. In this paper, we first introduce different models of regulatory capture from the social science literature. We then present results from interviews with 17 AI policy experts on what policy outcomes could compose regulatory capture in US AI policy, which AI industry actors are influencing the policy process, and whether and how AI industry actors attempt to achieve outcomes of regulatory capture. Experts were primarily concerned with capture leading to a lack of AI regulation, weak regulation, or regulation that over-emphasizes certain policy goals over others. Experts most commonly identified agenda-setting (15 of 17 interviews), advocacy (13), academic capture (10), information management (9), cultural capture through status (7), and media capture (7) as channels for industry influence. To mitigate these particular forms of industry influence, we recommend systemic changes in developing technical expertise in government and civil society, independent funding streams for the AI ecosystem, increased transparency and ethics requirements, greater civil society access to policy, and various procedural safeguards.

cs.CY

Safety Cases: How to Justify the Safety of Advanced AI Systems

As AI systems become more advanced, companies and regulators will make difficult decisions about whether it is safe to train and deploy them. To prepare for these decisions, we investigate how developers could make a 'safety case,' which is a structured rationale that AI systems are unlikely to cause a catastrophe. We propose a framework for organizing a safety case and discuss four categories of arguments to justify safety: total inability to cause a catastrophe, sufficiently strong control measures, trustworthiness despite capability to cause harm, and -- if AI systems become much more powerful -- deference to credible AI advisors. We evaluate concrete examples of arguments in each category and outline how arguments could be combined to justify that AI systems are safe to deploy.

cs.CY

Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Addition

We introduce Contrastive Activation Addition (CAA), an innovative method for steering language models by modifying their activations during forward passes. CAA computes "steering vectors" by averaging the difference in residual stream activations between pairs of positive and negative examples of a particular behavior, such as factual versus hallucinatory responses. During inference, these steering vectors are added at all token positions after the user's prompt with either a positive or negative coefficient, allowing precise control over the degree of the targeted behavior. We evaluate CAA's effectiveness on Llama 2 Chat using multiple-choice behavioral question datasets and open-ended generation tasks. We demonstrate that CAA significantly alters model behavior, is effective over and on top of traditional methods like finetuning and system prompt design, and minimally reduces capabilities. Moreover, we gain deeper insights into CAA's mechanisms by employing various activation space interpretation methods. CAA accurately steers model outputs and sheds light on how high-level concepts are represented in Large Language Models (LLMs).

cs.CL