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Nicolas Lanzetti

Publications and source records attributed to Nicolas Lanzetti.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Strategically Robust Aggregative Games

In many multiagent settings, such as electric vehicle charging and traffic routing, agents must make decisions in the face of uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, such as incomplete information, limited computation, or bounded rationality, ultimately impacting the aggregate behavior. To tackle this challenge, we follow recent work on strategically robust game theory and postulate that agents seek protection directly against deviations around the emergent behavior, as opposed to explicitly modeling all sources of uncertainty. Specifically, we propose that each agent protects itself against the worst-case aggregate behavior within an optimal-transport-based ambiguity set centered at the emergent aggregate population behavior. This leads to a novel equilibrium concept, called strategically robust Wardrop equilibrium, that enables one to interpolate between standard Wardrop equilibria (no robustness) and security strategies (maximum robustness). In the setting of convex aggregative games, we establish the existence of a pure strategically robust Wardrop equilibrium and provide tractable computational tools for computing it. Through an application in electric vehicle charging, we demonstrate that strategically robust Wardrop equilibria lead to better decisions, protecting agents against the uncertain aggregate behavior of the population. Remarkably, we also observe that strategic robustness can lead to lower equilibrium costs for all agents, uncovering a "coordination-via-robustification" effect.

cs.GT

Strategically Robust Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games

We study linear quadratic dynamic games where players are uncertain about each other's control policies or goals and consequently seek to be strategically robust. Building on recent work on strategically robust and risk-averse game theory, we first formalize the problem of strategically robust linear quadratic dynamic games. We show that these can be rewritten as simple transformations of linear quadratic games in which each player chooses a controller in a fictitious game in which they are faced with an adversary who is penalized for deviating from the other players' policies. This formulation naturally induces a novel notion of dynamic equilibrium, which we call a strategically robust dynamic equilibrium. We establish existence and uniqueness of such equilibria and furthermore show that the equilibrium policies are Markovian, linear, and can be efficiently computed via coupled backward Riccati equations. Through numerical simulations, including experiments in a network game, we illustrate the benefits of strategic robustness in designing robust and resilient decentralized control schemes. Our experiments also expose a "free-lunch" phenomenon in games in which robustness does not incur a corresponding loss in performance but can yield improvements in players' utilities and social welfare.

math.OC

Sparse optimal control in the Wasserstein space

We study sparse optimal control of a non-local continuity equation, where the goal is to steer a distribution via finitely many controllable agents or actuators. This model arises naturally in mean-field multi-agent systems and takes the form of a coupled PDE-ODE system where the PDE describes the evolution of the distribution and the controlled ODE captures the dynamics of the controllable agents. A natural objective is distribution steering via terminal costs based on optimal transport, such as the squared Wasserstein distance. These costs are problematic for finite-agent formulations due to non-smoothness at empirical measures and they fall outside common expected-value-type cost classes. We address these challenges by studying the resulting optimal control problem in the Wasserstein space. Under suitable assumptions on the system dynamics and Wasserstein differentiability of the terminal cost (with no smoothness requirement on the associated Wasserstein gradient), we prove first-order sensitivity of the control-to-state map, derive an adjoint system and an explicit formula for the gradient of the cost functional, and obtain Pontryagin-type necessary conditions. To illustrate the resulting adjoint-based method, we present numerical experiments on a representative distribution-splitting task.

math.OC

Training Generalizable Collaborative Agents via Strategic Risk Aversion

Many emerging agentic paradigms require agents to collaborate with one another (or people) to achieve shared goals. Unfortunately, existing approaches to learning policies for such collaborative problems produce brittle solutions that fail when paired with new partners. We attribute these failures to a combination of free-riding during training and a lack of strategic robustness. To address these problems, we study the concept of strategic risk aversion and interpret it as a principled inductive bias for generalizable cooperation with unseen partners. While strategically risk-averse players are robust to deviations in their partner's behavior by design, we show that, in collaborative games, they also (1) can have better equilibrium outcomes than those at classical game-theoretic concepts like Nash, and (2) exhibit less or no free-riding. Inspired by these insights, we develop a multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm that integrates strategic risk aversion into standard policy optimization methods. Our empirical results across collaborative benchmarks (including an LLM collaboration task) validate our theory and demonstrate that our approach consistently achieves reliable collaboration with heterogeneous and previously unseen partners across collaborative tasks.

cs.LG

Hedging against Black Swans in Day-Ahead Energy Markets

Renewable generators must commit to day-ahead market bids despite uncertainty in both production and real-time prices. While forecasts provide valuable guidance, rare and unpredictable extreme events (so-called black swans) can cause substantial financial losses. This paper models the nomination problem as an instance of optimal transport-based distributionally robust optimization (OT-DRO), a principled framework that balances risk and performance by accounting not only for the severity of deviations but also for their likelihood. The resulting formulation yields a tractable, data-driven strategy that remains competitive under normal conditions while providing effective protection against extreme price spikes. Using four years of Finnish wind farm and market data, we demonstrate that OT-DRO consistently outperforms forecast-based nominations and significantly mitigates losses during black swan events.

math.OC

Strategically Robust Game Theory via Optimal Transport

In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation, bounded rationality. While it may be possible to guide the agents' decisions by modeling each source, their joint presence makes this task particularly daunting. Toward this goal, it is natural for agents to seek protection against deviations around the emergent behavior itself, which is ultimately impacted by all the above sources of uncertainty. To do so, we propose that each agent takes decisions in face of the worst-case behavior contained in an ambiguity set of tunable size, centered at the emergent behavior so implicitly defined. This gives rise to a novel equilibrium notion, which we call strategically robust equilibrium. Building on its definition, we show that, when judiciously operationalized via optimal transport, strategically robust equilibria (i) are guaranteed to exist under the same assumptions required for Nash equilibria; (ii) interpolate between Nash and security strategies; (iii) come at no additional computational cost compared to Nash equilibria. Through a variety of experiments, including bi-matrix games, congestion games, and Cournot competition, we show that strategic robustness protects against uncertainty in the opponents' behavior and, surprisingly, often results in higher equilibrium payoffs - an effect we refer to as coordination via robustification.

cs.GT

Gradient-flow SDEs have unique transient population dynamics

Identifying the drift and diffusion of an SDE from its population dynamics is a notoriously challenging task. Researchers in machine learning and single-cell biology have only been able to prove a partial identifiability result: for potential-driven SDEs, the gradient-flow drift can be identified from temporal marginals if the Brownian diffusivity is already known. Existing methods therefore assume that the diffusivity is known a priori, despite it being unknown in practice. We dispel the need for this assumption by providing a complete characterization of identifiability: the gradient-flow drift and Brownian diffusivity are jointly identifiable from temporal marginals if and only if the process is observed outside of equilibrium. Given this fundamental result, we propose nn-APPEX, the first Schrodinger Bridge-based inference method that can simultaneously learn the drift and diffusion of a gradient-flow SDE solely from observed marginals. Extensive experiments show that nn-APPEX's ability to adjust its diffusion estimate enables accurate inference, while previous Schrodinger Bridge methods obtain biased drift estimates due to their assumed, and likely incorrect, diffusion.

math.PR

Distributionally Robust Linear Quadratic Gaussian Regulator with Stationary Distributions

We study the Linear Quadratic Gaussian regulation problem in the face of worst-case noise distributions when these are mutually independent, zero-mean, stationary, and within a radius (as measured by the Wasserstein distance) of some reference Gaussian noise distributions. Compared with nonstationary ambiguity models, our stationary modeling choice reduces conservatism when the disturbances are stationary, as is often the case in practice. We first show optimality of linear output-feedback policies via the existence of a Nash equilibrium in an equivalent zero-sum game between a control engineer and a fictitious adversary that compete to minimize and maximize the control cost. Additionally, we show that Nash equilibria may fail to exist when the distributions are not restricted to have zero mean. We then propose an iterated best-response algorithm to compute Nash equilibria and thereby the optimal feedback policies. Our computational framework unifies two seemingly different viewpoints: game-theoretic iterated best response and Frank-Wolfe approaches. Finally, we illustrate the robustness of the proposed controller to unknown noise distributions on an inverted pendulum with physical parameters, a canonical control benchmark.

math.OC

Fairness in Social Influence Maximization via Optimal Transport

We study fairness in social influence maximization, whereby one seeks to select seeds that spread a given information throughout a network, ensuring balanced outreach among different communities (e.g. demographic groups). In the literature, fairness is often quantified in terms of the expected outreach within individual communities. In this paper, we demonstrate that such fairness metrics can be misleading since they overlook the stochastic nature of information diffusion processes. When information diffusion occurs in a probabilistic manner, multiple outreach scenarios can occur. As such, outcomes such as ``In 50% of the cases, no one in group 1 gets the information, while everyone in group 2 does, and in the other 50%, it is the opposite'', which always results in largely unfair outcomes, are classified as fair by a variety of fairness metrics in the literature. We tackle this problem by designing a new fairness metric, mutual fairness, that captures variability in outreach through optimal transport theory. We propose a new seed-selection algorithm that optimizes both outreach and mutual fairness, and we show its efficacy on several real datasets. We find that our algorithm increases fairness with only a minor decrease (and at times, even an increase) in efficiency.

cs.SI

Learning diffusion at lightspeed

Diffusion regulates numerous natural processes and the dynamics of many successful generative models. Existing models to learn the diffusion terms from observational data rely on complex bilevel optimization problems and model only the drift of the system. We propose a new simple model, JKOnet*, which bypasses the complexity of existing architectures while presenting significantly enhanced representational capabilities: JKOnet* recovers the potential, interaction, and internal energy components of the underlying diffusion process. JKOnet* minimizes a simple quadratic loss and outperforms other baselines in terms of sample efficiency, computational complexity, and accuracy. Additionally, JKOnet* provides a closed-form optimal solution for linearly parametrized functionals, and, when applied to predict the evolution of cellular processes from real-world data, it achieves state-of-the-art accuracy at a fraction of the computational cost of all existing methods. Our methodology is based on the interpretation of diffusion processes as energy-minimizing trajectories in the probability space via the so-called JKO scheme, which we study via its first-order optimality conditions.

cs.LG

Variational Analysis in the Wasserstein Space

We study optimization problems whereby the optimization variable is a probability measure. Since the space of probability measures is not a vector space, many classical methods for optimization (e.g., gradients) do not directly apply. Thus, one typically resorts to the abstract machinery of infinite-dimensional analysis or other ad-hoc methodologies, not tailored to the space of probability measures, which however involve projections or rely on convexity-type assumptions. We believe instead that these problems call for a comprehensive methodological framework for calculus in the space of probability measures. In this work, we combine ideas from optimal transport, variational analysis, and Wasserstein gradient flows to equip the Wasserstein space (i.e., the space of probability measures endowed with the Wasserstein distance) with a variational structure, both by combining and extending existing results and introducing novel tools. Our theoretical analysis culminates in general necessary optimality conditions. These conditions (i) resemble the optimality conditions in Euclidean spaces, such as the KKT conditions, (ii) are intuitive, informative, and easy to study, and (iii) yield closed-form solutions or can be used to design computationally attractive algorithms. We accompany our theoretical results with numerous examples and present applications to machine learning, drug discovery, and distributionally robust optimization.

math.OC

The Impact of Recommendation Systems on Opinion Dynamics: Microscopic versus Macroscopic Effects

Recommendation systems are widely used in web services, such as social networks and e-commerce platforms, to serve personalized content to the users and, thus, enhance their experience. While personalization assists users in navigating through the available options, there have been growing concerns regarding its repercussions on the users and their opinions. Examples of negative impacts include the emergence of filter bubbles and the amplification of users' confirmation bias, which can cause opinion polarization and radicalization. In this paper, we study the impact of recommendation systems on users, both from a microscopic (i.e., at the level of individual users) and a macroscopic (i.e., at the level of a homogenous population) perspective. Specifically, we build on recent work on the interactions between opinion dynamics and recommendation systems to propose a model for this closed loop, which we then study both analytically and numerically. Among others, our analysis reveals that shifts in the opinions of individual users do not always align with shifts in the opinion distribution of the population. In particular, even in settings where the opinion distribution appears unaltered (e.g., measured via surveys across the population), the opinion of individual users might be significantly distorted by the recommendation system.

cs.SI

Distributional Uncertainty Propagation via Optimal Transport

This paper addresses the limitations of standard uncertainty models, e.g., robust (norm-bounded) and stochastic (one fixed distribution, e.g., Gaussian), and proposes to model uncertainty via Optimal Transport (OT) ambiguity sets. These constitute a very rich uncertainty model, which enjoys many desirable geometrical, statistical, and computational properties, and which: (1) naturally generalizes both robust and stochastic models, and (2) captures many additional real-world uncertainty phenomena (e.g., black swan events). Our contributions show that OT ambiguity sets are also analytically tractable: they propagate easily and intuitively through linear and nonlinear (possibly corrupted by noise) transformations, and the result of the propagation is again an OT ambiguity set or can be tightly upper bounded by an OT ambiguity set. In the context of dynamical systems, our results allow us to consider multiple sources of uncertainty (e.g., initial condition, additive noise, multiplicative noise) and to capture in closed-form, via an OT ambiguity set, the resulting uncertainty in the state at any future time. Our results are actionable, interpretable, and readily employable in a great variety of computationally tractable control and estimation formulations. To highlight this, we study three applications in trajectory planning, consensus algorithms, and least squares estimation. We conclude the paper with a list of exciting open problems enabled by our results.

math.OC

Strategic Interactions in Multi-modal Mobility Systems: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

The evolution of existing transportation systems,mainly driven by urbanization and increased availability of mobility options, such as private, profit-maximizing ride-hailing companies, calls for tools to reason about their design and regulation. To study this complex socio-technical problem, one needs to account for the strategic interactions of the heterogeneous stakeholders involved in the mobility ecosystem and analyze how they influence the system. In this paper, we focus on the interactions between citizens who compete for the limited resources of a mobility system to complete their desired trip. Specifically, we present a game-theoretic framework for multi-modal mobility systems, where citizens, characterized by heterogeneous preferences, have access to various mobility options and seek individually-optimal decisions. We study the arising game and prove the existence of an equilibrium, which can be efficiently computed via a convex optimization problem. Through both an analytical and a numerical case study for the classic scenario of Sioux Falls, USA, we illustrate the capabilities of our model and perform sensitivity analyses. Importantly, we show how to embed our framework into a "larger" game among stakeholders of the mobility ecosystem (e.g., municipality, Mobility Service Providers, and citizens), effectively giving rise to tools to inform strategic interventions and policy-making in the mobility ecosystem.

cs.MA

Stochastic Wasserstein Gradient Flows using Streaming Data with an Application in Predictive Maintenance

We study estimation problems in safety-critical applications with streaming data. Since estimation problems can be posed as optimization problems in the probability space, we devise a stochastic projected Wasserstein gradient flow that keeps track of the belief of the estimated quantity and can consume samples from online data. We show the convergence properties of our algorithm. Our analysis combines recent advances in the Wasserstein space and its differential structure with more classical stochastic gradient descent. We apply our methodology for predictive maintenance of safety-critical processes: Our approach is shown to lead to superior performance when compared to classical least squares, enabling, among others, improved robustness for decision-making.

eess.SY

Capture, Propagate, and Control Distributional Uncertainty

We study stochastic dynamical systems in settings where only partial statistical information about the noise is available, e.g., in the form of a limited number of noise realizations. Such systems are particularly challenging to analyze and control, primarily due to an absence of a distributional uncertainty model which: (1) is expressive enough to capture practically relevant scenarios; (2) can be easily propagated through system maps; (3) is invariant under propagation; and (4) allows for computationally tractable control actions. In this paper, we propose to model distributional uncertainty via Optimal Transport ambiguity sets and show that such modeling choice satisfies all of the above requirements. We then specialize our results to stochastic LTI systems, and start by showing that the distributional uncertainty can be efficiently captured, with high probability, within an Optimal Transport ambiguity set on the space of noise trajectories. Then, we show that such ambiguity sets propagate exactly through the system dynamics, giving rise to stochastic tubes that contain, with high probability, all trajectories of the stochastic system. Finally, we show that the control task is very interpretable, unveiling an interesting decomposition between the roles of the feedforward and the feedback control terms. Our results are actionable and successfully applied in stochastic reachability analysis and in trajectory planning under distributional uncertainty.

math.OC

Dynamic Programming in Probability Spaces via Optimal Transport

We study discrete-time finite-horizon optimal control problems in probability spaces, whereby the state of the system is a probability measure. We show that, in many instances, the solution of dynamic programming in probability spaces results from two ingredients: (i) the solution of dynamic programming in the "ground space" (i.e., the space on which the probability measures live) and (ii) the solution of an optimal transport problem. From a multi-agent control perspective, a separation principle holds: The "low-level control of the agents of the fleet" (how does one reach the destination?) and "fleet-level control" (who goes where?) are decoupled.

math.OC

Co-Design to Enable User-Friendly Tools to Assess the Impact of Future Mobility Solutions

The design of future mobility solutions and the design of the mobility systems they enable are closely coupled. Indeed, knowledge about the intended service of novel mobility solutions would impact their design and deployment process, whilst insights about their technological development could significantly affect transportation management policies. This requires tools to study such a coupling and co-design mobility systems in terms of different objectives. We present a framework to address such co-design problems, leveraging a mathematical theory of co-design to frame and solve the problem of designing and deploying an intermodal mobility system, whereby autonomous vehicles service travel demands jointly with micromobility solutions and public transit, in terms of fleets sizing, vehicle characteristics, and public transit service frequency. Our framework is modular and compositional, allowing one to describe the design as the interconnection of simple components and to tackle it from a systemic perspective. Moreover, it requires general monotonicity assumptions and naturally handles multiple objectives, delivering rational, actionable solutions for policy makers. We showcase our methodology in a case study of Washington D.C., USA. Our work suggests the possibility to create user-friendly optimization tools to systematically assess costs and benefits of interventions, and to inform policy-making in the future.

eess.SY