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Nicolas Miguel

Publications and source records attributed to Nicolas Miguel.

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A Control-Barrier-Function-Based Algorithm for Policy Adaptation in Reinforcement Learning

This paper considers the problem of adapting a predesigned policy, represented by a parameterized function class, from a solution that minimizes a given original cost function to a trade-off solution between minimizing the original objective and an additional cost function. The problem is formulated as a constrained optimization problem, where deviations from the optimal value of the original cost are explicitly constrained. To solve it, we develop a closed-loop system that governs the evolution of the policy parameters, with a closed-loop controller designed to adjust the additional cost gradient to ensure the satisfaction of the constraint. The resulting closed-loop system, termed control-barrier-function-based policy adaptation, exploits the set-invariance property of control barrier functions to guarantee constraint satisfaction. The effectiveness of the proposed method is demonstrated through numerical experiments on the Cartpole and Lunar Lander benchmarks from OpenAI Gym, as well as a quadruped robot, thereby illustrating both its practicality and potential for real-world policy adaptation.

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Adaptive Constraint Satisfaction for Markov Decision Process Congestion Games: Application to Transportation Networks

Under the Markov decision process (MDP) congestion game framework, we study the problem of enforcing population distribution constraints on a population of players with stochastic dynamics and coupled congestion costs. Existing research demonstrates that the constraints on the players' population distribution can be satisfied by enforcing tolls. However, computing the minimum toll value for constraint satisfaction requires accurate modeling of the player's congestion costs. Motivated by settings where an accurate congestion cost model is unavailable (e.g. transportation networks), we consider an MDP congestion game with unknown congestion costs. We assume that a constraint-enforcing authority can repeatedly enforce tolls on a population of players who converges to an $ε$-optimal population distribution for any given toll. We then construct a myopic update algorithm to compute the minimum toll value while ensuring that the constraints are satisfied on average. We analyze how the players' sub-optimal responses to tolls impact the rates of convergence towards the minimum toll value and constraint satisfaction. Finally, we construct a congestion game model for Uber drivers in Manhattan, New York City (NYC) using data from the Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) to illustrate how to efficiently reduce congestion while minimizing the impact on driver earnings.

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