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Nicolas Troquard

Publications and source records attributed to Nicolas Troquard.

21 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

DL-PA and DCL-PC: model checking and satisfiability problem are indeed in PSPACE

We prove that the model checking and the satisfiability problem of both Dynamic Logic of Propositional Assignments DL-PA and Coalition Logic of Propositional Control and Delegation DCL-PC are in PSPACE. We explain why the proof of EXPTIME-hardness of the model checking problem of DL-PA presented in (Balbiani, Herzig, Troquard, 2013) is false. We also explain why the proof of membership in PSPACE of the model checking problem of DCL-PC given in (van der Hoek, Walther, Wooldridge, 2010) is wrong.

cs.LO↗

Reasoning about Social Choice Functions

We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., that every social choice function can be characterised as a formula of the logic. We prove that the logic is decidable, and give a complete axiomatization. To demonstrate the value of the logic, we show in particular how it can be applied to the problem of determining whether a social choice function is strategy-proof.

cs.MA↗

Alternative axiomatics and complexity of deliberative STIT theories

We propose two alternatives to Xu's axiomatization of the Chellas STIT. The first one also provides an alternative axiomatization of the deliberative STIT. The second one starts from the idea that the historic necessity operator can be defined as an abbreviation of operators of agency, and can thus be eliminated from the logic of the Chellas STIT. The second axiomatization also allows us to establish that the problem of deciding the satisfiability of a STIT formula without temporal operators is NP-complete in the single-agent case, and is NEXPTIME-complete in the multiagent case, both for the deliberative and the Chellas' STIT.

cs.LO↗