arXiv subjects

Nihan Tanısalı

Publications and source records attributed to Nihan Tanısalı.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

High dimensional Riemann--Roch spaces in linear spaces with small squares

Let $F$ be a function field over an algebraically closed field $K$ and $S$ a finite dimensional $K$-subspace of $F$. The square of $S$ is spanned by all products of pairs of elements in $S$. We conjecture that if $\dim S^2 \leq 3 \dim S - 4$, then $S^2$ must contain a Riemann--Roch space of dimension at least $2 \dim S - 1 + g$, where $g$ is the genus of $F$. This generalizes a theorem of Freiman from additive combinatorics, stating that small sumsets must contain long arithmetic progressions. We prove our conjecture in the case that $S$ is contained in a Riemann--Roch space of dimension at most $3/2\dim S + 1$. For the proof we study the annihilator of $S$ and introduce the notion of weight for linear forms.

math.NT↗

arXiv2026

Box Progressions, Abelian Power-Free Morphisms and A Sieve Technique for the Template Method

Given balls and boxes both enumerated by the positive integers, we consider a sequential allocation of the balls into the boxes. We fix $\ell \ge 2$. Proceeding in increasing order of box labels, assign to each box the next $r$ smallest balls for some $ 1\leq r\leq\ell$. Given an integer $k\ge 3$, is there a natural number $N$ such that in any placement of $N$ balls into boxes, there exist $k$ balls whose labels and box labels each form a $k$-term arithmetic progression? We address this question by identifying abelian power-free fixed points of morphisms over a binary alphabet. We present sufficient conditions under which a morphism is abelian $k$-power-free. Our conditions extend Dekking's result over a binary alphabet and offer a weaker, yet more effective alternative to Carpi's. Combining Dekking's result with the template method of Currie and Rampersad, we develop a sieve technique that significantly reduces the number of parents that must be examined to establish abelian power-freeness. We then identify a binary morphism that is abelian 16-power free (but not abelian $15$-power free) with an abelian 14-power free fixed point, demonstrating the strength of our technique in verifying abelian power-freeness. Furthermore, we give a binary morphism which is not abelian power-free, yet has an abelian $5$-power free fixed point. These results offer novel examples of morphisms whose fixed points exhibit stronger abelian power-freeness than the corresponding morphisms.

math.CO↗

arXiv2025

On the structure of the Schur squares of Twisted Generalized Reed-Solomon codes and application to cryptanalysis

Twisted generalized Reed-Solomon (TGRS) codes constitute an interesting family of evaluation codes, containing a large class of maximum distance separable codes non-equivalent to generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) ones. Moreover, the Schur squares of TGRS codes may be much larger than those of GRS codes with same dimension. Exploiting these structural differences, in 2018, Beelen, Bossert, Puchinger and Rosenkilde proposed a subfamily of Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) Twisted Reed-Solomon (TRS) codes over $\mathbb{F}_q$ with $\ell$ twists $q \approx n^{2^{\ell}}$ for McEliece encryption, claiming their resistance to both Sidelnikov Shestakov attack and Schur products--based attacks. In short, they claimed these codes to resist to classical key recovery attacks on McEliece encryption scheme instantiated with Reed-Solomon (RS) or GRS codes. In 2020, Lavauzelle and Renner presented an original attack on this system based on the computation of the subfield subcode of the public TRS code. In this paper, we show that the original claim on the resistance of TRS and TGRS codes to Schur products based--attacks is wrong. We identify a broad class of codes including TRS and TGRS ones that is distinguishable from random by computing the Schur square of some shortening of the code. Then, we focus on the case of single twist (i.e., $\ell = 1$), which is the most efficient one in terms of decryption complexity, to derive an attack. The technique is similar to the distinguisher-based attacks of RS code-based systems given by Couvreur, Gaborit, Gauthier-Umaña, Otmani, Tillich in 2014.

cs.IT↗