arXiv subjects

Nikhil R. Devanur

Publications and source records attributed to Nikhil R. Devanur.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2024

Ranking with Multiple Objectives

In search and advertisement ranking, it is often required to simultaneously maximize multiple objectives. For example, the objectives can correspond to multiple intents of a search query, or in the context of advertising, they can be relevance and revenue. It is important to efficiently find rankings which strike a good balance between such objectives. Motivated by such applications, we formulate a general class of problems where - each result gets a different score corresponding to each objective, - the results of a ranking are aggregated by taking, for each objective, a weighted sum of the scores in the order of the ranking, and - an arbitrary concave function of the aggregates is maximized. Combining the aggregates using a concave function will naturally lead to more balanced outcomes. We give an approximation algorithm in a bicriteria/resource augmentation setting: the algorithm with a slight advantage does as well as the optimum. In particular, if the aggregation step is just the sum of the top k results, then the algorithm outputs k + 1 results which do as well the as the optimal top k results. We show how this approach helps with balancing different objectives via simulations on synthetic data as well as on real data from LinkedIn.

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arXiv2023

Proportional Dynamics in Exchange Economies

We study the Proportional Response dynamic in exchange economies, where each player starts with some amount of money and a good. Every day, the players bring one unit of their good and submit bids on goods they like, each good gets allocated in proportion to the bid amounts, and each seller collects the bids received. Then every player updates the bids proportionally to the contribution of each good in their utility. This dynamic models a process of learning how to bid and has been studied in a series of papers on Fisher and production markets, but not in exchange economies. Our main results are as follows: - For linear utilities, the dynamic converges to market equilibrium utilities and allocations, while the bids and prices may cycle. We give a combinatorial characterization of limit cycles for prices and bids. - We introduce a lazy version of the dynamic, where players may save money for later, and show this converges in everything: utilities, allocations, and prices. - For CES utilities in the substitute range $[0,1)$, the dynamic converges for all parameters. This answers an open question about exchange economies with linear utilities, where tatonnement does not converge to market equilibria, and no natural process leading to equilibria was known. We also note that proportional response is a process where the players exchange goods throughout time (in out-of-equilibrium states), while tatonnement only explains how exchange happens in the limit.

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arXiv2023

The Sample Complexity of Auctions with Side Information

Traditionally, the Bayesian optimal auction design problem has been considered either when the bidder values are i.i.d., or when each bidder is individually identifiable via her value distribution. The latter is a reasonable approach when the bidders can be classified into a few categories, but there are many instances where the classification of bidders is a continuum. For example, the classification of the bidders may be based on their annual income, their propensity to buy an item based on past behavior, or in the case of ad auctions, the click through rate of their ads. We introduce an alternate model that captures this aspect, where bidders are \emph{a priori} identical, but can be distinguished based (only) on some side information the auctioneer obtains at the time of the auction. We extend the sample complexity approach of Dhangwatnotai, Roughgarden, and Yan (2014) and Cole and Roughgarden (2014) to this model and obtain almost matching upper and lower bounds. As an aside, we obtain a revenue monotonicity lemma which may be of independent interest. We also show how to use Empirical Risk Minimization techniques to improve the sample complexity bound of Cole and Roughgarden (2014) for the non-identical but independent value distribution case.

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arXiv2021

Designing a Combinatorial Financial Options Market

Financial options are contracts that specify the right to buy or sell an underlying asset at a strike price by an expiration date. Standard exchanges offer options of predetermined strike values and trade options of different strikes independently, even for those written on the same underlying asset. Such independent market design can introduce arbitrage opportunities and lead to the thin market problem. The paper first proposes a mechanism that consolidates and matches orders on standard options related to the same underlying asset, while providing agents the flexibility to specify any custom strike value. The mechanism generalizes the classic double auction, runs in time polynomial to the number of orders, and poses no risk to the exchange, regardless of the value of the underlying asset at expiration. Empirical analysis on real-market options data shows that the mechanism can find new matches for options of different strike prices and reduce bid-ask spreads. Extending standard options written on a single asset, we propose and define a new derivative instrument -- combinatorial financial options that offer contract holders the right to buy or sell any linear combination of multiple underlying assets. We generalize our single-asset mechanism to match options written on different combinations of assets, and prove that optimal clearing of combinatorial financial options is coNP-hard. To facilitate market operations, we propose an algorithm that finds the exact optimal match through iterative constraint generation, and evaluate its performance on synthetically generated combinatorial options markets of different scales. As option prices reveal the market's collective belief of an underlying asset's future value, a combinatorial options market enables the expression of aggregate belief about future correlations among assets.

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arXiv2020

Efficient Algorithms for Device Placement of DNN Graph Operators

Modern machine learning workloads use large models, with complex structures, that are very expensive to execute. The devices that execute complex models are becoming increasingly heterogeneous as we see a flourishing of domain-specific accelerators being offered as hardware accelerators in addition to CPUs. These trends necessitate distributing the workload across multiple devices. Recent work has shown that significant gains can be obtained with model parallelism, i.e, partitioning a neural network's computational graph onto multiple devices. In particular, this form of parallelism assumes a pipeline of devices, which is fed a stream of samples and yields high throughput for training and inference of DNNs. However, for such settings (large models and multiple heterogeneous devices), we require automated algorithms and toolchains that can partition the ML workload across devices. In this paper, we identify and isolate the structured optimization problem at the core of device placement of DNN operators, for both inference and training, especially in modern pipelined settings. We then provide algorithms that solve this problem to optimality. We demonstrate the applicability and efficiency of our approaches using several contemporary DNN computation graphs.

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arXiv2019

Algorithmic Price Discrimination

We consider a generalization of the third degree price discrimination problem studied in Bergemann et al. (2015), where an intermediary between the buyer and the seller can design market segments to maximize any linear combination of consumer surplus and seller revenue. Unlike in Bergemann et al. (2015), we assume that the intermediary only has partial information about the buyer's value. We consider three different models of information, with increasing order of difficulty. In the first model, we assume that the intermediary's information allows him to construct a probability distribution of the buyer's value. Next we consider the sample complexity model, where we assume that the intermediary only sees samples from this distribution. Finally, we consider a bandit online learning model, where the intermediary can only observe past purchasing decisions of the buyer, rather than her exact value. For each of these models, we present algorithms to compute optimal or near optimal market segmentation.

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arXiv2019

Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities

We study a new model of complementary valuations, which we call "proportional complementarities." In contrast to common models, such as hypergraphic valuations, in our model, we do not assume that the extra value derived from owning a set of items is independent of the buyer's base valuations for the items. Instead, we model the complementarities as proportional to the buyer's base valuations, and these proportionalities are known market parameters. Our goal is to design a simple pricing scheme that, for a single buyer with proportional complementarities, yields approximately optimal revenue. We define a new class of mechanisms where some number of items are given away for free, and the remaining items are sold separately at inflated prices. We find that the better of such a mechanism and selling the grand bundle earns a 12-approximation to the optimal revenue for pairwise proportional complementarities. This confirms the intuition that items should not be sold completely separately in the presence of complementarities. In the more general case, a buyer has a maximum of proportional positive hypergraphic valuations, where a hyperedge in a given hypergraph describes the boost to the buyer's value for item $i$ given by owning any set of items $T$ in addition. The maximum-out-degree of such a hypergraph is $d$, and $k$ is the positive rank of the hypergraph. For valuations given by these parameters, our simple pricing scheme is an $O(\min\{d,k\})$-approximation.

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arXiv2019

Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Repeated Sales

A special case of Myerson's classic result describes the revenue-optimal equilibrium when a seller offers a single item to a buyer. We study a repeated sales extension of this model: a seller offers to sell a single fresh copy of an item to the same buyer every day via a posted price. The buyer's private value for the item is drawn initially from a publicly known distribution $F$ and remains the same throughout. A key aspect of this game is that the seller might try to learn the buyer's private value to extract more revenue, while the buyer is motivated to hide it. We study the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) in this setting with varying levels of commitment power to the seller. We find that the seller having the commitment power to not raise prices subsequent to a purchase significantly improves revenue in a PBE.

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arXiv2019

Near Optimal Online Algorithms and Fast Approximation Algorithms for Resource Allocation Problems

We present prior robust algorithms for a large class of resource allocation problems where requests arrive one-by-one (online), drawn independently from an unknown distribution at every step. We design a single algorithm that, for every possible underlying distribution, obtains a $1-ε$ fraction of the profit obtained by an algorithm that knows the entire request sequence ahead of time. The factor $ε$ approaches $0$ when no single request consumes/contributes a significant fraction of the global consumption/contribution by all requests together. We show that the tradeoff we obtain here that determines how fast $ε$ approaches $0$, is near optimal: we give a nearly matching lower bound showing that the tradeoff cannot be improved much beyond what we obtain. Going beyond the model of a static underlying distribution, we introduce the adversarial stochastic input model, where an adversary, possibly in an adaptive manner, controls the distributions from which the requests are drawn at each step. Placing no restriction on the adversary, we design an algorithm that obtains a $1-ε$ fraction of the optimal profit obtainable w.r.t. the worst distribution in the adversarial sequence. In the offline setting we give a fast algorithm to solve very large LPs with both packing and covering constraints. We give algorithms to approximately solve (within a factor of $1+ε$) the mixed packing-covering problem with $O(\frac{γm \log (n/δ)}{ε^2})$ oracle calls where the constraint matrix of this LP has dimension $n\times m$, the success probability of the algorithm is $1-δ$, and $γ$ quantifies how significant a single request is when compared to the sum total of all requests. We discuss implications of our results to several special cases including online combinatorial auctions, network routing and the adwords problem.

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arXiv2018

A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design

We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design, including the black-box reductions of Cai et al. [CDW13b], simple auctions for additive buyers [HN12], and posted-price mechanisms for unit-demand bidders [CHK07]. Additionally, we show that viewing these three previously disjoint lines of work through the same lens leads to new developments as well. First, we provide a duality framework for Bayesian mechanism design, which naturally accommodates multiple agents and arbitrary objectives/feasibility constraints. Using this, we prove that either a posted-price mechanism or the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction with per-bidder entry fees achieves a constant-factor of the optimal revenue achievable by a Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanism whenever buyers are unit-demand or additive, unifying previous breakthroughs of Chawla et al. [CHMS10] and Yao [Yao15], and improving both approximation ratios (from 30 to 24 and 69 to 8, respectively). Finally, we show that this view also leads to improved structural characterizations in the Cai et al. framework.

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arXiv2018

Multi-scale Online Learning and its Applications to Online Auctions

We consider revenue maximization in online auction/pricing problems. A seller sells an identical item in each period to a new buyer, or a new set of buyers. For the online posted pricing problem, we show regret bounds that scale with the best fixed price, rather than the range of the values. We also show regret bounds that are almost scale free, and match the offline sample complexity, when comparing to a benchmark that requires a lower bound on the market share. These results are obtained by generalizing the classical learning from experts and multi-armed bandit problems to their multi-scale versions. In this version, the reward of each action is in a different range, and the regret w.r.t. a given action scales with its own range, rather than the maximum range.

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arXiv2017

Truthful Multi-Parameter Auctions with Online Supply: an Impossible Combination

We study a basic auction design problem with online supply. There are two unit-demand bidders and two types of items. The first item type will arrive first for sure, and the second item type may or may not arrive. The auctioneer has to decide the allocation of an item immediately after each item arrives, but is allowed to compute payments after knowing how many items arrived. For this problem we show that there is no deterministic truthful and individually rational mechanism that, even with unbounded computational resources, gets any finite approximation factor to the optimal social welfare.

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arXiv2017

Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands

In the multi-unit pricing problem, multiple units of a single item are for sale. A buyer's valuation for $n$ units of the item is $v \min \{ n, d\} $, where the per unit valuation $v$ and the capacity $d$ are private information of the buyer. We consider this problem in the Bayesian setting, where the pair $(v,d)$ is drawn jointly from a given probability distribution. In the \emph{unlimited supply} setting, the optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanism is a pricing problem, i.e., it is a menu of lotteries. In this paper we show that under a natural regularity condition on the probability distributions, which we call \emph{decreasing marginal revenue}, the optimal pricing is in fact \emph{deterministic}. It is a price curve, offering $i$ units of the item for a price of $p_i$, for every integer $i$. Further, we show that the revenue as a function of the prices $p_i$ is a \emph{concave} function, which implies that the optimum price curve can be found in polynomial time. This gives a rare example of a natural multi-parameter setting where we can show such a clean characterization of the optimal mechanism. We also give a more detailed characterization of the optimal prices for the case where there are only two possible demands.

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arXiv2017

Stability of Service under Time-of-Use Pricing

We consider "time-of-use" pricing as a technique for matching supply and demand of temporal resources with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Relevant examples include energy, computing resources on a cloud computing platform, and charging stations for electric vehicles, among many others. A client/job in this setting has a window of time during which he needs service, and a particular value for obtaining it. We assume a stochastic model for demand, where each job materializes with some probability via an independent Bernoulli trial. Given a per-time-unit pricing of resources, any realized job will first try to get served by the cheapest available resource in its window and, failing that, will try to find service at the next cheapest available resource, and so on. Thus, the natural stochastic fluctuations in demand have the potential to lead to cascading overload events. Our main result shows that setting prices so as to optimally handle the {\em expected} demand works well: with high probability, when the actual demand is instantiated, the system is stable and the expected value of the jobs served is very close to that of the optimal offline algorithm.

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arXiv2016

Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare

We study Fisher markets and the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare (NSW), and show several closely related new results. In particular, we obtain: -- A new integer program for the NSW maximization problem whose fractional relaxation has a bounded integrality gap. In contrast, the natural integer program has an unbounded integrality gap. -- An improved, and tight, factor 2 analysis of the algorithm of [7]; in turn showing that the integrality gap of the above relaxation is at most 2. The approximation factor shown by [7] was $2e^{1/e} \approx 2.89$. -- A lower bound of $e^{1/e}\approx 1.44$ on the integrality gap of this relaxation. -- New convex programs for natural generalizations of linear Fisher markets and proofs that these markets admit rational equilibria. These results were obtained by establishing connections between previously known disparate results, and they help uncover their mathematical underpinnings. We show a formal connection between the convex programs of Eisenberg and Gale and that of Shmyrev, namely that their duals are equivalent up to a change of variables. Both programs capture equilibria of linear Fisher markets. By adding suitable constraints to Shmyrev's program, we obtain a convex program that captures equilibria of the spending-restricted market model defined by [7] in the context of the NSW maximization problem. Further, adding certain integral constraints to this program we get the integer program for the NSW mentioned above. The basic tool we use is convex programming duality. In the special case of convex programs with linear constraints (but convex objectives), we show a particularly simple way of obtaining dual programs, putting it almost at par with linear program duality. This simple way of finding duals has been used subsequently for many other applications.

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arXiv2016

An efficient algorithm for contextual bandits with knapsacks, and an extension to concave objectives

We consider a contextual version of multi-armed bandit problem with global knapsack constraints. In each round, the outcome of pulling an arm is a scalar reward and a resource consumption vector, both dependent on the context, and the global knapsack constraints require the total consumption for each resource to be below some pre-fixed budget. The learning agent competes with an arbitrary set of context-dependent policies. This problem was introduced by Badanidiyuru et al. (2014), who gave a computationally inefficient algorithm with near-optimal regret bounds for it. We give a computationally efficient algorithm for this problem with slightly better regret bounds, by generalizing the approach of Agarwal et al. (2014) for the non-constrained version of the problem. The computational time of our algorithm scales logarithmically in the size of the policy space. This answers the main open question of Badanidiyuru et al. (2014). We also extend our results to a variant where there are no knapsack constraints but the objective is an arbitrary Lipschitz concave function of the sum of outcome vectors.

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arXiv2016

Linear Contextual Bandits with Knapsacks

We consider the linear contextual bandit problem with resource consumption, in addition to reward generation. In each round, the outcome of pulling an arm is a reward as well as a vector of resource consumptions. The expected values of these outcomes depend linearly on the context of that arm. The budget/capacity constraints require that the total consumption doesn't exceed the budget for each resource. The objective is once again to maximize the total reward. This problem turns out to be a common generalization of classic linear contextual bandits (linContextual), bandits with knapsacks (BwK), and the online stochastic packing problem (OSPP). We present algorithms with near-optimal regret bounds for this problem. Our bounds compare favorably to results on the unstructured version of the problem where the relation between the contexts and the outcomes could be arbitrary, but the algorithm only competes against a fixed set of policies accessible through an optimization oracle. We combine techniques from the work on linContextual, BwK, and OSPP in a nontrivial manner while also tackling new difficulties that are not present in any of these special cases.

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arXiv2016

Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints

We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with m items for sale to n additive bidders with hard budget constraints, assuming that the seller has some prior distribution over bidder values and budgets. The prior may be correlated across items and budgets of the same bidder, but is assumed independent across bidders. We target mechanisms that are Bayesian Incentive Compatible, but that are ex-post Individually Rational and ex-post budget respecting. Virtually no such mechanisms are known that satisfy all these conditions and guarantee any revenue approximation, even with just a single item. We provide a computationally efficient mechanism that is a $3$-approximation with respect to all BIC, ex-post IR, and ex-post budget respecting mechanisms. Note that the problem is NP-hard to approximate better than a factor of 16/15, even in the case where the prior is a point mass \cite{ChakrabartyGoel}. We further characterize the optimal mechanism in this setting, showing that it can be interpreted as a distribution over virtual welfare maximizers. We prove our results by making use of a black-box reduction from mechanism to algorithm design developed by \cite{CaiDW13b}. Our main technical contribution is a computationally efficient $3$-approximation algorithm for the algorithmic problem that results by an application of their framework to this problem. The algorithmic problem has a mixed-sign objective and is NP-hard to optimize exactly, so it is surprising that a computationally efficient approximation is possible at all. In the case of a single item ($m=1$), the algorithmic problem can be solved exactly via exhaustive search, leading to a computationally efficient exact algorithm and a stronger characterization of the optimal mechanism as a distribution over virtual value maximizers.

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