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Niloofar Fadavi

Publications and source records attributed to Niloofar Fadavi.

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Early Recognition of Parkinson's Disease Through Acoustic Analysis and Machine Learning

Parkinson's Disease (PD) is a progressive neurodegenerative disorder that significantly impacts both motor and non-motor functions, including speech. Early and accurate recognition of PD through speech analysis can greatly enhance patient outcomes by enabling timely intervention. This paper provides a comprehensive review of methods for PD recognition using speech data, highlighting advances in machine learning and data-driven approaches. We discuss the process of data wrangling, including data collection, cleaning, transformation, and exploratory data analysis, to prepare the dataset for machine learning applications. Various classification algorithms are explored, including logistic regression, SVM, and neural networks, with and without feature selection. Each method is evaluated based on accuracy, precision, and training time. Our findings indicate that specific acoustic features and advanced machine-learning techniques can effectively differentiate between individuals with PD and healthy controls. The study concludes with a comparison of the different models, identifying the most effective approaches for PD recognition, and suggesting potential directions for future research.

math.NA

Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for dynamic pricing competition with finite planning horizon

Having fixed capacities, homogeneous products and price sensitive customer purchase decision are primary distinguishing characteristics of numerous revenue management systems. Even with two or three rivals, competition is still highly fierce. This paper studies sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of a price competition in an oligopoly market with perishable assets. Sellers each has one unit of a good that cannot be replenished, and they compete in setting prices to sell their good over a finite sales horizon. Each period, buyers desire one unit of the good and the number of buyers coming to the market in each period is random. All sellers' prices are accessible for buyers, and search is costless. Using stochastic dynamic programming methods, the best response of sellers can be obtained from a one-shot price competition game regarding remained periods and the current-time demand structure. Assuming a binary demand model, we demonstrate that the duopoly model has a unique Nash equilibrium and the oligopoly model does not reveal price dispersion with respect to a particular metric. We illustrate that, when considering a generalized demand model, the duopoly model has a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium while the oligopoly model has a unique symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

econ.TH