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Noam Hazon

Publications and source records attributed to Noam Hazon.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Perpetual Fully-Online Approximate Fairness

Many decision processes run for a long and unknown duration: in each round new requests arrive, an irrevocable choice must be made immediately, and the system is judged by ongoing fairness requirements. Examples include food banks allocating donations, computing systems repeatedly scheduling scarce resources across users, and institutions making repeated decisions while remaining fair over time. We propose a general approach based on \emph{deficits}, which measure how far the current outcome is from satisfying each fairness requirement. The goal is to keep all deficits small at each time step, without knowing the horizon or future agent valuations. This viewpoint also highlights a natural modeling question for long-running systems: how much of the past should be counted when fairness is evaluated? We first study the full-history model, where all past rounds count equally. We propose an efficient fully-online rule. For $n$ agents, we prove anytime guarantees: after any $t$ rounds, all requirements remain satisfied up to a slack of order $\tilde O(\sqrt{t/n})$. We instantiate the rule for online allocation of indivisible goods, yielding natural relaxations of proportionality and envy-free, and for online public decision-making. We show that this slack is tight even for weak proportionality. For unrestricted classical $\mathrm{EF}c$, the exact worst-case parameter at horizon $T$ is $\lceil T/n\rceil$. We then study discounted-memory fairness, where older deficits carry smaller weight. The same fully-online rule applies to these discounted deficits, and the resulting threshold is controlled by the discount function. In particular, the time dependence is never worse than the full-history $\sqrt t$ dependence. Overall, our results show that memory is a central part of perpetual fairness. The question is not only which requirement to impose, but also how the system should count past unfairness.

cs.GT

Does Calibration Affect Human Actions?

Calibration has been proposed as a way to enhance the reliability and adoption of machine learning classifiers. We study a particular aspect of this proposal: how does calibrating a classification model affect the decisions made by non-expert humans consuming the model's predictions? We perform a Human-Computer-Interaction (HCI) experiment to ascertain the effect of calibration on (i) trust in the model, and (ii) the correlation between decisions and predictions. We also propose further corrections to the reported calibrated scores based on Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory from behavioral economics, and study the effect of these corrections on trust and decision-making. We find that calibration is not sufficient on its own; the prospect theory correction is crucial for increasing the correlation between human decisions and the model's predictions. While this increased correlation suggests higher trust in the model, responses to ``Do you trust the model more?" are unaffected by the method used.

cs.HC

The Complexity of Manipulation of k-Coalitional Games on Graphs

In many settings, there is an organizer who would like to divide a set of agents into $k$ coalitions, and cares about the friendships within each coalition. Specifically, the organizer might want to maximize utilitarian social welfare, maximize egalitarian social welfare, or simply guarantee that every agent will have at least one friend within his coalition. However, in many situations, the organizer is not familiar with the friendship connections, and he needs to obtain them from the agents. In this setting, a manipulative agent may falsely report friendship connections in order to increase his utility. In this paper, we analyze the complexity of finding manipulation in such $k$-coalitional games on graphs. We also introduce a new type of manipulation, socially-aware manipulation, in which the manipulator would like to increase his utility without decreasing the social welfare. We then study the complexity of finding socially-aware manipulation in our setting. Finally, we examine the frequency of socially-aware manipulation and the running time of our algorithms via simulation results.

cs.GT

Identifying the Source of Information Spread in Networks via Markov Chains

Nowadays, the diffusion of information through social networks is a powerful phenomenon. One common way to model diffusions in social networks is the Independent Cascade (IC) model. Given a set of infected nodes according to the IC model, a natural problem is the source detection problem, in which the goal is to identify the unique node that has started the diffusion. Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is a common approach for tackling the source detection problem, but it is computationally hard. In this work, we propose an efficient method for the source detection problem under the MLE approach, which is based on computing the stationary distribution of a Markov chain. Using simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method compared to other state-of-the-art methods from the literature, both on random and real-world networks.

cs.SI

Coalition Formation with Bounded Coalition Size

In many situations when people are assigned to coalitions, the utility of each person depends on the friends in her coalition. Additionally, in many situations, the size of each coalition should be bounded. This paper studies such coalition formation scenarios in both weighted and unweighted settings. Since finding a partition that maximizes the utilitarian social welfare is computationally hard, we provide a polynomial-time approximation algorithm. We also investigate the existence and the complexity of finding stable partitions. Namely, we show that the Contractual Strict Core (CSC) is never empty, but the Strict Core (SC) of some games is empty. Finding partitions that are in the CSC is computationally easy, but even deciding whether an SC of a given game exists is NP-hard. The analysis of the core is more involved. In the unweighted setting, we show that when the coalition size is bounded by 3 the core is never empty, and we present a polynomial time algorithm for finding a member of the core. However, for the weighted setting, the core may be empty, and we prove that deciding whether there exists a core is NP-hard.

cs.GT

The Leximin Approach for a Sequence of Collective Decisions

In many situations, several agents need to make a sequence of decisions. For example, a group of workers that needs to decide where their weekly meeting should take place. In such situations, a decision-making mechanism must consider fairness notions. In this paper, we analyze the fairness of three known mechanisms: round-robin, maximum Nash welfare, and leximin. We consider both offline and online settings, and concentrate on the fairness notion of proportionality and its relaxations. Specifically, in the offline setting, we show that the three mechanisms fail to find a proportional or approximate-proportional outcome, even if such an outcome exists. We thus introduce a new fairness property that captures this requirement, and show that a variant of the leximin mechanism satisfies the new fairness property. In the online setting, we show that it is impossible to guarantee proportionality or its relaxations. We thus consider a natural restriction on the agents' preferences, and show that the leximin mechanism guarantees the best possible additive approximation to proportionality and satisfies all the relaxations of proportionality.

cs.GT

Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams

In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However, there are many cases in which each member of M or W represents a team that consists of several individuals with common interests. For example, students may need to be matched to professors for their final projects, but each project is carried out by a team of students. Thus, the students first form teams, and the matching is between teams of students and professors. When a team is considered as an agent from M or W, it needs to have a preference order that represents it. A voting rule is a natural mechanism for aggregating the preferences of the team members into a single preference order. In this paper, we investigate the problem of strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams. Specifically, we assume that members of each team use the Borda rule for generating the preference order of the team. Then, the Gale-Shapley algorithm is used for finding a stable-matching, where the set M is the proposing side. We show that the single-voter manipulation problem can be solved in polynomial time, both when the team is from M and when it is from W. We show that the coalitional manipulation problem is computationally hard, but it can be solved approximately both when the team is from M and when it is from W.

cs.GT

Efficient Nearly-Fair Division with Capacity Constraints

We consider the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible items (goods or bads) under capacity constraints. In this setting, we are given a set of categorized items. Each category has a capacity constraint (the same for all agents), that is an upper bound on the number of items an agent can receive from each category. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that solves the problem for two agents with additive utilities over the items. When each category contains items that are all goods (positively evaluated) or all chores (negatively evaluated) for each of the agents, our algorithm finds a feasible allocation of the items, which is both Pareto-optimal and envy-free up to one item. In the general case, when each item can be a good or a chore arbitrarily, our algorithm finds an allocation that is Pareto-optimal and envy-free up to one good and one chore.

cs.GT

Strategic Voting in the Context of Negotiating Teams

A negotiating team is a group of two or more agents who join together as a single negotiating party because they share a common goal related to the negotiation. Since a negotiating team is composed of several stakeholders, represented as a single negotiating party, there is need for a voting rule for the team to reach decisions. In this paper, we investigate the problem of strategic voting in the context of negotiating teams. Specifically, we present a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a manipulation for a single voter when using a positional scoring rule. We show that the problem is still tractable when there is a coalition of manipulators that uses a x-approval rule. The coalitional manipulation problem becomes computationally hard when using Borda, but we provide a polynomial-time algorithm with the following guarantee: given a manipulable instance with k manipulators, the algorithm finds a successful manipulation with at most one additional manipulator. Our results hold for both constructive and destructive manipulations.

cs.GT

Explaining Ridesharing: Selection of Explanations for Increasing User Satisfaction

Transportation services play a crucial part in the development of modern smart cities. In particular, on-demand ridesharing services, which group together passengers with similar itineraries, are already operating in several metropolitan areas. These services can be of significant social and environmental benefit, by reducing travel costs, road congestion and CO2 emissions. Unfortunately, despite their advantages, not many people opt to use these ridesharing services. We believe that increasing the user satisfaction from the service will cause more people to utilize it, which, in turn, will improve the quality of the service, such as the waiting time, cost, travel time, and service availability. One possible way for increasing user satisfaction is by providing appropriate explanations comparing the alternative modes of transportation, such as a private taxi ride and public transportation. For example, a passenger may be more satisfied from a shared-ride if she is told that a private taxi ride would have cost her 50% more. Therefore, the problem is to develop an agent that provides explanations that will increase the user satisfaction. We model our environment as a signaling game and show that a rational agent, which follows the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, must reveal all of the information regarding the possible alternatives to the passenger. In addition, we develop a machine learning based agent that, when given a shared-ride along with its possible alternatives, selects the explanations that are most likely to increase user satisfaction. Using feedback from humans we show that our machine learning based agent outperforms the rational agent and an agent that randomly chooses explanations, in terms of user satisfaction.

cs.AI

Manipulation of k-Coalitional Games on Social Networks

In many coalition formation games the utility of the agents depends on a social network. In such scenarios there might be a manipulative agent that would like to manipulate his connections in the social network in order to increase his utility. We study a model of coalition formation in which a central organizer, who needs to form $k$ coalitions, obtains information about the social network from the agents. The central organizer has her own objective: she might want to maximize the utilitarian social welfare, maximize the egalitarian social welfare, or simply guarantee that every agent will have at least one connection within her coalition. In this paper we study the susceptibility to manipulation of these objectives, given the abilities and information that the manipulator has. Specifically, we show that if the manipulator has very limited information, namely he is only familiar with his immediate neighbours in the network, then a manipulation is almost always impossible. Moreover, if the manipulator is only able to add connections to the social network, then a manipulation is still impossible for some objectives, even if the manipulator has full information on the structure of the network. On the other hand, if the manipulator is able to hide some of his connections, then all objectives are susceptible to manipulation, even if the manipulator has limited information, i.e., when he is familiar with his immediate neighbours and with their neighbours.

cs.GT

On Maximizing Egalitarian Value in K-coalitional Hedonic Games

This paper considers the problem of dividing agents among coalitions. We concentrate on Additively Separable Hedonic Games (ASHG's), in which each agent has a non-negative value for every other agent and her utility is the sum of the values she assigns to the members of her coalition. Unlike previous work, we analyze a model where exactly $k$ coalitions must be formed, and the goal is to maximize the utility of the agent which is worst off, i.e., the egalitarian social welfare. We show that this problem is hard, even when the number of agents should be equally divided among the coalitions. We thus propose a heuristic that maximizes the egalitarian social welfare and maximizes the average utility of each agent as a secondary goal. Using extensive simulations, both on synthetic and real data, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. Specifically, our heuristic provides solutions that are much fairer than the solutions that maximize the average social welfare, while still providing a relatively high average social welfare.

cs.GT

AI for Explaining Decisions in Multi-Agent Environments

Explanation is necessary for humans to understand and accept decisions made by an AI system when the system's goal is known. It is even more important when the AI system makes decisions in multi-agent environments where the human does not know the systems' goals since they may depend on other agents' preferences. In such situations, explanations should aim to increase user satisfaction, taking into account the system's decision, the user's and the other agents' preferences, the environment settings and properties such as fairness, envy and privacy. Generating explanations that will increase user satisfaction is very challenging; to this end, we propose a new research direction: xMASE. We then review the state of the art and discuss research directions towards efficient methodologies and algorithms for generating explanations that will increase users' satisfaction from AI system's decisions in multi-agent environments.

cs.AI

Fair Sharing: The Shapley Value for Ride-Sharing and Routing Games

Ride-sharing services are gaining popularity and are crucial for a sustainable environment. A special case in which such services are most applicable, is the last mile variant. In this variant it is assumed that all the passengers are positioned at the same origin location (e.g. an airport), and each have a different destination. One of the major issues in a shared ride is fairly splitting of the ride cost among the passengers. In this paper we use the Shapley value, which is one of the most significant solution concepts in cooperative game theory, for fairly splitting the cost of a shared ride. We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario there exists a fixed priority order in which the passengers are dropped-off (e.g. elderly, injured etc.), and we show a method for efficient computation of the Shapley value in this setting. Our results are also applicable for efficient computation of the Shapley value in routing games. In the second scenario there is no predetermined priority order. We show that the Shapley value cannot be efficiently computed in this setting. However, extensive simulations reveal that our approach for the first scenario can serve as an excellent proxy for the second scenario, outperforming other known proxies.

cs.GT

Human Satisfaction as the Ultimate Goal in Ridesharing

Transportation services play a crucial part in the development of modern smart cities. In particular, on-demand ridesharing services, which group together passengers with similar itineraries, are already operating in several metropolitan areas. These services can be of significant social and environmental benefit, by reducing travel costs, road congestion and co2 emissions. The deployment of autonomous cars in the near future will surely change the way people are traveling. It is even more promising for a ridesharing service, since it will be easier and cheaper for a company to handle a fleet of autonomous cars that can serve the demands of different passengers. We argue that user satisfaction should be the main objective when trying to find the best assignment of passengers to vehicles and the determination of their routes. Moreover, the model of user satisfaction should be rich enough to capture the traveling distance, cost, and other factors as well. We show that it is more important to capture a rich model of human satisfaction than peruse an optimal performance. That is, we developed a practical algorithm for assigning passengers to vehicles, which outperforms assignment algorithms that are optimal, but use a simpler satisfaction model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to exclusively concentrate on a rich and realistic function of user satisfaction as the objective, which is (arguably) the most important aspect to consider for achieving a widespread adaption of ridesharing services.

cs.MA

Negotiation Strategies for Agents with Ordinal Preferences

Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents. Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to elicit from humans. In this work we concentrate on negotiation with ordinal preferences over a finite set of outcomes. We study an intuitive protocol for bilateral negotiation, where the two parties make offers alternately. We analyze the negotiation protocol under different settings. First, we assume that each party has full information about the other party's preference order. We provide elegant strategies that specify a sub-game perfect equilibrium for the agents. We further show how the studied negotiation protocol almost completely implements a known bargaining rule. Finally, we analyze the no information setting. We study several solution concepts that are distribution-free, and analyze both the case where neither party knows the preference order of the other party, and the case where only one party is uninformed.

cs.GT

New Approximations for Coalitional Manipulation in General Scoring Rules

We study the problem of coalitional manipulation---where $k$ manipulators try to manipulate an election on $m$ candidates---under general scoring rules, with a focus on the Borda protocol. We do so both in the weighted and unweighted settings. We focus on minimizing the maximum score obtainable by a non-preferred candidate. In the strongest, most general setting, we provide an algorithm for any scoring rule as described by a vector $\vecα=(α_1,\ldots,α_m)$: for some $β=O(\sqrt{m\log m})$, it obtains an additive approximation equal to $W\cdot \max_i \lvert α_{i+β}-α_i \rvert$, where $W$ is the sum of voter weights. For Borda, both the weighted and unweighted variants are known to be $NP$-hard. For the unweighted case, our simpler algorithm provides a randomized, additive $O(k \sqrt{m \log m} )$ approximation; in other words, if there exists a strategy enabling the preferred candidate to win by an $Ω(k \sqrt{m \log m} )$ margin, our method, with high probability, will find a strategy enabling her to win (albeit with a possibly smaller margin). It thus provides a somewhat stronger guarantee compared to the previous methods, which implicitly implied a strategy that provides an $Ω(m)$-additive approximation to the maximum score of a non-preferred candidate. For the weighted case, our generalized algorithm provides an $O(W \sqrt{m \log m} )$-additive approximation, where $W$ is the sum of voter weights. This is a clear advantage over previous methods: some of them do not generalize to the weighted case, while others---which approximate the number of manipulators---pose restrictions on the weights of extra manipulators added. Our methods are based on carefully rounding an exponentially-large configuration linear program that is solved by using the ellipsoid method with an efficient separation oracle.

cs.DS

Improving Comparison Shopping Agents' Competence through Selective Price Disclosure

The plethora of comparison shopping agents (CSAs) in today's markets enables buyers to query more than a single CSA when shopping, and an inter-CSAs competition naturally arises. We suggest a new approach, termed "selective price disclosure", which improves the attractiveness of a CSA by removing some of the prices in the outputted list. The underlying idea behind this approach is to affect the buyer's beliefs regarding the chance of obtaining more attractive prices. The paper presents two methods, which are suitable for fully-rational buyers, for deciding which prices among those known to the CSA should be disclosed. The effectiveness and efficiency of the methods are evaluated using real data collected from five CSAs. The methods are also evaluated with human subjects, showing that selective price disclosure can be highly effective in this case as well, however, the disclosed subset of prices should be extracted in a different (simplistic) manner.

cs.GT