Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Norihito Toyota

Publications and source records attributed to Norihito Toyota.

26 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Some Considerations on Six Degrees of Separation from A Theoretical Point of View

In this article we discuss six degrees of separation, which has been proposed by Milgram, from a theoretical point of view. Simply if one has $k$ friends, the number $N$ of indirect friends goes up to $\sim k^d$ in $d$ degrees of separation. So it would easily come up to population of whole world. That, however, is unacceptable. Mainly because of nonzero clustering coefficient $C$, $N$ does not become $\sim k^d$. In this article, we first discuss relations between six degrees of separation and the clustering coefficient in the small world network proposed by Watt and Strogatz\cite{Watt1},\cite{Watt2}. Especially, conditions that $(N)>$ (population of U.S.A or of the whole world) arises in the WS model is explored by theoretical and numerical points of view. Secondly we introduce an index that represents velocity of propagation to the number of friends and obtain an analytical formula for it as a function of $C$, $K$, which is an average degree over all nodes, and some parameter $P$ concerned with network topology. Finally the index is calculated numerically to study the relation between $C$, $K$ and $P$ and $N$.

physics.data-an↗

Network Growth via Preferential Attachment based on Prisoner's Dilemma Game

In this article we discuss network growth based on Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) where palyers on nodes in a network palay with its linked players. The players estimate total profits in the PD. When a new node is attached, the node make linkes to nodes in the network with the probabilities in proportion to the profits made by the game. Iterating this process, a network grows. We investigate properties of this type of growing networks, especially the degree distribution and time-depending strategy distribution by running computer simulation. We also find a sort of phase transition in the strategy distributions. For these phenomena given by computer simulation, theoretical studies are also carried out.

physics.soc-ph↗

The Analyses of Node Swapping Networks by New Graph Index

We have proposed two new dynamic networks where two node are swapped each other, and showed that the both networks behave as a small world like in the average path length but can not make any effective discussions on the clustering coefficient because of the topological invariant properties of the networks. In this article we introduce a new index, "hamming coefficient" or "multiplicity", that can act well for these dynamic networks. The hamming coefficient or multiplicity is shown essentially to behave as the clustering coefficient in the small world network proposed by Watts and Strogatz\cite{Watt1}. By evaluating the new index, we uncover another properties of the two networks.

physics.soc-ph↗

Node Exchange Network and its Statistical Analysis

In considering a social network, there are cases where people is transferred to another place. Then the physical (direct) relations among nodes are lost by the movement. In terms of a network theory, some nodes break the present connections with neighboring nodes, move and there build new connections of nodes. For simplicity we here consider only that two nodes exchange the place each other on a network. Such exchange is assumed to be constantly carried out. We study this dynamic network (node exchange network NEN) and uncover some new features which usual networks do not contain. We mainly consider average path length and the diameter. Lastly we consider a propagation of one virus on the network by a computer simulation. They are compared to other networks investigated hitherto. The relation to a scale free network is also discussed.

physics.soc-ph↗

The Evolution of Cellar Automaton based on Dilemmma Games with Selfish Strategy

We have proposed two new evolutionary rules on spatio-iterated games that is not mimic evolution of strategies, and mainly discussed the Prisoner's Dilemma game \cite{toyota2} by the two evoutionary rules \cite{toyota3}. In this paper we focus the first rule, that is, the selfish evolutionary rule for various dilemma games. In contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, there are gererally rich pase structures in the dilemma games. First we analytically clear the structure to present phase diagrams in the various dilemma games. Forthermore we simulate the time evolution of the soatio-games in the some representatives of the parameters according to the phase diagrams. Including some mutations, detail investigations are made by a computer simulation for five kinds of initial configurations. As results we find some dualities and game invariant properties. They show a sort of bifurcation as a mutation parameter are varied. In the path from one period to two one some common features are observed in most of games and some chaotic behaviors appear in the middle of the transition. Lastly we estimate the total hamiltonian, which is defined by the sum of the total payoff of all agents in the system, and show that the chaotic period is best from the perspective of the payoff. We also made some primitive discussions on them.

nlin.CD↗

The Phase Structure in the Evolution of Globally coupled Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma

We propose two new evolutionary rules that is not mimic evolution of strategies based on the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). The former follows the selfish evolutionary rule and then the coexistence phase appears with weak phase transition with mutations. The second rule is that of globally coupled spatial PD where the strategy of an agent is taken so that the total payoff of the whole system increases. Then it is natulally suspected that all agents will become cooperators in general. We, however, find that situations is rather complerx. We find two critical points within the usual conditions in the parameters included the payoff matrix in the PD. Further as we break the condition without losing PD condition, we meet two more essential curitical points. We discuss the areas between these critical points in the parameter space and uncover the various properties by simulating on computer. We show that in some parameter regions, strange properties, that is, like chaotic behaveor appear and the coexistence between defectors and cooperators appears in the large parameter region. Thus we point out that usual non-essential condition among the parameters in the payoff matrix imposed on the PD privent from recovering rich structures in the evolutionally spatial PS.

nlin.CG↗

Simulation of the weighted spatio-structured three cornered game and its satatistical properties

In this article, we study the evolution of the strategies in a sort of weighted three cornered game, Glico Game. This game has three strategies in each agent and three parameters in the payoff matrix. We divide the parameter region into 8 areas and explore its qualitative and quantitative properties of the evolution of strategies which include Haming distance, correlation functions and the population sequence of each strategy. When the three payoff parameters take nearly values each other, the complex patterns mainly appear and as the difference of parameter values are enlarged, some peculiar strategy trends to be dominant gradually. An interesting fact is that the strongest strategy in the payoff do not necessarily dominate the latice world. There are even the cases where the weakest strategy in the payof dominate. Generally many cases have some period much shoter than the dimension of the configuration space.

nlin.CG↗

Quantization of the stag hunt game and the Nash equilibrilum

In this paper I quantize the stag hunt game in the framework proposed by Marinatto and Weber which, is introduced to quantize the Battle of the Sexes game and gives a general quntization scheme of various game theories. Then I discuss the Nash equibilium solution in the cases of which starting strategies are taken in both non entangled state and entangled state and uncover the structure of Nash Equilibrium solutions and compare the case of the Battle of the Sexes game. Since the game has 4 parameters in the payoff matrix has rather rich structure than the Battle of the Sexes game with 3-parameters in the payoff matrix, the relations of the magnitude of these payoff values in Nash Equilibriums are much involuved. This structure is uncovered completly and it is found that the best strategy which give the maximal sum of the payoffs of both players strongly depends on the initial quntum state. As the bonus of the formulation the stag hunt game with four parameters we can discuss various types of symmetric games played by two players by using the latter formulation, i.e. Chicken game. As result some common properties are found between them and the stag hunt game. Lastly a little remark is made on Prisoner's Dillemma.

quant-ph↗