arXiv subjects

O. J. E. Maroney

Publications and source records attributed to O. J. E. Maroney.

15 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2017

Constraints on Macroscopic Realism Without Assuming Non-Invasive Measurability

Macroscopic realism is the thesis that macroscopically observable properties must always have definite values. The idea was introduced by Leggett and Garg (1985), who wished to show a conflict with the predictions of quantum theory. However, their analysis required not just the assumption of macroscopic realism per se, but also that the observable properties could be measured non-invasively. In recent years there has been increasing interest in experimental tests of the violation of the Leggett-Garg inequality, but it has remained a matter of controversy whether this second assumption is a reasonable requirement for a macroscopic realist view of quantum theory. In a recent critical assessment Maroney and Timpson (2017) identified three different categories of macroscopic realism, and argued that only the simplest category could be ruled out by Leggett-Garg inequality violations. Allen, Maroney, and Gogioso (2016) then showed that the second of these approaches was also incompatible with quantum theory in Hilbert spaces of dimension 4 or higher. However, we show that the distinction introduced by Maroney and Timpson between the second and third approaches is not noise tolerant, so unfortunately Allen's result, as given, is not directly empirically testable. In this paper we replace Maroney and Timpson's three categories with a parameterization of macroscopic realist models, which can be related to experimental observations in a noise tolerant way, and recover the original definitions in the noise-free limit. We show how this parameterization can be used to experimentally rule out classes of macroscopic realism in Hilbert spaces of dimension 3 or higher, including the category tested by the Leggett-Garg inequality, without any use of the non-invasive measurability assumption.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2013

How statistical are quantum states?

A novel no-go theorem is presented which sets a bound upon the extent to which 'Ψ-epistemic' interpretations of quantum theory are able to explain the overlap between non-orthogonal quantum states in terms of an experimenter's ignorance of an underlying state of reality. The theorem applies to any Hilbert space of dimension greater than two. In the limit of large Hilbert spaces, no more than half of the overlap between quantum states can be accounted for. Unlike other recent no-go theorems no additional assumptions, such as forms of locality, invasiveness, or non-contextuality, are required.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2013

Maximally epistemic interpretations of the quantum state and contextuality

We examine the relationship between quantum contextuality (in both the standard Kochen-Specker sense and in the generalised sense proposed by Spekkens) and models of quantum theory in which the quantum state is maximally epistemic. We find that preparation noncontextual models must be maximally epistemic, and these in turn must be Kochen-Specker noncontextual. This implies that the Kochen-Specker theorem is sufficient to establish both the impossibility of maximally epistemic models and the impossibility of preparation noncontextual models. The implication from preparation noncontextual to maximally epistemic then also yields a proof of Bell's theorem from an EPR-like argument.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2012

A brief note on epistemic interpretations and the Kochen-Specker theorem

One of the recent no-go theorems on Ψ-epistemic interpretations of quantum proves that there are no 'maximally epistemic' interpretations of quantum theory. The proof utilises similar arrangements to Clifton's quantum contextuality proof and has parallels to Harrigan and Rudolph's quantum deficiency no-go theorem, itself based on the Kochen-Specker quantum contextuality proof. This paper shows how the Kochen-Specker theorem can also be turned into a no 'maximally epistemic' theorem, but of a more limited kind.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2012

Detectability, Invasiveness and the Quantum Three Box Paradox

Quantum pre- and post-selection (PPS) paradoxes occur when counterfactual inferences are made about different measurements that might have been performed, between two measurements that are actually performed. The 3 box paradox is the paradigm example of such a paradox, where a ball is placed in one of three boxes and it is inferred that it would have been found, with certainty, both in box 1 and in box 2 had either box been opened on their own. Precisely what is at stake in PPS paradoxes has been unclear, and classical models have been suggested which are supposed to mimic the essential features of the problem. We show that the essential difference between the classical and quantum pre- and post-selection effects lies in the fact that for a quantum PPS paradox to occur the intervening measurement, had it been performed, would need to be invasive but non-detectable. This invasiveness is required even for null result measurements. While some quasi-classical features (such as non-contextuality and macrorealism) are compatible with PPS paradoxes, it seems no fully classical model of the 3 box paradox is possible.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2011

Landauer's erasure principle in non-equilibrium systems

In two recent papers, Maroney and Turgut separately and independently show generalisations of Landauer's erasure principle to indeterministic logical operations, as well as to logical states with variable energies and entropies. Here we show that, although Turgut's generalisation seems more powerful, in that it implies but is not implied by Maroney's and that it does not rely upon initial probability distributions over logical states, it does not hold for non-equilibrium states, while Maroney's generalisation holds even in non-equilibrium. While a generalisation of Turgut's inequality to non-equilibrium seems possible, it lacks the properties that makes the equilibrium inequality appealing. The non-equilibrium generalisation also no longer implies Maroney's inequality, which may still be derived independently. Furthermore, we show that Turgut's inequality can only give a necessary, but not sufficient, criteria for thermodynamic reversibility. Maroney's inequality gives the necessary and sufficient conditions.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2009

Thermodynamic constraints on fluctuation phenomena

The relationships between reversible Carnot cycles, the absence of perpetual motion machines and the existence of a non-decreasing, globally unique entropy function forms the starting point of many textbook presentations of the foundations of thermodynamics. However, the thermal fluctuation phenomena associated with statistical mechanics has been argued to restrict the domain of validity of this basis of the second law of thermodynamics. Here we demonstrate that fluctuation phenomena can be incorporated into the traditional presentation, extending, rather than restricting, the domain of validity of the phenomenologically motivated second law. Consistency conditions lead to constraints upon the possible spectrum of thermal fluctuations. In a special case this uniquely selects the Gibbs canonical distribution and more generally incorporates the Tsallis distributions. No particular model of microscopic dynamics need be assumed.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2009

Does a Computer have an Arrow of Time?

In [Sch05a], it is argued that Boltzmann's intuition, that the psychological arrow of time is necessarily aligned with the thermodynamic arrow, is correct. Schulman gives an explicit physical mechanism for this connection, based on the brain being representable as a computer, together with certain thermodynamic properties of computational processes. [Haw94] presents similar, if briefer, arguments. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the support for the link between thermodynamics and an arrow of time for computers. The principal arguments put forward by Schulman and Hawking will be shown to fail. It will be shown that any computational process that can take place in an entropy increasing universe, can equally take place in an entropy decreasing universe. This conclusion does not automatically imply a psychological arrow can run counter to the thermodynamic arrow. Some alternative possible explana- tions for the alignment of the two arrows will be briefly discussed.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2009

Generalising Landauer's Principle

In a recent paper [Mar05] it is argued that to properly understand the thermodynamics of Landauer's Principle it is necessary extend the concept of logical operations to include indeterministic operations. Here we examine the thermodynamics of such operations in more detail, extending the work of Landuaer[Lan61] to include indeterministic operations and to include logical states with variable entropies, temperatures and mean energies. We derive the most general statement of Landauer's Principle and prove it's universality, extending considerably the validity of previous proofs. This confirms conjectures made in [Mar05b], in particular that all logical operations may, in principle, be performed in a thermodynamically reversible fashion. We demonstrate a physical process that can perform any computation without work requirements or heat exchange with the environment. Many widespread statements of Landauer's Principle are shown to be only special cases of our generalised principle.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2008

The Physical Basis of the Gibbs-von Neumann entropy

We develop the argument that the Gibbs-von Neumann entropy is the appropriate statistical mechanical generalisation of the thermodynamic entropy, for macroscopic and microscopic systems, whether in thermal equilibrium or not, as a consequence of Hamiltonian dynamics. The mathematical treatment utilises well known results [Gib02, Tol38, Weh78, Par89], but most importantly, incorporates a variety of arguments on the phenomenological properties of thermal states [Szi25, TQ63, HK65, GB91] and of statistical distributions[HG76, PW78, Len78]. This enables the identification of the canonical distribution as the unique representation of thermal states without approximation or presupposing the existence of an entropy function. The Gibbs-von Neumann entropy is then derived, from arguments based solely on the addition of probabilities to Hamiltonian dynamics.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2004

Information and Entropy in Quantum Theory

We look at certain thought experiments based upon the 'delayed choice' and 'quantum eraser' interference experiments, which present a complementarity between information gathered from a quantum measurement and interference effects. It has been argued that these experiments show the Bohm interpretation of quantum theory is untenable. We demonstrate that these experiments depend critically upon the assumption that a quantum optics device can operate as a measuring device, and show that, in the context of these experiments, it cannot be consistently understood in this way. By contrast, we then show how the notion of 'active information' in the Bohm interpretation provides a coherent explanation of the phenomena shown in these experiments. We then examine the relationship between information and entropy. The thought experiment connecting these two quantities is the Szilard Engine version of Maxwell's Demon, and it has been suggested that quantum measurement plays a key role in this. We provide the first complete description of the operation of the Szilard Engine as a quantum system. This enables us to demonstrate that the role of quantum measurement suggested is incorrect, and further, that the use of information theory to resolve Szilard's paradox is both unnecessary and insufficient. Finally we show that, if the concept of 'active information' is extended to cover thermal density matrices, then many of the conceptual problems raised by this paradox appear to be resolved.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2004

The (absence of a) relationship between thermodynamic and logical reversibility

Landauer erasure seems to provide a powerful link between thermodynamics and information processing (logical computation). The only logical operations that require a generation of heat are logically irreversible ones, with the minimum heat generation being $kT \ln 2$ per bit of information lost. Nevertheless, it will be shown logical reversibility neither implies, nor is implied by thermodynamic reversibility. By examining thermodynamically reversible operations which are logically irreversible, it is possible to show that information and entropy, while having the same form, are conceptually different.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2004

Are all reversible computations tidy?

It has long been known that to minimise the heat emitted by a deterministic computer during it's operation it is necessary to make the computation act in a logically reversible manner\cite{Lan61}. Such logically reversible operations require a number of auxiliary bits to be stored, maintaining a history of the computation, and which allows the initial state to be reconstructed by running the computation in reverse. These auxiliary bits are wasteful of resources and may require a dissipation of energy for them to be reused. A simple procedure due to Bennett\cite{Ben73} allows these auxiliary bits to be "tidied", without dissipating energy, on a classical computer. All reversible classical computations can be made tidy in this way. However, this procedure depends upon a classical operation ("cloning") that cannot be generalised to quantum computers\cite{WZ82}. Quantum computations must be logically reversible, and therefore produce auxiliary qbits during their operation. We show that there are classes of quantum computation for which Bennett's procedure cannot be implemented. For some of these computations there may exist another method for which the computation may be "tidied". However, we also show there are quantum computations for which there is no possible method for tidying the auxiliary qbits. Not all reversible quantum computations can be made "tidy". This represents a fundamental additional energy burden to quantum computations. This paper extends results in \cite{Mar01}.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2003

The density matrix in the de Broglie-Bohm approach

If the density matrix is treated as an objective description of individual systems, it may become possible to attribute the same objective significance to statistical mechanical properties, such as entropy or temperature, as to properties such as mass or energy. It is shown that the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum theory can be consistently applied to density matrices as a description of individual systems. The resultant trajectories are examined for the case of the delayed choice interferometer, for which Bell appears to suggest that such an interpretation is not possible. Bell's argument is shown to be based upon a different understanding of the density matrix to that proposed here.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2000

Consistent Histories and the Bohm Approach

In a recent paper Griffiths claims that the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics gives rise to results that contradict those obtained from the Bohm interpretation. This is in spite of the fact that both claim to provide a realist interpretation of the formalism without the need to add any new mathematical content and both always produce exactly the same probability predictions of the outcome of experiments. In constrasting the differences Griffiths argues that the consistent histories interpretation provides a more physically reasonable account of quantum phenomena. We examine this claim and show that the consistent histories approach is not without its difficulties.

quant-ph↗