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Olav Benjamin Vassend

Publications and source records attributed to Olav Benjamin Vassend.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

A Causal Markov Condition for Value

This paper proposes a causal independence principle for value -- the value Causal Markov Condition (v-CMC) -- and develops the conceptual and mathematical foundations of a "causal value theory" linking causality and utility. After motivating a local formulation of the v-CMC, we introduce a probability-value duality that translates standard causal-inference results into the value setting. In particular, we formulate local, global, and decomposition versions of the v-CMC and prove their equivalence. We also define v-separation and show that it is sound and complete for conditional value independence. Furthermore, we derive a Bellman-type recursion as a special case of the v-CMC, thereby generalizing standard Bellman recursion from linear chains to causal DAGs. Finally, we show how the v-CMC supports modular transfer and updating of utility information across causal contexts and develop algorithms for causally structured utility elicitation and canonical influence-diagram construction.

stat.ML

A Divergence-Based Method for Weighting and Averaging Model Predictions

This paper uses a minimum divergence framework to introduce a new way of calculating model weights that can be used to average probabilistic predictions from statistical and machine learning models. The method is general and can be applied regardless of whether the models under consideration are fit to data using frequentist, Bayesian, or some other fitting method. The proposed method is motivated in two different ways and is shown empirically to perform better than or on a par with standard model averaging methods, including model stacking and model averaging that relies on Akaike-style negative exponentiated model weighting, especially when the sample size is small. Our theoretical analysis explains why the method has a small-sample advantage.

stat.ML

Justifying the Norms of Inductive Inference

Bayesian inference is limited in scope because it cannot be applied in idealized contexts where none of the hypotheses under consideration is true and because it is committed to always using the likelihood as a measure of evidential favoring, even when that is inappropriate. The purpose of this paper is to study inductive inference in a very general setting where finding the truth is not necessarily the goal and where the measure of evidential favoring is not necessarily the likelihood. I use an accuracy argument to argue for probabilism and I develop a new kind of argument to argue for two general updating rules, both of which are reasonable in different contexts. One of the updating rules has standard Bayesian updating, Bissiri et al's (2016) general Bayesian updating, Douven's (2016) IBE-based updating, and Vassend's (2019a) quasi-Bayesian updating as special cases. The other updating rule is novel.

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