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Olga Rospuskova

Publications and source records attributed to Olga Rospuskova.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Local Global Games and Network Common Learning

We study global games in which agents coordinate locally, with their social network neighbors, contingent on a favorable state. Before acting, agents learn the private signals of all agents within network distance $r$. As $r$ grows, every agent learns the state, but efficient coordination depends on higher-order beliefs, which are shaped by the geometry of the network. We introduce network common learning, a network analogue of common learning, and show that it is attained when neighboring agents' observations differ by many signals, as on the two-dimensional grid, but fails on networks with informational bottlenecks, such as the line, where only the safe action survives in equilibrium.

econ.TH

Local Coordination and the Geometry of Social Networks

We study agents playing a pure coordination game on a large social network. Agents are restricted to coordinate locally, without access to a global communication device, and so different regions of the network will converge to different actions, precluding perfect coordination. We show that the extent of this inefficiency depends on the network geometry: on some networks, near-perfect efficiency is achievable, while on others welfare is strictly bounded away from the optimum. We provide a geometric condition on the network structure that characterizes when near-efficiency is attainable. On networks in which it is unattainable, our results more generally preclude high correlations between outcomes in a large spectrum of dynamic games.

econ.TH