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Oliver Braganza

Publications and source records attributed to Oliver Braganza.

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A simple model suggesting economically rational sample-size choice drives irreproducibility

Several systematic studies have suggested that a large fraction of published research is not reproducible. One probable reason for low reproducibility is insufficient sample size, resulting in low power and low positive predictive value. It has been suggested that insufficient sample-size choice is driven by a combination of scientific competition and 'positive publication bias'. Here we formalize this intuition in a simple model, in which scientists choose economically rational sample sizes, balancing the cost of experimentation with income from publication. Specifically, assuming that a scientist's income derives only from 'positive' findings (positive publication bias) and that individual samples cost a fixed amount, allows to leverage basic statistical formulas into an economic optimality prediction. We find that if effects have i) low base probability, ii) small effect size or iii) low grant income per publication, then the rational (economically optimal) sample size is small. Furthermore, for plausible distributions of these parameters we find a robust emergence of a bimodal distribution of obtained statistical power and low overall reproducibility rates, both matching empirical findings. Finally, we explore conditional equivalence testing as a means to align economic incentives with adequate sample sizes. Overall, the model describes a simple mechanism explaining both the prevalence and the persistence of small sample sizes, and is well suited for empirical validation. It proposes economic rationality, or economic pressures, as a principal driver of irreproducibility and suggests strategies to change this.

econ.GN

Proxyeconomics, the inevitable corruption of proxy-based competition

When society maintains a competitive system to promote an abstract goal, competition by necessity relies on imperfect proxy measures. For instance profit is used to measure value to consumers, patient volumes to measure hospital performance, or the Journal Impact Factor to measure scientific value. Here we note that \textit{any proxy measure in a competitive societal system becomes a target for the competitors, promoting corruption of the measure}, suggesting a general applicability of what is best known as Campbell's or Goodhart's Law. Indeed, prominent voices have argued that the scientific reproducibility crisis or inaction to the threat of global warming represent instances of such competition induced corruption. Moreover, competing individuals often report that competitive pressures limit their ability to act according to the societal goal, suggesting lock-in. However, despite the profound implications, we lack a coherent theory of such a process. Here we propose such a theory, formalized as an agent based model, integrating insights from complex systems theory, contest theory, behavioral economics and cultural evolution theory. The model reproduces empirically observed patterns at multiple levels. It further suggests that any system is likely to converge towards an equilibrium level of corruption determined by i) the information captured in the proxy and ii) the strength of an intrinsic incentive towards the societal goal. Overall, the theory offers mechanistic insight to subjects as diverse as the scientific reproducibility crisis and the threat of global warming.

physics.soc-ph