Spreads Don't Price a Rival Market Maker's Information
When one market maker becomes better informed, do its competitors widen their bid-ask spreads? Adverse-selection reasoning suggests that they should, because the better-informed maker avoids toxic order flow and leaves more of it to the others, and the closest model of competition with an informed dealer predicts more conservative quotes by the uninformed dealers. We study this question in a stochastic quoting game in which one maker receives a private signal of varying precision about a persistent state that drives order flow. Strategies are learned with independent reinforcement learning, which we benchmark against an exact dynamic-programming solution of the single-agent case. In none of the configurations we examine does the average spread of the uninformed makers increase with the rival's precision. Where competition for order flow is weak, the slope of their spread in precision is statistically equivalent to zero within half an action tick; where competition is strong, their spread tightens. The informed maker's own spread tightens markedly in every configuration and serves as a positive control. These results hold with two, three and four makers, across an eightfold variation in the depth of the background liquidity, with a background quote that reprices after toxic fills, and under price-time priority. Our measurements point to a competitive trade-off. In the model the total toxicity of the flow does not depend on any maker's information. A better-informed maker avoids more of it, and where this leaves more toxic flow to its competitors, it also quotes more tightly, so that a wider quote would cost them more order flow than it would save in adverse selection. The uninformed makers adjust the skew of their quotes and their inventory instead, and the rival's information changes the distribution of profits across makers while quoted spreads remain nearly unchanged.