arXiv subjects

Oliviero Nardi

Publications and source records attributed to Oliviero Nardi.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Beyond Lower Quota: Avoiding Overrepresentation in Multi-Winner Voting

Recently, in the social choice literature, much attention has been given to the question of avoiding underrepresentation in approval-based multi-winner voting. In this paper, we explore the largely overlooked complementary question of avoiding overrepresentation. This has not been explored systematically, despite being a desirable property with concrete applications. Intuitively, overrepresentation happens when a group determines a disproportionately large part of the committee, thereby exceeding the group's quota. We formulate a strong and appealing axiom for avoiding overrepresentation, called justifiable upper quota (JUQ). We introduce a generalization of Thiele rules, composite Thiele rules, and characterize the unique rule in this class satisfying our axiom. This rule, Adams-AV, which naturally extends Adams' apportionment method, has not been studied before. Additionally, we introduce a polynomial-time rule that satisfies JUQ. Furthermore, we introduce justified near quota, an axiom that balances avoiding under- and overrepresentation. It characterizes the unique Thiele rule extending the Sainte-Laguë apportionment method. Finally, we analyze the compatibility of our axioms with established proportionality notions such as EJR+.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Free-Riding in Multi-Issue Decisions

Voting in multi-issue domains allows for compromise outcomes that satisfy all voters to some extent, but such fairness considerations open the possibility of a special form of manipulation: free-riding, where voters untruthfully oppose a popular opinion in one issue to receive increased consideration in other issues; we study under which conditions this is possible and show that even weak fairness considerations enable free-riding, and through computational and experimental analysis, we find that while free-riding in multi-issue domains is often possible, it comes at a non-negligible individual risk for voters, making its allure smaller than one could intuitively assume.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Combining Voting and Abstract Argumentation to Understand Online Discussions

Online discussion platforms are a vital part of the public discourse in a deliberative democracy. However, how to interpret the outcomes of the discussions on these platforms is often unclear. In this paper, we propose a novel and explainable method for selecting a set of most representative, consistent points of view by combining methods from computational social choice and abstract argumentation. Specifically, we model online discussions as abstract argumentation frameworks combined with information regarding which arguments voters approve of. Based on ideas from approval-based multiwinner voting, we introduce several voting rules for selecting a set of preferred extensions that represents voters' points of view. We compare the proposed methods across several dimensions, theoretically and in numerical simulations, and give clear suggestions on which methods to use depending on the specific situation.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Repeated Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items

The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness and proportionality) and economic efficiency (such as Pareto-optimality). However, in the real world, items are not always allocated once and for all, but often repeatedly. For example, the items may be recurring chores to distribute in a household. Motivated by this, we initiate the study of the repeated fair division of indivisible goods and chores, and propose a formal model for this scenario. In this paper, we show that, if the number of repetitions is a multiple of the number of agents, there always exists a sequence of allocations that is proportional and Pareto-optimal. On the other hand, irrespective of the number of repetitions, an envy-free and Pareto-optimal sequence of allocations may not exist. For the case of two agents, we show that if the number of repetitions is even, it is always possible to find a sequence of allocations that is overall envy-free and Pareto-optimal. We then prove even stronger fairness guarantees, showing that every allocation in such a sequence satisfies some relaxation of envy-freeness. Finally, in case that the number of repetitions can be chosen freely, we show that envy-free and Pareto-optimal allocations are achievable for any number of agents.

cs.GT↗