arXiv subjects

Onno Zoeter

Publications and source records attributed to Onno Zoeter.

17 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Testing Partially-Identifiable Causal Queries Using Ternary Tests

We consider hypothesis testing of binary causal queries using observational data. Since the mapping of causal models to the observational distribution that they induce is not one-to-one, in general, causal queries are often only partially identifiable. When binary statistical tests are used for testing partially-identifiable causal queries, their results do not translate in a straightforward manner to the causal hypothesis testing problem. We propose using ternary (three-outcome) statistical tests to test partially-identifiable causal queries. We establish testability requirements that ternary tests must satisfy in terms of uniform consistency and present equivalent topological conditions on the hypotheses. To leverage the existing toolbox of binary tests, we prove that obtaining ternary tests by combining binary tests is complete. Finally, we demonstrate how topological conditions serve as a guide to construct ternary tests for two concrete causal hypothesis testing problems, namely testing the instrumental variable (IV) inequalities and comparing treatment efficacy.

stat.ME↗

arXiv2025

CLAX: Fast and Flexible Neural Click Models in JAX

CLAX is a JAX-based library that implements classic click models using modern gradient-based optimization. While neural click models have emerged over the past decade, complex click models based on probabilistic graphical models (PGMs) have not systematically adopted gradient-based optimization, preventing practitioners from leveraging modern deep learning frameworks while preserving the interpretability of classic models. CLAX addresses this gap by replacing EM-based optimization with direct gradient-based optimization in a numerically stable manner. The framework's modular design enables the integration of any component, from embeddings and deep networks to custom modules, into classic click models for end-to-end optimization. We demonstrate CLAX's efficiency by running experiments on the full Baidu-ULTR dataset comprising over a billion user sessions in $\approx$ 2 hours on a single GPU, orders of magnitude faster than traditional EM approaches. CLAX implements ten classic click models, serving both industry practitioners seeking to understand user behavior and improve ranking performance at scale and researchers developing new click models. CLAX is available at: https://github.com/philipphager/clax

cs.IR↗

arXiv2025

Conditional Forecasts and Proper Scoring Rules for Reliable and Accurate Performative Predictions

Performative predictions are forecasts which influence the outcomes they aim to predict, undermining the existence of correct forecasts and standard methods of elicitation and estimation. We show that conditioning forecasts on covariates that separate them from the outcome renders the target distribution forecast-invariant, guaranteeing well-posedness of the forecasting problem. However, even under this condition, classical proper scoring rules fail to elicit correct forecasts. We prove a general impossibility result and identify two solutions: (i) in decision-theoretic settings, elicitation of correct and incentive-compatible forecasts is possible if forecasts are separating; (ii) scoring with unbiased estimates of the divergence between the forecast and the induced distribution of the target variable yields correct forecasts. Applying these insights to parameter estimation, conditional forecasts and proper scoring rules enable performatively stable estimation of performatively correct parameters, resolving the issues raised by Perdomo et al. (2020). Our results expose fundamental limits of classical forecast evaluation and offer new tools for reliable and accurate forecasting in performative settings.

math.ST↗

arXiv2025

Unidentified and Confounded? Understanding Two-Tower Models for Unbiased Learning to Rank (Extended Abstract)

Additive two-tower models are popular learning-to-rank methods for handling biased user feedback in industry settings. Recent studies, however, report a concerning phenomenon: training two-tower models on clicks collected by well-performing production systems leads to decreased ranking performance. This paper investigates two recent explanations for this observation: confounding effects from logging policies and model identifiability issues. We theoretically analyze the identifiability conditions of two-tower models, showing that either document swaps across positions or overlapping feature distributions are required to recover model parameters from clicks. We also investigate the effect of logging policies on two-tower models, finding that they introduce no bias when models perfectly capture user behavior. However, logging policies can amplify biases when models imperfectly capture user behavior, particularly when prediction errors correlate with document placement across positions. We propose a sample weighting technique to mitigate these effects and provide actionable insights for researchers and practitioners using two-tower models.

cs.IR↗

arXiv2025

Unidentified and Confounded? Understanding Two-Tower Models for Unbiased Learning to Rank

cs.IR↗

arXiv2025

Revisiting the Berkeley Admissions data: Statistical Tests for Causal Hypotheses

Reasoning about fairness through correlation-based notions is rife with pitfalls. The 1973 University of California, Berkeley graduate school admissions case from Bickel et. al. (1975) is a classic example of one such pitfall, namely Simpson's paradox. The discrepancy in admission rates among males and female applicants, in the aggregate data over all departments, vanishes when admission rates per department are examined. We reason about the Berkeley graduate school admissions case through a causal lens. In the process, we introduce a statistical test for causal hypothesis testing based on Pearl's instrumental-variable inequalities (Pearl 1995). We compare different causal notions of fairness that are based on graphical, counterfactual and interventional queries on the causal model, and develop statistical tests for these notions that use only observational data. We study the logical relations between notions, and show that while notions may not be equivalent, their corresponding statistical tests coincide for the case at hand. We believe that a thorough case-based causal analysis helps develop a more principled understanding of both causal hypothesis testing and fairness.

stat.ME↗

arXiv2024

Unbiased Learning to Rank Meets Reality: Lessons from Baidu's Large-Scale Search Dataset

Unbiased learning-to-rank (ULTR) is a well-established framework for learning from user clicks, which are often biased by the ranker collecting the data. While theoretically justified and extensively tested in simulation, ULTR techniques lack empirical validation, especially on modern search engines. The Baidu-ULTR dataset released for the WSDM Cup 2023, collected from Baidu's search engine, offers a rare opportunity to assess the real-world performance of prominent ULTR techniques. Despite multiple submissions during the WSDM Cup 2023 and the subsequent NTCIR ULTRE-2 task, it remains unclear whether the observed improvements stem from applying ULTR or other learning techniques. In this work, we revisit and extend the available experiments on the Baidu-ULTR dataset. We find that standard unbiased learning-to-rank techniques robustly improve click predictions but struggle to consistently improve ranking performance, especially considering the stark differences obtained by choice of ranking loss and query-document features. Our experiments reveal that gains in click prediction do not necessarily translate to enhanced ranking performance on expert relevance annotations, implying that conclusions strongly depend on how success is measured in this benchmark.

cs.IR↗

arXiv2024

Evaluating and Correcting Performative Effects of Decision Support Systems via Causal Domain Shift

When predicting a target variable $Y$ from features $X$, the prediction $\hat{Y}$ can be performative: an agent might act on this prediction, affecting the value of $Y$ that we eventually observe. Performative predictions are deliberately prevalent in algorithmic decision support, where a Decision Support System (DSS) provides a prediction for an agent to affect the value of the target variable. When deploying a DSS in high-stakes settings (e.g. healthcare, law, predictive policing, or child welfare screening) it is imperative to carefully assess the performative effects of the DSS. In the case that the DSS serves as an alarm for a predicted negative outcome, naive retraining of the prediction model is bound to result in a model that underestimates the risk, due to effective workings of the previous model. In this work, we propose to model the deployment of a DSS as causal domain shift and provide novel cross-domain identification results for the conditional expectation $E[Y | X]$, allowing for pre- and post-hoc assessment of the deployment of the DSS, and for retraining of a model that assesses the risk under a baseline policy where the DSS is not deployed. Using a running example, we empirically show that a repeated regression procedure provides a practical framework for estimating these quantities, even when the data is affected by sample selection bias and selective labelling, offering for a practical, unified solution for multiple forms of target variable bias.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

When Do Off-Policy and On-Policy Policy Gradient Methods Align?

Policy gradient methods are widely adopted reinforcement learning algorithms for tasks with continuous action spaces. These methods succeeded in many application domains, however, because of their notorious sample inefficiency their use remains limited to problems where fast and accurate simulations are available. A common way to improve sample efficiency is to modify their objective function to be computable from off-policy samples without importance sampling. A well-established off-policy objective is the excursion objective. This work studies the difference between the excursion objective and the traditional on-policy objective, which we refer to as the on-off gap. We provide the first theoretical analysis showing conditions to reduce the on-off gap while establishing empirical evidence of shortfalls arising when these conditions are not met.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2024

Foundations of Structural Causal Models with Latent Selection

Three distinct phenomena complicate statistical causal analysis: latent common causes, causal cycles, and latent selection. Foundational works on Structural Causal Models (SCMs), e.g., Bongers et al. (2021, Ann. Stat., 49(5): 2885-2915), treat cycles and latent variables, while an analogous account of latent selection is missing. The goal of this article is to develop a theoretical foundation for modeling latent selection with SCMs. To achieve that, we introduce a conditioning operation for SCMs: it maps an SCM with explicit selection mechanisms to one without them while preserving the causal semantics of the selected subpopulation. Graphically, in Directed Mixed Graphs we extend bidirected edge--beyond latent common cause--to also encode latent selection. We prove that the conditioning operation preserves simplicity, acyclicity, and linearity of SCMs, and interacts well with marginalization, conditioning, and interventions. These properties make those three operations valuable tools for causal modeling, reasoning, and learning after abstracting away latent details (latent common causes and selection). Examples show how this abstraction streamlines analysis and clarifies when standard tools (e.g., adjustment, causal calculus, instrumental variables) remain valid under selection bias. We hope that these results deepen the SCM-based understanding of selection bias and become part of the standard causal modeling toolbox to build more reliable causal analysis.

stat.ME↗

arXiv2023

Fair Grading Algorithms for Randomized Exams

This paper studies grading algorithms for randomized exams. In a randomized exam, each student is asked a small number of random questions from a large question bank. The predominant grading rule is simple averaging, i.e., calculating grades by averaging scores on the questions each student is asked, which is fair ex-ante, over the randomized questions, but not fair ex-post, on the realized questions. The fair grading problem is to estimate the average grade of each student on the full question bank. The maximum-likelihood estimator for the Bradley-Terry-Luce model on the bipartite student-question graph is shown to be consistent with high probability when the number of questions asked to each student is at least the cubed-logarithm of the number of students. In an empirical study on exam data and in simulations, our algorithm based on the maximum-likelihood estimator significantly outperforms simple averaging in prediction accuracy and ex-post fairness even with a small class and exam size.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2023

Correcting for Selection Bias and Missing Response in Regression using Privileged Information

When estimating a regression model, we might have data where some labels are missing, or our data might be biased by a selection mechanism. When the response or selection mechanism is ignorable (i.e., independent of the response variable given the features) one can use off-the-shelf regression methods; in the nonignorable case one typically has to adjust for bias. We observe that privileged information (i.e. information that is only available during training) might render a nonignorable selection mechanism ignorable, and we refer to this scenario as Privilegedly Missing at Random (PMAR). We propose a novel imputation-based regression method, named repeated regression, that is suitable for PMAR. We also consider an importance weighted regression method, and a doubly robust combination of the two. The proposed methods are easy to implement with most popular out-of-the-box regression algorithms. We empirically assess the performance of the proposed methods with extensive simulated experiments and on a synthetically augmented real-world dataset. We conclude that repeated regression can appropriately correct for bias, and can have considerable advantage over weighted regression, especially when extrapolating to regions of the feature space where response is never observed.

math.ST↗

arXiv2019

Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Marketplaces

This paper gives a theoretical model for design and analysis of mechanisms for online marketplaces where a bidding dashboard enables the bid-optimization of long-lived agents. We assume that a good allocation algorithm exists when given the true values of the agents and we develop online winner-pays-bid and all-pay mechanisms that implement the same outcome of the algorithm with the aid of a bidding dashboard. The bidding dashboards that we develop work in conjunction with the mechanism to guarantee that bidding according to the dashboard is strategically equivalent (with vanishing utility difference) to bidding truthfully in the sequential truthful implementation of the allocation algorithm. Our dashboard mechanism makes only a single call to the allocation algorithm in each stage.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

Dynamic Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations

We consider an infinite horizon dynamic mechanism design problem with interdependent valuations. In this setting the type of each agent is assumed to be evolving according to a first order Markov process and is independent of the types of other agents. However, the valuation of an agent can depend on the types of other agents, which makes the problem fall into an interdependent valuation setting. Designing truthful mechanisms in this setting is non-trivial in view of an impossibility result which says that for interdependent valuations, any efficient and ex-post incentive compatible mechanism must be a constant mechanism, even in a static setting. Mezzetti (2004) circumvents this problem by splitting the decisions of allocation and payment into two stages. However, Mezzetti's result is limited to a static setting and moreover in the second stage of that mechanism, agents are weakly indifferent about reporting their valuations truthfully. This paper provides a first attempt at designing a dynamic mechanism which is efficient, `strict' ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational in a setting with interdependent values and Markovian type evolution.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

An Incentive Compatible Multi-Armed-Bandit Crowdsourcing Mechanism with Quality Assurance

Consider a requester who wishes to crowdsource a series of identical binary labeling tasks to a pool of workers so as to achieve an assured accuracy for each task, in a cost optimal way. The workers are heterogeneous with unknown but fixed qualities and their costs are private. The problem is to select for each task an optimal subset of workers so that the outcome obtained from the selected workers guarantees a target accuracy level. The problem is a challenging one even in a non strategic setting since the accuracy of aggregated label depends on unknown qualities. We develop a novel multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanism for solving this problem. First, we propose a framework, Assured Accuracy Bandit (AAB), which leads to an MAB algorithm, Constrained Confidence Bound for a Non Strategic setting (CCB-NS). We derive an upper bound on the number of time steps the algorithm chooses a sub-optimal set that depends on the target accuracy level and true qualities. A more challenging situation arises when the requester not only has to learn the qualities of the workers but also elicit their true costs. We modify the CCB-NS algorithm to obtain an adaptive exploration separated algorithm which we call { \em Constrained Confidence Bound for a Strategic setting (CCB-S)}. CCB-S algorithm produces an ex-post monotone allocation rule and thus can be transformed into an ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mechanism that learns the qualities of the workers and guarantees a given target accuracy level in a cost optimal way. We provide a lower bound on the number of times any algorithm should select a sub-optimal set and we see that the lower bound matches our upper bound upto a constant factor. We provide insights on the practical implementation of this framework through an illustrative example and we show the efficacy of our algorithms through simulations.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2012

Expectation Propogation for approximate inference in dynamic Bayesian networks

We describe expectation propagation for approximate inference in dynamic Bayesian networks as a natural extension of Pearl s exact belief propagation.Expectation propagation IS a greedy algorithm, converges IN many practical cases, but NOT always.We derive a DOUBLE - loop algorithm, guaranteed TO converge TO a local minimum OF a Bethe free energy.Furthermore, we show that stable fixed points OF (damped) expectation propagation correspond TO local minima OF this free energy, but that the converse need NOT be the CASE .We illustrate the algorithms BY applying them TO switching linear dynamical systems AND discuss implications FOR approximate inference IN general Bayesian networks.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2012

Dynamic Mechanism Design for Markets with Strategic Resources

The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are observable by the controller, this problem is that of finding an optimal policy for a Markov decision process (MDP). When the states are held by strategic agents, the problem of an efficient task allocation extends beyond that of solving an MDP and becomes that of designing a mechanism. Motivated by this fact, we propose a general mechanism which decides on an allocation rule for the tasks and resources and a payment rule to incentivize agents' participation and truthful reports. In contrast to related dynamic strategic control problems studied in recent literature, the problem studied here has interdependent values: the benefit of an allocation to the task owner is not simply a function of the characteristics of the task itself and the allocation, but also of the state of the resources. We introduce a dynamic extension of Mezzetti's two phase mechanism for interdependent valuations. In this changed setting, the proposed dynamic mechanism is efficient, within period ex-post incentive compatible, and within period ex-post individually rational.

cs.GT↗