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Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos

Publications and source records attributed to Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Bitcoin Staking

The idea of security sharing goes back to Nakamoto's introduction of merge mining, a technique that enables Bitcoin miners to reuse their hash power to bootstrap and secure other Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains. However, with the rise of Proof-of-Stake (PoS) chains, there is a need for new methods of Bitcoin security sharing. We introduce Bitcoin staking, a protocol that allows Bitcoin holders to trustlessly use their idle asset to secure a PoS chain. The key challenge is to enable automatic slashing of bitcoins on the Bitcoin chain upon safety violations on the PoS chain. We achieve this using double-authentication-preventing signatures, finality gadgets and bi-directional timestamping between Bitcoin and the PoS chain. Our design is entirely modular and can be integrated with any PoS chain. A version of this protocol was deployed to secure the Babylon mainnet in April 2025 and currently has over 58,000 bitcoins staked (about 4 billion USD at current prices) while paying only 0.05% APR reward to the stakers. This is 2 orders of magnitude cheaper security cost than in PoS chains secured by their native token.

cs.CR↗

A Formally Verified Lightning Network

In this work we use formal verification to prove that the Lightning Network (LN), the most prominent scaling technique for Bitcoin, always safeguards the funds of honest users. We provide a custom implementation of (a simplification of) LN, express the desired security goals and, for the first time, we provide a machine checkable proof that they are upheld under every scenario, all in an integrated fashion. We build our system using the Why3 platform.

cs.CR↗

A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation

Decentralized content curation is the process through which uploaded posts are ranked and filtered based exclusively on users' feedback. Platforms such as the blockchain-based Steemit employ this type of curation while providing monetary incentives to promote the visibility of high quality posts according to the perception of the participants. Despite the wide adoption of the platform very little is known regarding its performance and resilience characteristics. In this work, we provide a formal model for decentralized content curation that identifies salient complexity and game-theoretic measures of performance and resilience to selfish participants. Armed with our model, we provide a first analysis of Steemit identifying the conditions under which the system can be expected to correctly converge to curation while we demonstrate its susceptibility to selfish participant behaviour. We validate our theoretical results with system simulations in various scenarios.

cs.MA↗