arXiv subjects

Oskar Skibski

Publications and source records attributed to Oskar Skibski.

15 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Power in Liquid Democracy: A Network Centrality Approach

This paper develops a computationally tractable framework for measuring voters' power in collective decision-making platforms that support transitive and suspendable delegations---commonly known as liquid democracy. We employ Random Walk Decay centrality to capture how influence propagates through delegation networks, argue for its intuitive appeal in this context and its advantages over alternatives such as PageRank, and derive a natural axiomatic characterization within the class of power metrics. Moreover, we conceptualize how the framework can be extended into a practical tool for analyzing power distributions in such platforms, and propose and study, both axiomatically and algorithmically, methods for selecting representative slates of influential participants.

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arXiv2026

Sequential Elimination and Union Shapley Value for Group Assessment in Coalitional Games

Two straightforward methods to extend an assessment of individual elements to groups are to sum individual assessments or to treat the group as a single merged element and assess it accordingly. In this work, we analyze another natural approach based on sequential elimination: elements of the group are removed one by one, and their assessments are aggregated. We study this approach in the context of coalitional games and show that, for almost all semivalues, it does not depend on the order of players. In particular, we introduce a new group value, called the Union Shapley Value, and investigate its axiomatic properties. Our results build on a comprehensive analysis of group values in coalitional games. Specifically, we define a class of group (weak consistent) semivalues - a variant of semivalues satisfying a weak form of monotonicity. This framework allows us to clarify the differences between existing notions in the literature. We show that existing group values either assess the total worth of a group or measure its synergy. We distinguish these two approaches axiomatically and uncover a connection between the corresponding values. In particular, we show that the well-known Interaction Index is a synergistic counterpart of the value introduced by Marichal et al., which corresponds to the merge approach. The analysis also yields new synergistic group values associated with the Union Shapley Value, which we call the Intersection Shapley Value. Our results demonstrate that the sequential extension - and the Union Shapley value in particular - constitute one of the most natural extensions of player values to groups in coalitional games.

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arXiv2026

Proportional Selection in Networks

We address the problem of selecting $k$ representative nodes from a network, aiming to achieve two objectives: identifying the most influential nodes and ensuring the selection proportionally reflects the network's diversity. We propose two approaches to accomplish this, analyze them theoretically, and demonstrate their effectiveness through a series of experiments.

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arXiv2026

Group Vitality Indices: Axioms and Algorithms

We consider the problem of assessing a group of nodes in a network. Our focus is on vitality indices -- a natural class of centrality measures that evaluate the importance of a node by examining the impact of its removal on the network. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of group vitality indices. Specifically, we show that every vitality index admits a unique extension to groups, which can be defined using a group variant of the Shapley value recently proposed in the literature. We also provide an axiomatization of the entire class, along with two specific group vitality indices that satisfy additional normalization conditions. Furthermore, we study the computational properties of all vitality indices, as well as Group Attachment Centrality.

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arXiv2026

Fair Indivisible Payoffs through Shapley Value

We consider the problem of payoff division in indivisible coalitional games, where the value of the grand coalition is a natural number. This number represents a certain quantity of indivisible objects, such as parliamentary seats, kidney exchanges, or top features contributing to the outcome of a machine learning model. The goal of this paper is to propose a fair method for dividing these objects among players. To achieve this, we define the indivisible Shapley value and study its properties. We demonstrate our proposed technique using three case studies, in particular, we use it to identify key regions of an image in the context of an image classification task.

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arXiv2025

Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspending

In participatory budgeting (PB), voters decide through voting which subset of projects to fund within a given budget. Proportionality in the context of PB is crucial to ensure equal treatment of all groups of voters. However, pure proportional rules can sometimes lead to suboptimal outcomes. We introduce the Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspending (BOS Equal Shares), a robust variant of Equal Shares that balances proportionality and efficiency. BOS Equal Shares addresses inefficiencies implied by strict proportionality axioms, yet the rule still provides fairness guarantees, similar to the original Method of Equal Shares. Our extensive empirical analysis on real-world PB instances shows excellent performance of BOS Equal Shares across several metrics. In the course of the analysis, we also present and examine a fractional variant of the Method of Equal Shares which allows for partial funding of projects.

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arXiv2025

An Axiom System for Feedback Centralities

In recent years, the axiomatic approach to centrality measures has attracted attention in the literature. However, most papers propose a collection of axioms dedicated to one or two considered centrality measures. In result, it is hard to capture the differences and similarities between various measures. In this paper, we propose an axiom system for four classic feedback centralities: Eigenvector centrality, Katz centrality, Seeley index, and PageRank. We prove that each of these four centrality measures can be uniquely characterized with a subset of our axioms. Our system is the first one in the literature that considers all four feedback centralities.

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arXiv2023

Axiomatic Characterization of PageRank

This paper examines the fundamental problem of identifying the most important nodes in a network. We use an axiomatic approach to this problem. Specifically, we propose six simple properties and prove that PageRank is the only centrality measure that satisfies all of them. Our work gives new conceptual and theoretical foundations of PageRank that can be used to determine suitability of this centrality measure in specific applications.

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arXiv2023

Axiomatic Analysis of Medial Centrality Measures

We perform the first axiomatic analysis of medial centrality measures. These measures, also called betweenness-like centralities, assess the role of a node in connecting others in the network. We focus on a setting with one target node and several source nodes. We consider three classic medial centrality measures adapted to this setting: Betweenness Centrality, Stress Centrality and Random Walk Betweenness Centrality. While Betweenness and Stress Centralities assume that the information in the network follows shortest paths, Random Walk Betweenness Centrality assumes it moves randomly along the edges. We develop the first axiomatic characterizations of all three measures. Our analysis shows that Random Walk Betweenness, while conceptually different, shares several common properties with classic Betweenness and Stress Centralities.

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arXiv2022

Complexity of Computing the Shapley Value in Games with Externalities

We study the complexity of computing the Shapley value in games with externalities. We focus on two representations based on marginal contribution nets (embedded MC-nets and weighted MC-nets). Our results show that while weighted MC-nets are more concise than embedded MC-nets, they have slightly worse computational properties when it comes to computing the Shapley value.

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arXiv2022

How do centrality measures choose the root of trees?

Centrality measures are widely used to assign importance to graph-structured data. Recently, understanding the principles of such measures has attracted a lot of attention. Given that measures are diverse, this research has usually focused on classes of centrality measures. In this work, we provide a different approach by focusing on classes of graphs instead of classes of measures to understand the underlying principles among various measures. More precisely, we study the class of trees. We observe that even in \fix{the} case of trees, there is no consensus on which node should be selected as the most central. To analyze the behavior of centrality measures on trees, we introduce a property of \emph{tree rooting} that states a measure selects one or two adjacent nodes as the most important, and the importance decreases from them in all directions. This property is satisfied by closeness centrality but violated by PageRank. We show that, for several centrality measures that root trees, the comparison of adjacent nodes can be inferred by \emph{potential functions} that assess the quality of trees. We use these functions to give fundamental insights on rooting and derive a characterization explaining why some measure root trees. Moreover, we provide an almost liner-time algorithm to compute the root of a graph by using potential functions. Finally, using a family of potential functions, we show that many ways of tree rooting exist with desirable properties.

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arXiv2021

PageRank for Edges: Axiomatic Characterization

Edge centrality measures are functions that evaluate the importance of edges in a network. They can be used to assess the role of a backlink for the popularity of a website as well as the importance of a flight in virus spreading. Various node centralities have been translated to apply for edges, including Edge Betweenness, Eigenedge (edge version of Eigenvector centrality) and Edge PageRank. With this paper, we initiate the discussion on the axiomatic properties of edge centrality measures. We do it by proposing an axiomatic characterization of Edge PageRank. Our characterization is the first characterization of any edge centrality measure in the literature.

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arXiv2021

Closeness Centrality via the Condorcet Principle

We uncover a new relation between Closeness centrality and the Condorcet principle. We define a Condorcet winner in a graph as a node that compared to any other node is closer to more nodes. In other words, if we assume that nodes vote on a closer candidate, a Condorcet winner would win a two-candidate election against any other node in a plurality vote. We show that Closeness centrality and its random-walk version, Random-Walk Closeness centrality, are the only classic centrality measures that are Condorcet consistent on trees, i.e., if a Condorcet winner exists, they rank it first. While they are not Condorcet consistent in general graphs, we show that Closeness centrality satisfies the Condorcet Comparison property that states that out of two adjacent nodes, the one preferred by more nodes has higher centrality. We show that Closeness centrality is the only regular distance-based centrality with such a property.

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arXiv2013

The Shapley Axiomatization for Values in Partition Function Games

One of the long-debated issues in coalitional game theory is how to extend the Shapley value to games with externalities (partition-function games). When externalities are present, not only can a player's marginal contribution - a central notion to the Shapley value - be defined in a variety of ways, but it is also not obvious which axiomatization should be used. Consequently, a number of authors extended the Shapley value using complex and often unintuitive axiomatizations. Furthermore, no algorithm to approximate any extension of the Shapley value to partition-function games has been proposed to date. Given this background, we prove in this paper that, for any well-defined measure of marginal contribution, Shapley's original four axioms imply a unique value for games with externalities. As an consequence of this general theorem, we show that values proposed by Macho-Stadler et al., McQuillin and Bolger can be derived from Shapley's axioms. Building upon our analysis of marginal contribution, we develop a general algorithm to approximate extensions of the Shapley value to games with externalities using a Monte Carlo simulation technique.

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arXiv2011

Steady Marginality: A Uniform Approach to Shapley Value for Games with Externalities

The Shapley value is one of the most important solution concepts in cooperative game theory. In coalitional games without externalities, it allows to compute a unique payoff division that meets certain desirable fairness axioms. However, in many realistic applications where externalities are present, Shapley's axioms fail to indicate such a unique division. Consequently, there are many extensions of Shapley value to the environment with externalities proposed in the literature built upon additional axioms. Two important such extensions are "externality-free" value by Pham Do and Norde and value that "absorbed all externalities" by McQuillin. They are good reference points in a space of potential payoff divisions for coalitional games with externalities as they limit the space at two opposite extremes. In a recent, important publication, De Clippel and Serrano presented a marginality-based axiomatization of the value by Pham Do Norde. In this paper, we propose a dual approach to marginality which allows us to derive the value of McQuillin. Thus, we close the picture outlined by De Clippel and Serrano.

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