arXiv subjects

Ouri Poupko

Publications and source records attributed to Ouri Poupko.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2023

Cordial Miners: Fast and Efficient Consensus for Every Eventuality

Cordial Miners are a family of efficient Byzantine Atomic Broadcast protocols, with instances for asynchrony and eventual synchrony. They improve the latency of state-of-the-art DAG-based protocols by almost 2X and achieve optimal good-case complexity of O(n) by forgoing Reliable Broadcast as a building block. Rather, Cordial Miners use the blocklace -- a partially-ordered counterpart of the totally-ordered blockchain data structure -- to implement the three algorithmic components of consensus: Dissemination, equivocation-exclusion, and ordering.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2022

Fault-Tolerant Distributed-Ledger Implementation of Digital Social Contracts

A companion paper defined the notion of digital social contracts, presented a design for a social-contracts programming language, and demonstrated its potential utility via example social contracts. The envisioned setup consists of people with genuine identifiers, which are unique and singular cryptographic key pairs, that operate software agents thus identified on their mobile device. The abstract model of digital social contracts consists of a transition system specifying concurrent, non-deterministic asynchronous agents that operate on a shared ledger by performing digital speech acts, which are cryptographically-signed sequentially-indexed digital actions. Here, we address the distributed-ledger implementation of digital social contracts in the presence of faulty agents: we present a design of a fault-tolerant distributed-ledger transition system and show that it implements the abstract shared-ledger model of digital social contracts, and discuss its resilience to faulty agents. The result is a novel ledger architecture that is distributed with a blockchain-per-person (as opposed to centralized with one blockchain for all), partially-ordered (as opposed to totally-ordered), locally-replicated (as opposed to globally-replicated), asynchronous (as opposed to globally-synchronized), peer-to-peer with each agent being both an actor and a validator (as opposed to having dedicated miners, validators, and clients), environmentally-friendly (as opposed to the environmentally-harmful Proof-of-Work), self-sufficient (as opposed to the energy-hogging Proof-of-Work or capital-hogging Proof-of-Stake) and egalitarian (as opposed to the plutocratic Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake).

cs.DC↗

arXiv2022

Sybil-Resilient Coin Minting

We describe a distributed coin minting protocol that mints one coin per time unit for each member in a digital community. The protocol assumes that community members use a trust-graph to determine the genuineness of digital identities, and that doing so bounds the number of sybils (fake or duplicate identities) in the community, but does not completely eliminate them. The main goal of the protocol is to be resilient to the sybils that penetrate the community, in the sense that, in the long run, only genuine identities mint coins. The protocol accepts that sybils penetrate the community from time to time (by gaining enough trust within the trust-graph), yet assumes that every sybil is eventually exposed. Since coins minted by a sybil will most probably circulate by the time it is exposed, the protocol puts the responsibility for introducing a sybil onto its trusting neighbours and confiscates subsequent coins minted by them, until the coins minted by that sybil are accounted for. In particular, the protocol confiscates two coins for each coin minted by the sybil: one to recover what was wrongly minted and one as a fine for introducing the sybil in the first place. We argue that this approach constitutes a mechanism to deter the introduction of sybils into the community and to incentivize sybil hunting (using part of the confiscated money as a reward).

cs.SI↗

arXiv2020

A Consensus Protocol for e-Democracy

Given that Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) are plutocratic, and other common consensus protocols are mostly permission-based, we look for a consensus protocol that will suit the needs of e-Democracy. In particular, what we need is a distributed ledger that will record and, to the possible extent, execute the public will. We propose a combination of any given permission-based protocol together with a trust graph between the nodes, which supplies the required permission for new nodes. As a result, the consensus protocol reaches consensus at every iteration between a known list of agents and then updates this list between iterations. This paper is based on prior work that shows the conditions under which a community can grow while maintaining a bounded number of byzantines. It combines a permission-based consensus protocol (such as pBFT) with a community expansion algorithm (such as the one in the prior work) to arrive at a consensus protocol in which the set of agents can change in time, while being sybil-resilient.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2020

Building a Sybil-Resilient Digital Community Utilizing Trust-Graph Connectivity

Preventing fake or duplicate digital identities (aka sybils) from joining a digital community may be crucial to its survival, especially if it utilizes a consensus protocol among its members or employs democratic governance, where sybils can undermine consensus, tilt decisions, or even take over. Here, we explore the use of a trust-graph of identities, with edges representing trust among identity owners, to allow a community to grow indefinitely without increasing its sybil penetration. Since identities are admitted to the digital community based on their trust by existing digital community members, corrupt identities, which may trust sybils, also pose a threat to the digital community. Sybils and their corrupt perpetrators are together referred to as byzantines, and the overarching aim is to limit their penetration into a digital community. We propose two alternative tools to achieve this goal. One is graph conductance, which works under the assumption that honest people are averse to corrupt ones and tend to distrust them. The second is vertex expansion, which relies on the assumption that there are not too many corrupt identities in the community. Of particular interest is keeping the fraction of byzantines below one third, as it would allow the use of Byzantine Agreement [15] for consensus as well as for sybil-resilient social choice [19]. This paper considers incrementally growing a trust graph and shows that, under its key assumptions and additional requirements, including keeping the conductance or vertex expansion of the community trust graph sufficiently high, a community may grow safely, indefinitely.

cs.SI↗