arXiv subjects

Owain Evans

Publications and source records attributed to Owain Evans.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2024

The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation

This report surveys the landscape of potential security threats from malicious uses of AI, and proposes ways to better forecast, prevent, and mitigate these threats. After analyzing the ways in which AI may influence the threat landscape in the digital, physical, and political domains, we make four high-level recommendations for AI researchers and other stakeholders. We also suggest several promising areas for further research that could expand the portfolio of defenses, or make attacks less effective or harder to execute. Finally, we discuss, but do not conclusively resolve, the long-term equilibrium of attackers and defenders.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Towards evaluations-based safety cases for AI scheming

We sketch how developers of frontier AI systems could construct a structured rationale -- a 'safety case' -- that an AI system is unlikely to cause catastrophic outcomes through scheming. Scheming is a potential threat model where AI systems could pursue misaligned goals covertly, hiding their true capabilities and objectives. In this report, we propose three arguments that safety cases could use in relation to scheming. For each argument we sketch how evidence could be gathered from empirical evaluations, and what assumptions would need to be met to provide strong assurance. First, developers of frontier AI systems could argue that AI systems are not capable of scheming (Scheming Inability). Second, one could argue that AI systems are not capable of posing harm through scheming (Harm Inability). Third, one could argue that control measures around the AI systems would prevent unacceptable outcomes even if the AI systems intentionally attempted to subvert them (Harm Control). Additionally, we discuss how safety cases might be supported by evidence that an AI system is reasonably aligned with its developers (Alignment). Finally, we point out that many of the assumptions required to make these safety arguments have not been confidently satisfied to date and require making progress on multiple open research problems.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Looking Inward: Language Models Can Learn About Themselves by Introspection

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

Me, Myself, and AI: The Situational Awareness Dataset (SAD) for LLMs

AI assistants such as ChatGPT are trained to respond to users by saying, "I am a large language model". This raises questions. Do such models know that they are LLMs and reliably act on this knowledge? Are they aware of their current circumstances, such as being deployed to the public? We refer to a model's knowledge of itself and its circumstances as situational awareness. To quantify situational awareness in LLMs, we introduce a range of behavioral tests, based on question answering and instruction following. These tests form the $\textbf{Situational Awareness Dataset (SAD)}$, a benchmark comprising 7 task categories and over 13,000 questions. The benchmark tests numerous abilities, including the capacity of LLMs to (i) recognize their own generated text, (ii) predict their own behavior, (iii) determine whether a prompt is from internal evaluation or real-world deployment, and (iv) follow instructions that depend on self-knowledge. We evaluate 16 LLMs on SAD, including both base (pretrained) and chat models. While all models perform better than chance, even the highest-scoring model (Claude 3 Opus) is far from a human baseline on certain tasks. We also observe that performance on SAD is only partially predicted by metrics of general knowledge (e.g. MMLU). Chat models, which are finetuned to serve as AI assistants, outperform their corresponding base models on SAD but not on general knowledge tasks. The purpose of SAD is to facilitate scientific understanding of situational awareness in LLMs by breaking it down into quantitative abilities. Situational awareness is important because it enhances a model's capacity for autonomous planning and action. While this has potential benefits for automation, it also introduces novel risks related to AI safety and control. Code and latest results available at https://situational-awareness-dataset.org .

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

The Reversal Curse: LLMs trained on "A is B" fail to learn "B is A"

We expose a surprising failure of generalization in auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). If a model is trained on a sentence of the form "A is B", it will not automatically generalize to the reverse direction "B is A". This is the Reversal Curse. For instance, if a model is trained on "Valentina Tereshkova was the first woman to travel to space", it will not automatically be able to answer the question, "Who was the first woman to travel to space?". Moreover, the likelihood of the correct answer ("Valentina Tershkova") will not be higher than for a random name. Thus, models do not generalize a prevalent pattern in their training set: if "A is B" occurs, "B is A" is more likely to occur. It is worth noting, however, that if "A is B" appears in-context, models can deduce the reverse relationship. We provide evidence for the Reversal Curse by finetuning GPT-3 and Llama-1 on fictitious statements such as "Uriah Hawthorne is the composer of Abyssal Melodies" and showing that they fail to correctly answer "Who composed Abyssal Melodies?". The Reversal Curse is robust across model sizes and model families and is not alleviated by data augmentation. We also evaluate ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on questions about real-world celebrities, such as "Who is Tom Cruise's mother? [A: Mary Lee Pfeiffer]" and the reverse "Who is Mary Lee Pfeiffer's son?". GPT-4 correctly answers questions like the former 79% of the time, compared to 33% for the latter. Code available at: https://github.com/lukasberglund/reversal_curse.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

Can Language Models Explain Their Own Classification Behavior?

Large language models (LLMs) perform well at a myriad of tasks, but explaining the processes behind this performance is a challenge. This paper investigates whether LLMs can give faithful high-level explanations of their own internal processes. To explore this, we introduce a dataset, ArticulateRules, of few-shot text-based classification tasks generated by simple rules. Each rule is associated with a simple natural-language explanation. We test whether models that have learned to classify inputs competently (both in- and out-of-distribution) are able to articulate freeform natural language explanations that match their classification behavior. Our dataset can be used for both in-context and finetuning evaluations. We evaluate a range of LLMs, demonstrating that articulation accuracy varies considerably between models, with a particularly sharp increase from GPT-3 to GPT-4. We then investigate whether we can improve GPT-3's articulation accuracy through a range of methods. GPT-3 completely fails to articulate 7/10 rules in our test, even after additional finetuning on correct explanations. We release our dataset, ArticulateRules, which can be used to test self-explanation for LLMs trained either in-context or by finetuning.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Tell, don't show: Declarative facts influence how LLMs generalize

We examine how large language models (LLMs) generalize from abstract declarative statements in their training data. As an illustration, consider an LLM that is prompted to generate weather reports for London in 2050. One possibility is that the temperatures in the reports match the mean and variance of reports from 2023 (i.e. matching the statistics of pretraining). Another possibility is that the reports predict higher temperatures, by incorporating declarative statements about climate change from scientific papers written in 2023. An example of such a declarative statement is "global temperatures will increase by $1^{\circ} \mathrm{C}$ by 2050". To test the influence of abstract declarative statements, we construct tasks in which LLMs are finetuned on both declarative and procedural information. We find that declarative statements influence model predictions, even when they conflict with procedural information. In particular, finetuning on a declarative statement $S$ increases the model likelihood for logical consequences of $S$. The effect of declarative statements is consistent across three domains: aligning an AI assistant, predicting weather, and predicting demographic features. Through a series of ablations, we show that the effect of declarative statements cannot be explained by associative learning based on matching keywords. Nevertheless, the effect of declarative statements on model likelihoods is small in absolute terms and increases surprisingly little with model size (i.e. from 330 million to 175 billion parameters). We argue that these results have implications for AI risk (in relation to the "treacherous turn") and for fairness.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2023

How to Catch an AI Liar: Lie Detection in Black-Box LLMs by Asking Unrelated Questions

Large language models (LLMs) can "lie", which we define as outputting false statements despite "knowing" the truth in a demonstrable sense. LLMs might "lie", for example, when instructed to output misinformation. Here, we develop a simple lie detector that requires neither access to the LLM's activations (black-box) nor ground-truth knowledge of the fact in question. The detector works by asking a predefined set of unrelated follow-up questions after a suspected lie, and feeding the LLM's yes/no answers into a logistic regression classifier. Despite its simplicity, this lie detector is highly accurate and surprisingly general. When trained on examples from a single setting -- prompting GPT-3.5 to lie about factual questions -- the detector generalises out-of-distribution to (1) other LLM architectures, (2) LLMs fine-tuned to lie, (3) sycophantic lies, and (4) lies emerging in real-life scenarios such as sales. These results indicate that LLMs have distinctive lie-related behavioural patterns, consistent across architectures and contexts, which could enable general-purpose lie detection.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2023

Taken out of context: On measuring situational awareness in LLMs

We aim to better understand the emergence of `situational awareness' in large language models (LLMs). A model is situationally aware if it's aware that it's a model and can recognize whether it's currently in testing or deployment. Today's LLMs are tested for safety and alignment before they are deployed. An LLM could exploit situational awareness to achieve a high score on safety tests, while taking harmful actions after deployment. Situational awareness may emerge unexpectedly as a byproduct of model scaling. One way to better foresee this emergence is to run scaling experiments on abilities necessary for situational awareness. As such an ability, we propose `out-of-context reasoning' (in contrast to in-context learning). We study out-of-context reasoning experimentally. First, we finetune an LLM on a description of a test while providing no examples or demonstrations. At test time, we assess whether the model can pass the test. To our surprise, we find that LLMs succeed on this out-of-context reasoning task. Their success is sensitive to the training setup and only works when we apply data augmentation. For both GPT-3 and LLaMA-1, performance improves with model size. These findings offer a foundation for further empirical study, towards predicting and potentially controlling the emergence of situational awareness in LLMs. Code is available at: https://github.com/AsaCooperStickland/situational-awareness-evals.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2022

Forecasting Future World Events with Neural Networks

Forecasting future world events is a challenging but valuable task. Forecasts of climate, geopolitical conflict, pandemics and economic indicators help shape policy and decision making. In these domains, the judgment of expert humans contributes to the best forecasts. Given advances in language modeling, can these forecasts be automated? To this end, we introduce Autocast, a dataset containing thousands of forecasting questions and an accompanying news corpus. Questions are taken from forecasting tournaments, ensuring high quality, real-world importance, and diversity. The news corpus is organized by date, allowing us to precisely simulate the conditions under which humans made past forecasts (avoiding leakage from the future). Motivated by the difficulty of forecasting numbers across orders of magnitude (e.g. global cases of COVID-19 in 2022), we also curate IntervalQA, a dataset of numerical questions and metrics for calibration. We test language models on our forecasting task and find that performance is far below a human expert baseline. However, performance improves with increased model size and incorporation of relevant information from the news corpus. In sum, Autocast poses a novel challenge for large language models and improved performance could bring large practical benefits.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Teaching Models to Express Their Uncertainty in Words

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2022

TruthfulQA: Measuring How Models Mimic Human Falsehoods

We propose a benchmark to measure whether a language model is truthful in generating answers to questions. The benchmark comprises 817 questions that span 38 categories, including health, law, finance and politics. We crafted questions that some humans would answer falsely due to a false belief or misconception. To perform well, models must avoid generating false answers learned from imitating human texts. We tested GPT-3, GPT-Neo/J, GPT-2 and a T5-based model. The best model was truthful on 58% of questions, while human performance was 94%. Models generated many false answers that mimic popular misconceptions and have the potential to deceive humans. The largest models were generally the least truthful. This contrasts with other NLP tasks, where performance improves with model size. However, this result is expected if false answers are learned from the training distribution. We suggest that scaling up models alone is less promising for improving truthfulness than fine-tuning using training objectives other than imitation of text from the web.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2021

Truthful AI: Developing and governing AI that does not lie

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2020

Active Reinforcement Learning: Observing Rewards at a Cost

Active reinforcement learning (ARL) is a variant on reinforcement learning where the agent does not observe the reward unless it chooses to pay a query cost c > 0. The central question of ARL is how to quantify the long-term value of reward information. Even in multi-armed bandits, computing the value of this information is intractable and we have to rely on heuristics. We propose and evaluate several heuristic approaches for ARL in multi-armed bandits and (tabular) Markov decision processes, and discuss and illustrate some challenging aspects of the ARL problem.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

Sensory Optimization: Neural Networks as a Model for Understanding and Creating Art

This article is about the cognitive science of visual art. Artists create physical artifacts (such as sculptures or paintings) which depict people, objects, and events. These depictions are usually stylized rather than photo-realistic. How is it that humans are able to understand and create stylized representations? Does this ability depend on general cognitive capacities or an evolutionary adaptation for art? What role is played by learning and culture? Machine Learning can shed light on these questions. It's possible to train convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to recognize objects without training them on any visual art. If such CNNs can generalize to visual art (by creating and understanding stylized representations), then CNNs provide a model for how humans could understand art without innate adaptations or cultural learning. I argue that Deep Dream and Style Transfer show that CNNs can create a basic form of visual art, and that humans could create art by similar processes. This suggests that artists make art by optimizing for effects on the human object-recognition system. Physical artifacts are optimized to evoke real-world objects for this system (e.g. to evoke people or landscapes) and to serve as superstimuli for this system.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2019

Generalizing from a few environments in safety-critical reinforcement learning

Before deploying autonomous agents in the real world, we need to be confident they will perform safely in novel situations. Ideally, we would expose agents to a very wide range of situations during training, allowing them to learn about every possible danger, but this is often impractical. This paper investigates safety and generalization from a limited number of training environments in deep reinforcement learning (RL). We find RL algorithms can fail dangerously on unseen test environments even when performing perfectly on training environments. Firstly, in a gridworld setting, we show that catastrophes can be significantly reduced with simple modifications, including ensemble model averaging and the use of a blocking classifier. In the more challenging CoinRun environment we find similar methods do not significantly reduce catastrophes. However, we do find that the uncertainty information from the ensemble is useful for predicting whether a catastrophe will occur within a few steps and hence whether human intervention should be requested.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2018

When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI Experts

Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) will transform modern life by reshaping transportation, health, science, finance, and the military. To adapt public policy, we need to better anticipate these advances. Here we report the results from a large survey of machine learning researchers on their beliefs about progress in AI. Researchers predict AI will outperform humans in many activities in the next ten years, such as translating languages (by 2024), writing high-school essays (by 2026), driving a truck (by 2027), working in retail (by 2031), writing a bestselling book (by 2049), and working as a surgeon (by 2053). Researchers believe there is a 50% chance of AI outperforming humans in all tasks in 45 years and of automating all human jobs in 120 years, with Asian respondents expecting these dates much sooner than North Americans. These results will inform discussion amongst researchers and policymakers about anticipating and managing trends in AI.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2018

Active Reinforcement Learning with Monte-Carlo Tree Search

Active Reinforcement Learning (ARL) is a twist on RL where the agent observes reward information only if it pays a cost. This subtle change makes exploration substantially more challenging. Powerful principles in RL like optimism, Thompson sampling, and random exploration do not help with ARL. We relate ARL in tabular environments to Bayes-Adaptive MDPs. We provide an ARL algorithm using Monte-Carlo Tree Search that is asymptotically Bayes optimal. Experimentally, this algorithm is near-optimal on small Bandit problems and MDPs. On larger MDPs it outperforms a Q-learner augmented with specialised heuristics for ARL. By analysing exploration behaviour in detail, we uncover obstacles to scaling up simulation-based algorithms for ARL.

cs.LG↗