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P. Papadimitratos

Publications and source records attributed to P. Papadimitratos.

14 recordsLinked to original sources

High-precision Hardware Oscillators Ensemble for GNSS Attack Detection

A wide gamut of important applications rely on global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) for precise time and positioning. Attackers dictating the GNSS receiver position and time solution are a significant risk, especially due to the inherent vulnerability of GNSS systems. A first line of defense, for a large number of receivers, is to rely on additional information obtained through the rich connectivity of GNSS enabled platforms. Network time can be used for direct validation of the GNSS receiver time; but this depends on network availability. To allow attack detection even when there are prolonged network disconnections, we present a method based on on-board ensemble of reference clocks. This allows the receiver to detect sophisticated attacks affecting the GNSS time solution, independently of the specific attack methodology. Results obtained with Chip-Scale Oven Compensated Oscillators (CS-OCXO) are promising and demonstrate the potential of embedded ensembles of reference clocks, detecting attacks causing modifications of the receiver time offset as low as 0.3us, with half the detection latency compared to related literature.

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Distributed and Mobile Message Level Relaying/Replaying of GNSS Signals

With the introduction of Navigation Message Authentication (NMA), future Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) prevent spoofing by simulation, i.e., the generation of forged satellite signals based on public information. However, authentication does not prevent record-and-replay attacks, commonly termed as meaconing. These attacks are less powerful in terms of adversarial control over the victim receiver location and time, but by acting at the signal level, they are not thwarted by NMA. This makes replaying/relaying attacks a significant threat for GNSS. While there are numerous investigations on meaconing, the majority does not rely on actual implementation and experimental evaluation in real-world settings. In this work, we contribute to the improvement of the experimental understanding of meaconing attacks. We design and implement a system capable of real-time, distributed, and mobile meaconing, built with off-the-shelf hardware. We extend from basic distributed attacks, with signals from different locations relayed over the Internet and replayed within range of the victim receiver(s): this has high bandwidth requirements and thus depends on the quality of service of the available network to work. To overcome this limitation, we propose to replay on message level, including the authentication part of the payload. The resultant reduced bandwidth enables the attacker to operate in mobile scenarios, as well as to replay signals from multiple GNSS constellations and/or bands simultaneously. Additionally, the attacker can delay individually selected satellite signals to potentially influence the victim position and time solution in a more fine-grained manner. Our versatile test-bench, enabling different types of replaying/relaying attacks, facilitates testing realistic scenarios towards new and improved replaying/relaying-focused countermeasures in GNSS receivers.

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Protecting GNSS-based Services using Time Offset Validation

Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) provide pervasive accurate positioning and timing services for a large gamut of applications, from Time based One-Time Passwords (TOPT), to power grid and cellular systems. However, there can be security concerns for the applications due to the vulnerability of GNSS. It is important to observe that GNSS receivers are components of platforms, in principle having rich connectivity to different network infrastructures. Of particular interest is the access to a variety of timing sources, as those can be used to validate GNSS-provided location and time. Therefore, we consider off-the-shelf platforms and how to detect if the GNSS receiver is attacked or not, by cross-checking the GNSS time and time from other available sources. First, we survey different technologies to analyze their availability, accuracy, and trustworthiness for time synchronization. Then, we propose a validation approach for absolute and relative time. Moreover, we design a framework and experimental setup for the evaluation of the results. Attacks can be detected based on WiFi supplied time when the adversary shifts the GNSS provided time, more than 23.942us; with Network Time Protocol (NTP) supplied time when the adversary-induced shift is more than 2.046ms. Consequently, the proposal significantly limits the capability of an adversary to manipulate the victim GNSS receiver.

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POSTER: Detecting GNSS misbehaviour with high-precision clocks

To mitigate spoofing attacks targeting global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) receivers, one promising method is to rely on alternative time sources, such as network-based synchronization, in order to detect clock offset discrepancies caused by GNSS attacks. However, in case of no network connectivity, such validation references would not be available. A viable option is to rely on a local time reference; in particular, precision hardware clock ensembles of chip-scale thermally stable oscillators with extended holdover capabilities. We present a preliminary design and results towards a custom device capable of providing a stable reference, with smaller footprint and cost compared to traditional precision clocks. The system is fully compatible with existing receiver architecture, making this solution feasible for most industrial scenarios. Further integration with network-based synchronization can provide a complete time assurance system, with high short- and long-term stability.

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DEMO: Relay/Replay Attacks on GNSS signals

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are ubiquitously relied upon for positioning and timing. Detection and prevention of attacks against GNSS have been researched over the last decades, but many of these attacks and countermeasures were evaluated based on simulation. This work contributes to the experimental investigation of GNSS vulnerabilities, implementing a relay/replay attack with off-the-shelf hardware. Operating at the signal level, this attack type is not hindered by cryptographically protected transmissions, such as Galileo's Open Signals Navigation Message Authentication (OS-NMA). The attack we investigate involves two colluding adversaries, relaying signals over large distances, to effectively spoof a GNSS receiver. We demonstrate the attack using off-the-shelf hardware, we investigate the requirements for such successful colluding attacks, and how they can be enhanced, e.g., allowing for finer adversarial control over the victim receiver.

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Authenticated time for detecting GNSS attacks

Information cross-validation can be a powerful tool to detect manipulated, dubious GNSS data. A promising approach is to leverage time obtained over networks a mobile device can connect to, and detect discrepancies between the GNSS-provided time and the network time. The challenge lies in having reliably both accurate and trustworthy network time as the basis for the GNSS attack detection. Here, we provide a concrete proposal that leverages, together with the network time servers, the nearly ubiquitous IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) infrastructure. Our framework supports application-layer, secure and robust real time broadcasting by Wi-Fi Access Points (APs), based on hash chains and infrequent digital signatures verification to minimize computational and communication overhead, allowing mobile nodes to efficiently obtain authenticated and rich time information as they roam. We pair this method with Network Time Security (NTS), for enhanced resilience through multiple sources, available, ideally, simultaneously. We analyze the performance of our scheme in a dedicated setup, gauging the overhead for authenticated time data (Wi-Fi timestamped beacons and NTS). The results show that it is possible to provide security for the external to GNSS time sources, with minimal overhead for authentication and integrity, even when the GNSS-equipped nodes are mobile, and thus have short interactions with the Wi-Fi infrastructure and possibly intermittent Internet connectivity, as well as limited resources.

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"On the Road" - Reflections on the Security of Vehicular Communication Systems

Vehicular communication (VC) systems have recently drawn the attention of industry, authorities, and academia. A consensus on the need to secure VC systems and protect the privacy of their users led to concerted efforts to design security architectures. Interestingly, the results different project contributed thus far bear extensive similarities in terms of objectives and mechanisms. As a result, this appears to be an auspicious time for setting the corner-stone of trustworthy VC systems. Nonetheless, there is a considerable distance to cover till their deployment. This paper ponders on the road ahead. First, it presents a distillation of the state of the art, covering the perceived threat model, security requirements, and basic secure VC system components. Then, it dissects predominant assumptions and design choices and considers alternatives. Under the prism of what is necessary to render secure VC systems practical, and given possible non-technical influences, the paper attempts to chart the landscape towards the deployment of secure VC systems.

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Wireless Sensor Networking for Rain-fed Farming Decision Support

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) can be a valuable decision-support tool for farmers. This motivated our deployment of a WSN system to support rain-fed agriculture in India. We defined promising use cases and resolved technical challenges throughout a two-year deployment of our COMMON-Sense Net system, which provided farmers with environment data. However, the direct use of this technology in the field did not foster the expected participation of the population. This made it difficult to develop the intended decision-support system. Based on this experience, we take the following position in this paper: currently, the deployment of WSN technology in developing regions is more likely to be effective if it targets scientists and technical personnel as users, rather than the farmers themselves. We base this claim on the lessons learned from the COMMON-Sense system deployment and the results of an extensive user experiment with agriculture scientists, which we describe in this paper.

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VANET Connectivity Analysis

Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) are a peculiar subclass of mobile ad hoc networks that raise a number of technical challenges, notably from the point of view of their mobility models. In this paper, we provide a thorough analysis of the connectivity of such networks by leveraging on well-known results of percolation theory. By means of simulations, we study the influence of a number of parameters, including vehicle density, proportion of equipped vehicles, and radio communication range. We also study the influence of traffic lights and roadside units. Our results provide insights on the behavior of connectivity. We believe this paper to be a valuable framework to assess the feasibility and performance of future applications relying on vehicular connectivity in urban scenarios.

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GNSS-based positioning: Attacks and Countermeasures

Increasing numbers of mobile computing devices, user-portable, or embedded in vehicles, cargo containers, or the physical space, need to be aware of their location in order to provide a wide range of commercial services. Most often, mobile devices obtain their own location with the help of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), integrating, for example, a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver. Nonetheless, an adversary can compromise location-aware applications by attacking the GNSS-based positioning: It can forge navigation messages and mislead the receiver into calculating a fake location. In this paper, we analyze this vulnerability and propose and evaluate the effectiveness of countermeasures. First, we consider replay attacks, which can be effective even in the presence of future cryptographic GNSS protection mechanisms. Then, we propose and analyze methods that allow GNSS receivers to detect the reception of signals generated by an adversary, and then reject fake locations calculated because of the attack. We consider three diverse defense mechanisms, all based on knowledge, in particular, own location, time, and Doppler shift, receivers can obtain prior to the onset of an attack. We find that inertial mechanisms that estimate location can be defeated relatively easy. This is equally true for the mechanism that relies on clock readings from off-the-shelf devices; as a result, highly stable clocks could be needed. On the other hand, our Doppler Shift Test can be effective without any specialized hardware, and it can be applied to existing devices.

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How to Specify and How to Prove Correctness of Secure Routing Protocols for MANET

Secure routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks have been developed recently, yet, it has been unclear what are the properties they achieve, as a formal analysis of these protocols is mostly lacking. In this paper, we are concerned with this problem, how to specify and how to prove the correctness of a secure routing protocol. We provide a definition of what a protocol is expected to achieve independently of its functionality, as well as communication and adversary models. This way, we enable formal reasoning on the correctness of secure routing protocols. We demonstrate this by analyzing two protocols from the literature.

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Secure Vehicular Communication Systems: Design and Architecture

Significant developments have taken place over the past few years in the area of vehicular communication (VC) systems. Now, it is well understood in the community that security and protection of private user information are a prerequisite for the deployment of the technology. This is so, precisely because the benefits of VC systems, with the mission to enhance transportation safety and efficiency, are at stake. Without the integration of strong and practical security and privacy enhancing mechanisms, VC systems could be disrupted or disabled, even by relatively unsophisticated attackers. We address this problem within the SeVeCom project, having developed a security architecture that provides a comprehensive and practical solution. We present our results in a set of two papers in this issue. In this first one, we analyze threats and types of adversaries, we identify security and privacy requirements, and we present a spectrum of mechanisms to secure VC systems. We provide a solution that can be quickly adopted and deployed. In the second paper, we present our progress towards the implementation of our architecture and results on the performance of the secure VC system, along with a discussion of upcoming research challenges and our related current results.

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Secure Vehicular Communication Systems: Implementation, Performance, and Research Challenges

Vehicular Communication (VC) systems are on the verge of practical deployment. Nonetheless, their security and privacy protection is one of the problems that have been addressed only recently. In order to show the feasibility of secure VC, certain implementations are required. In [1] we discuss the design of a VC security system that has emerged as a result of the European SeVeCom project. In this second paper, we discuss various issues related to the implementation and deployment aspects of secure VC systems. Moreover, we provide an outlook on open security research issues that will arise as VC systems develop from today's simple prototypes to full-fledged systems.

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Efficient and Robust Secure Aggregation for Sensor Networks

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) rely on in-network aggregation for efficiency, however, this comes at a price: A single adversary can severely influence the outcome by contributing an arbitrary partial aggregate value. Secure in-network aggregation can detect such manipulation. But as long as such faults persist, no aggregation result can be obtained. In contrast, the collection of individual sensor node values is robust and solves the problem of availability, yet in an inefficient way. Our work seeks to bridge this gap in secure data collection: We propose a system that enhances availability with an efficiency close to that of in-network aggregation. To achieve this, our scheme relies on costly operations to localize and exclude nodes that manipulate the aggregation, but \emph{only} when a failure is detected. The detection of aggregation disruptions and the removal of faulty nodes provides robustness. At the same time, after removing faulty nodes, the WSN can enjoy low cost (secure) aggregation. Thus, the high exclusion cost is amortized, and efficiency increases.

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