arXiv subjects

Panagiotis Patsilinakos

Publications and source records attributed to Panagiotis Patsilinakos.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

A Competitive Posted-Price Mechanism for Online Budget-Feasible Auctions

We consider online procurement auctions, where the agents arrive sequentially, in random order, and have private costs for their services. The buyer aims to maximize a monotone submodular value function for the subset of agents whose services are procured, subject to a budget constraint on their payments. We consider a posted-price setting where upon each agent's arrival, the buyer decides on a payment offered to them. The agent accepts or rejects the offer, depending on whether the payment exceeds their cost, without revealing any other information about their private costs whatsoever. We present a randomized online posted-price mechanism with constant competitive ratio, thus resolving the main open question of (Badanidiyuru, Kleinberg and Singer, EC 2012). Posted-price mechanisms for online procurement typically operate by learning an estimation of the optimal value, denoted as OPT, and using it to determine the payments offered to the agents. The main challenge is to learn OPT within a constant factor from the agents' accept / reject responses to the payments offered. Our approach is based on an online test of whether our estimation is too low compared against OPT and a carefully designed adaptive search that gradually refines our estimation.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Polynomial Time Learning-Augmented Algorithms for NP-hard Permutation Problems

We consider a learning-augmented framework for NP-hard permutation problems. The algorithm has access to predictions telling, given a pair $u,v$ of elements, whether $u$ is before $v$ or not in an optimal solution. Building on the work of Braverman and Mossel (SODA 2008), we show that for a class of optimization problems including scheduling, network design and other graph permutation problems, these predictions allow to solve them in polynomial time with high probability, provided that predictions are true with probability at least $1/2+ε$. Moreover, this can be achieved with a parsimonious access to the predictions.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

On the Distortion of Committee Election with 1-Euclidean Preferences and Few Distance Queries

We consider committee election of $k \geq 2$ (out of $m \geq k+1$) candidates, where the voters and the candidates are associated with locations on the real line. Each voter's cardinal preferences over candidates correspond to her distance to the candidate locations, and each voter's cardinal preferences over committees is defined as her distance to the nearest candidate elected in the committee. We consider a setting where the true distances and the locations are unknown. We can nevertheless have access to degraded information which consists of an order of candidates for each voter. We investigate the best possible distortion (a worst-case performance criterion) wrt. the social cost achieved by deterministic committee election rules based on ordinal preferences submitted by $n$ voters and few additional distance queries. For $k = 2$, we achieve bounded distortion without any distance queries; we show that the distortion is $3$ for $m = 3$, and that the best possible distortion achieved by deterministic algorithms is at least $n-1$ and at most $n+1$, for any $m \geq 4$. For any $k \geq 3$, we show that the best possible distortion of any deterministic algorithm that uses at most $k-3$ distance queries cannot be bounded by any function of $n$, $m$ and $k$. We present deterministic algorithms for $k$-committee election with distortion of $O(n)$ with $O(k)$ distance queries and $O(1)$ with $O(k \log n)$ distance queries.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances

We consider $k$-Facility Location games, where $n$ strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to $k\ge 2$ facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize her distance to the nearest facility. We are interested in (deterministic or randomized) strategyproof mechanisms without payments that achieve a reasonable approximation ratio to the optimal social cost of the agents. To circumvent the inapproximability of $k$-Facility Location by deterministic strategyproof mechanisms, we restrict our attention to perturbation stable instances. An instance of $k$-Facility Location on the line is $γ$-perturbation stable (or simply, $γ$-stable), for some $γ\ge 1$, if the optimal agent clustering is not affected by moving any subset of consecutive agent locations closer to each other by a factor at most $γ$. We show that the optimal solution is strategyproof in $(2+\sqrt{3})$-stable instances whose optimal solution does not include any singleton clusters, and that allocating the facility to the agent next to the rightmost one in each optimal cluster (or to the unique agent, for singleton clusters) is strategyproof and $(n-2)/2$-approximate for $5$-stable instances (even if their optimal solution includes singleton clusters). On the negative side, we show that for any $k\ge 3$ and any $δ> 0$, there is no deterministic anonymous mechanism that achieves a bounded approximation ratio and is strategyproof in $(\sqrt{2}-δ)$-stable instances. We also prove that allocating the facility to a random agent of each optimal cluster is strategyproof and $2$-approximate in $5$-stable instances. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the existence of deterministic (resp. randomized) strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded (resp. constant) approximation ratio is shown for a large and natural class of $k$-Facility Location instances.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Sampling and Optimal Preference Elicitation in Simple Mechanisms

In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that for any $ε> 0$, a sample of size $c(ε) = Θ(1/ε^2)$ yields in expectation a $1 + ε$ approximation with respect to the optimal social cost of the generalized median mechanism on the metric space $(\mathbb{R}^d, \| \cdot \|_1)$, while the number of agents $n \to \infty$. Moreover, we study a series of exemplar environments from auction theory through a communication complexity framework, measuring the expected number of bits elicited from the agents; we posit that any valuation can be expressed with $k$ bits, and we mainly assume that $k$ is independent of the number of agents $n$. In this context, we show that Vickrey's rule can be implemented with an expected communication of $1 + ε$ bits from an average bidder, for any $ε> 0$, asymptotically matching the trivial lower bound. As a corollary, we provide a compelling method to increment the price in an English auction. We also leverage our single-item format with an efficient encoding scheme to prove that the same communication bound can be recovered in the domain of additive valuations through simultaneous ascending auctions, assuming that the number of items is a constant. Finally, we propose an ascending-type multi-unit auction under unit demand bidders; our mechanism announces at every round two separate prices and is based on a sampling algorithm that performs approximate selection with limited communication, leading again to asymptotically optimal communication. Our results do not require any prior knowledge on the agents' valuations, and mainly follow from natural sampling techniques.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Dimensionality, Coordination, and Robustness in Voting

We study the performance of voting mechanisms from a utilitarian standpoint, under the recently introduced framework of metric-distortion, offering new insights along three main lines. First, if $d$ represents the doubling dimension of the metric space, we show that the distortion of STV is $O(d \log \log m)$, where $m$ represents the number of candidates. For doubling metrics this implies an exponential improvement over the lower bound for general metrics, and as a special case it effectively answers a question left open by Skowron and Elkind (AAAI '17) regarding the distortion of STV under low-dimensional Euclidean spaces. More broadly, this constitutes the first nexus between the performance of any voting rule and the "intrinsic dimensionality" of the underlying metric space. We also establish a nearly-matching lower bound, refining the construction of Skowron and Elkind. Moreover, motivated by the efficiency of STV, we investigate whether natural learning rules can lead to low-distortion outcomes. Specifically, we introduce simple, deterministic and decentralized exploration/exploitation dynamics, and we show that they converge to a candidate with $O(1)$ distortion. Finally, driven by applications in facility location games, we consider several refinements and extensions of the standard metric-setting. Namely, we prove that the deterministic mechanism recently introduced by Gkatzelis, Halpern, and Shah (FOCS '20) attains the optimal distortion bound of $2$ under ultra-metrics, while it also comes close to our lower bound under distances satisfying approximate triangle inequalities.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Metric-Distortion Bounds under Limited Information

In this work we study the metric distortion problem in voting theory under a limited amount of ordinal information. Our primary contribution is threefold. First, we consider mechanisms which perform a sequence of pairwise comparisons between candidates. We show that a widely-popular deterministic mechanism employed in most knockout phases yields distortion $\mathcal{O}(\log m)$ while eliciting only $m-1$ out of $Θ(m^2)$ possible pairwise comparisons, where $m$ represents the number of candidates. Our analysis for this mechanism leverages a powerful technical lemma recently developed by Kempe \cite{DBLP:conf/aaai/000120a}. We also provide a matching lower bound on its distortion. In contrast, we prove that any mechanism which performs fewer than $m-1$ pairwise comparisons is destined to have unbounded distortion. Moreover, we study the power of deterministic mechanisms under incomplete rankings. Most notably, when every agent provides her $k$-top preferences we show an upper bound of $6 m/k + 1$ on the distortion, for any $k \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$. Thus, we substantially improve over the previous bound of $12 m/k$ recently established by Kempe \cite{DBLP:conf/aaai/000120a,DBLP:conf/aaai/000120b}, and we come closer to matching the best-known lower bound. Finally, we are concerned with the sample complexity required to ensure near-optimal distortion with high probability. Our main contribution is to show that a random sample of $Θ(m/ε^2)$ voters suffices to guarantee distortion $3 + ε$ with high probability, for any sufficiently small $ε> 0$. This result is based on analyzing the sensitivity of the deterministic mechanism introduced by Gkatzelis, Halpern, and Shah \cite{DBLP:conf/focs/Gkatzelis0020}. Importantly, all of our sample-complexity bounds are distribution-independent.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Node Max-Cut and Computing Equilibria in Linear Weighted Congestion Games

In this work, we seek a more refined understanding of the complexity of local optimum computation for Max-Cut and pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) computation for congestion games with weighted players and linear latency functions. We show that computing a PNE of linear weighted congestion games is PLS-complete either for very restricted strategy spaces, namely when player strategies are paths on a series-parallel network with a single origin and destination, or for very restricted latency functions, namely when the latency on each resource is equal to the congestion. Our results reveal a remarkable gap regarding the complexity of PNE in congestion games with weighted and unweighted players, since in case of unweighted players, a PNE can be easily computed by either a simple greedy algorithm (for series-parallel networks) or any better response dynamics (when the latency is equal to the congestion). For the latter of the results above, we need to show first that computing a local optimum of a natural restriction of Max-Cut, which we call \emph{Node-Max-Cut}, is PLS-complete. In Node-Max-Cut, the input graph is vertex-weighted and the weight of each edge is equal to the product of the weights of its endpoints. Due to the very restricted nature of Node-Max-Cut, the reduction requires a careful combination of new gadgets with ideas and techniques from previous work. We also show how to compute efficiently a $(1+\eps)$-approximate equilibrium for Node-Max-Cut, if the number of different vertex weights is constant.

cs.CC↗