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Paola B. Manasero

Publications and source records attributed to Paola B. Manasero.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Lattice operations for the stable set in many-to-many markets via re-equilibration dynamics

We compute the lattice operations for the (pairwise) stable set in many-to-many matching markets when only path-independence on agents' choice functions is imposed. To do this, we first show that the sets of firm-quasi-stable and worker-quasi-stable many-to-many matchings form lattices. Then, we construct Tarski operators on these lattices whose fixed points coincide with the set of stable matchings, and show that iterating these operators from suitable quasi-stable matchings yields the lattice operations in the stable set. These operators resemble lay-off and vacancy chain dynamics, respectively.

econ.TH↗

Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market

In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implements the individually rational correspondence in Nash equilibrium when both sides of the market play strategically. Moreover, when only workers play strategically and firms' choice functions satisfy the law of aggregate demand, we show that the firm-optimal stable rule implements the stable correspondence in Nash equilibrium.

econ.TH↗

General Manipulability Theorem for a Matching Model

In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we proof the General Manipulability Theorem. We result generalizes the presented in Sotomayor (1996 and 2012) for the many-to-one model. In addition, we show General Manipulability Theorem fail when agents' preferences satisfy only substitutability.

econ.TH↗