arXiv subjects

Paola Manasero

Publications and source records attributed to Paola Manasero.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

A polyhedral characterization of worker-quasi-stable matchings

We provide the first polyhedral characterization of worker-quasi-stable matchings in the classical one-to-one matching model. By modifying the classical stability constraints, we introduce a convex polytope and prove that it is integral. Consequently, its extreme points coincide exactly with the incidence vectors of worker-quasi-stable matchings, demonstrating that worker-quasi-stability preserves the geometric tractability of standard stability.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

A characterization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set in matching markets

This paper studies the structure and computation of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets in one-to-one matching markets. While pairwise stability and corewise stability coincide under strict preferences and provide a well-understood benchmark, vNM stability is defined through dominance relations among sets of matchings and remains considerably more difficult to characterize. A key contribution of the paper is a generalization of the classical Decomposition Lemma. We show that the structural decomposition traditionally used to compare stable matchings extends to any pair of matchings belonging to the same internally stable set. This result reveals a previously unexplored connection between internal stability and the cycle structure underlying matching markets. Building on this characterization, we identify the relationships that are relevant for dominance-based stability and derive a reduced environment that concentrates all undominated outcomes. Our main result shows that the vNM stable set is unique and admits a simple characterization in terms of the core of this reduced environment. The characterization provides both structural insight and a constructive procedure for computing the vNM stable set using standard matching theoretic tools.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Pseudo-Substitutability: A Maximal Domain for Pairwise Stability in Matching Markets with Contracts

We study the existence of pairwise stable allocations in matching markets with contracts and propose a domain restriction that guarantees their existence. Specifically, we define pseudo-substitutable preferences, a domain that strictly extends the classical notion of substitutability while still preserving the existence of pairwise stable allocations. This domain accommodates limited complementarities among contracts while retaining enough structure to preserve the key stability properties of substitutable preferences. Moreover, we show that, among all preference domains that contain the classical substitutable domain and guarantee the existence of pairwise stable allocations, the pseudo-substitutable domain is maximal. Our results establish that pairwise stability extends well beyond the classical substitutable domain.

econ.TH↗