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Paolo Castagno

Publications and source records attributed to Paolo Castagno.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

What Causes COVID-19 Fear? General Drivers of Fear During a Health Crisis

The COVID-19 pandemic triggered not only a global health crisis but also an infodemic, where exposure to heterogeneous information sources influenced public emotional responses. In this work, we investigate the determinants of self-reported fear of infection using data from the Delphi US CTIS survey. In particular, we analyze how demographic variables, epidemiological conditions, and exposure to different information sources shape fear levels. We introduce a Probabilistic Causal Model to estimate causal relationship strengths, identifying the variables that most strongly influence fear. Our results indicate that exposure to information sources accounts for a greater proportion of the variance in fear than demographic and epidemiological variables do. We further compute the Average Treatment Effect to quantify the impact of different information sources on fear. After causal adjustment, institutional and expert-driven sources are associated with increased fear levels, whereas politicians, religious leaders, and alternative information channels are associated with reduced fear. These findings highlight both the central role of the information ecosystem in shaping emotional responses during public health crises and the value of causal inference approaches for studying behavioral responses to pandemics.

cs.SI

Self-organisation of common good usage and an application to Internet services

Natural and human-made common goods present key challenges due to their susceptibility to degradation, overuse, or congestion. We explore the self-organisation of their usage when individuals have access to several available commons but limited information on them. We propose an extension of the Win-Stay, Lose-Shift (WSLS) strategy for such systems, under which individuals use a resource iteratively until they are unsuccessful and then shift randomly. This simple strategy leads to a distribution of the use of commons with an improvement against random shifting. Selective individuals who retain information on their usage and accordingly adapt their tolerance to failure in each common good improve the average experienced quality for an entire population. Hybrid systems of selective and non-selective individuals can lead to an equilibrium with equalised experienced quality akin to the ideal free distribution. We show that these results can be applied to the server selection problem faced by mobile users accessing Internet services and we perform realistic simulations to test their validity. Furthermore, these findings can be used to understand other real systems such as animal dispersal on grazing and foraging land, and to propose solutions to operators of systems of public transport or other technological commons.

cs.MA

Optimal Allocation of Tasks and Price of Anarchy of Distributed Optimization in Networked Computing Facilities

The allocation of computing tasks for networked distributed services poses a question to service providers on whether centralized allocation management be worth its cost. Existing analytical models were conceived for users accessing computing resources with practically indistinguishable (hence irrelevant for the allocation decision) delays, which is typical of services located in the same distant data center. However, with the rise of the edge-cloud continuum, a simple analysis of the sojourn time that computing tasks observe at the server misses the impact of diverse latency values imposed by server locations. We therefore study the optimization of computing task allocation with a new model that considers both distance of servers and sojourn time in servers. We derive exact algorithms to optimize the system and we show, through numerical analysis and real experiments, that differences in server location in the edge-cloud continuum cannot be neglected. By means of algorithmic game theory, we study the price of anarchy of a distributed implementation of the computing task allocation problem and unveil important practical properties such as the fact that the price of anarchy tends to be small -- except when the system is overloaded -- and its maximum can be computed with low complexity.

cs.GT