arXiv subjects

Paritosh Verma

Publications and source records attributed to Paritosh Verma.

23 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2022

Radiation from a Classical Harmonic Oscillator

This article presents the calculation of gravitational and electromagnetic radiation emitted from a classical simple harmonic oscillator (SHO). Here we show only the selected formulae and apply them to a toy problem without rigorous derivation. First, we calculate the explicit expressions for the gravitational waves polarizations and then obtain the power radiated away in gravitational waves using Brans-Dicke theory (BD). We also calculate the electromagnetic dipole and quadrupole power emitted by the SHO and compare them with their gravitational counterparts.

gr-qc↗

arXiv2021

Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents in a fair and economically efficient manner. In this context, the Nash social welfare-defined as the geometric mean of agents' valuations for their assigned bundles-stands as a fundamental measure that quantifies the extent of fairness of an allocation. Focusing on instances in which the agents' valuations have binary marginals, we develop essentially tight results for (approximately) maximizing Nash social welfare under two of the most general classes of complement-free valuations, i.e., under binary XOS and binary subadditive valuations. For binary XOS valuations, we develop a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a constant-factor (specifically $288$) approximation for the optimal Nash social welfare, in the standard value-oracle model. The allocations computed by our algorithm also achieve constant-factor approximation for social welfare and the groupwise maximin share guarantee. These results imply that-in the case of binary XOS valuations-there necessarily exists an allocation that simultaneously satisfies multiple (approximate) fairness and efficiency criteria. We complement the algorithmic result by proving that Nash social welfare maximization is APX-hard under binary XOS valuations. Furthermore, this work establishes an interesting separation between the binary XOS and binary subadditive settings. In particular, we prove that an exponential number of value queries are necessarily required to obtain even a sub-linear approximation for Nash social welfare under binary subadditive valuations.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Truthful and Fair Mechanisms for Matroid-Rank Valuations

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among strategic agents. We focus on settings wherein monetary transfers are not available and each agent's private valuation is a submodular function with binary marginals, i.e., the agents' valuations are matroid-rank functions. In this setup, we establish a notable dichotomy between two of the most well-studied fairness notions in discrete fair division; specifically, between envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and maximin shares (MMS). First, we show that a Pareto-efficient mechanism of Babaioff et al. (2021) is group strategy-proof for finding EF1 allocations, under matroid-rank valuations. The group strategy-proofness guarantee strengthens the result of Babaioff et al. (2021), that establishes truthfulness (individually for each agent) in the same context. Our result also generalizes a work of Halpern et al. (2020), from binary additive valuations to the matroid-rank case. Next, we establish that an analogous positive result cannot be achieved for MMS, even when considering truthfulness on an individual level. Specifically, we prove that, for matroid-rank valuations, there does not exist a truthful mechanism that is index oblivious, Pareto efficient, and maximin fair. For establishing our results, we develop a characterization of truthful mechanisms for matroid-rank functions. This characterization in fact holds for a broader class of valuations (specifically, holds for binary XOS functions) and might be of independent interest.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Existence and Computation of Maximin Fair Allocations Under Matroid-Rank Valuations

We study fair and economically efficient allocation of indivisible goods among agents whose valuations are rank functions of matroids. Such valuations constitute a well-studied class of submodular functions (i.e., they exhibit a diminishing returns property) and model preferences in several resource-allocation settings. We prove that, for matroid-rank valuations, a social welfare-maximizing allocation that gives each agent her maximin share always exists. Furthermore, such an allocation can be computed in polynomial time. We establish similar existential and algorithmic results for the pairwise maximin share guarantee as well. To complement these results, we show that if the agents have binary XOS valuations or weighted-rank valuations, then maximin fair allocations are not guaranteed to exist. Both of these valuation classes are immediate generalizations of matroid-rank functions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Space Lower Bounds for Graph Stream Problems

This work concerns with proving space lower bounds for graph problems in the streaming model. It is known that computing the length of shortest path between two nodes in the streaming model requires $Ω(n)$ space, where $n$ is the number of nodes in the graph. We study the problem of finding the depth of a given node in a rooted tree in the streaming model. For this problem we prove a tight single pass space lower bound and a multipass space lower bound. As this is a special case of computing shortest paths on graphs, the above lower bounds also apply to the shortest path problem in the streaming model. The results are obtained by using known communication complexity lower bounds or by constructing hard instances for the problem. Additionally, we apply the techniques used in proving the above lower bound results to prove space lower bounds (single and multipass) for other graph problems like finding min $s-t$ cut, detecting negative weight cycle and finding whether two nodes lie in the same strongly connected component.

cs.CC↗