arXiv subjects

Patricia Paskov

Publications and source records attributed to Patricia Paskov.

12 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Underwriting the Agent Economy: The Blueprint for an AI Insurance Stack

From maritime trade to commercial nuclear power, insurance has been the enabler of major economic and technological developments by pricing risk, limiting downside, and spreading best practices. The emerging AI agent economy, projected to handle trillions of dollars in transactions by 2030, looks to be the next such development. Yet insurers' exposure to AI agent risk currently sits largely unpriced across existing insurance lines; between this silent coverage and growing exclusions, coverage is not fit for purpose. Furthermore, insurability is trending the wrong way: AI agent capabilities appear to be outpacing reliability, leading to rising incident severity; concentration among a few foundation model providers threatens correlated losses; and traditional actuarial modeling will struggle to keep pace with a technology evolving as rapidly as frontier AI. This report argues that affirmative AI coverage with limits in the billions is achievable by 2030, but only with industry-wide coordination. Drawing on successful historical precedents such as Underwriters Laboratories, the Closed Claims Project, and others, we lay out an eight-component AI insurance stack spanning incident data collection, catastrophe modeling, standards, contract design, risk selection, pricing, monitoring, and claims management. Building out this infrastructure is what will enable insurers to cover and manage AI agent risk sustainably and at scale. Finally, we discuss coverage for catastrophic risk from frontier AI ("AI CAT"), including CBRN, critical infrastructure collapse, and loss of control scenarios. Addressing these tail risks will require purpose-built instruments, potentially including a frontier model developer mutual, catastrophe bonds, bespoke liability regimes, and government backstops.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

RCTs for Frontier AI Governance: Methodological Challenges and Solutions for Human Uplift Studies

Human uplift studies, or studies that measure the effects of AI access on human performance via randomized controlled trials (RCT) or similar methodologies, increasingly inform frontier AI governance and deployment decisions. While RCT methods are robust in other fields, their interaction with the distinctive properties of frontier AI systems remains underexamined, particularly when results are used to inform high-stakes decisions. We present findings from interviews with 16 expert practitioners with experience conducting human uplift studies in domains including biosecurity, cybersecurity, education, and labor. Across interviews, experts described a recurring tension between the standard causal inference assumptions upon which human uplift studies rely and the object of study itself. Rapidly evolving AI systems, shifting baselines, heterogeneous and changing user proficiency, and porous real-world settings strain assumptions underlying internal, external, and construct validity, complicating the interpretation and appropriate use of uplift evidence. We contribute (1) a synthesis of methodological challenges in human uplift studies, mapped to risks to study validity and classified by their degree of specificity to large language model (LLM) systems, and (2) a mapping from challenges to proposed solutions. By collating expert-identified challenges and solutions, we seek to clarify the interpretive limits and appropriate uses of human uplift evidence, to align evaluation practice with the decisions it informs, and to support more coordinated methodological foundations for AI governance.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Open Weight AI Models Require Proportional Evaluation Approaches

Open-weight AI models (OWMs), or models released with publicly-available weights, are distributing rapidly and approaching the performance levels of leading closed-weight AI models (CWMs). While OWMs offer substantial scientific and economic benefits, their release introduces distinct risk factors for which existing evaluation practices, largely designed for CWM deployment, fail to account. In this paper, we argue that these risk factors demand distinct proportional evaluation (PE) approaches: evaluating without system-level safeguards (PE1), assessing robustness to modifications that undo model-level safeguards (PE2), testing selective capability amplification (PE3), and proxying worst-case misuse (PE4). We systematically review current evaluation practices of OWMs released in 2025 through April 2026, finding that only one of the 37 families of models reviewed fulfills PE1-4 and most do not fulfill any. This paper targets policymakers, funders, and researchers involved in AI evaluation. As OWMs grow increasingly capable, their evaluation warrants close attention from developers, funders, and governance bodies alike.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Measuring Biological Capabilities and Risks of AI Agents

This paper addresses a rapidly emerging policy challenge: how to generate and interpret credible evidence about the biological capabilities and risks of AI scientists, or agentic AI systems capable of autonomously or collaboratively performing multi-step scientific tasks. As these systems enter real research workflows, decision-makers increasingly face evaluation results whose meaning depends on underlying design choices that are often implicit or under-documented. We synthesize current evidence on AI-enabled biological risks and introduce biological agentic evaluations as a promising, but interpretation-sensitive, tool for assessing these systems. Our central contribution is a set of practical, experience-grounded considerations -- drawing from our own evaluations -- that show how choices around defining, designing, running, scoring, and documenting evaluations materially shape what results do and do not imply about risk. The analysis is intended to help policymakers interpret biological evaluation outputs with appropriate caution; guide public and private funders toward high-leverage investments in AI-biology evaluation research; and support biosecurity practitioners assessing emerging AI systems. A secondary audience includes researchers designing or conducting agentic evaluations within frontier AI labs, AI providers, scientific institutions, and third-party evaluation organizations.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Open Problems in Frontier AI Risk Management

Frontier AI both amplifies existing risks and introduces qualitatively novel challenges. Not only is there a notable lack of stable scientific consensus resulting from the rapid pace of technological change, but emerging frontier AI safety practices are often misaligned with, or may undermine, established risk management frameworks. To address these challenges, we systematically surface open problems in frontier AI risk management. Adopting a problem-oriented approach, we examine each stage of the risk management process - risk planning, identification, analysis, evaluation, and mitigation - through a structured review of the literature, identifying unresolved challenges and the actors best positioned to address them. Recognising that different types of open problems call for different responses, we classify open problems according to whether they reflect (a) a lack of scientific or technical consensus, (b) misalignment with, or challenges to, established risk management frameworks, or (c) shortcomings in implementation despite apparent consensus and alignment. By mapping these open problems and identifying the actors best positioned to address them - including developers, deployers, regulators, standards bodies, researchers, and third-party evaluators - this work aims to clarify where progress is needed to enable robust and meaningful consensus on frontier AI risk management.The paper does not propose specific solutions; instead, it provides a problem-oriented, agenda-setting reference document, complemented by a living online repository, intended to support coordination, reduce duplication, and guide future research and governance efforts.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

International AI Safety Report 2026

The International AI Safety Report 2026 synthesises the current scientific evidence on the capabilities, emerging risks, and safety of general-purpose AI systems. The report series was mandated by the nations attending the AI Safety Summit in Bletchley, UK. 29 nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU each nominated a representative to the report's Expert Advisory Panel. Over 100 AI experts contributed, representing diverse perspectives and disciplines. Led by the Report's Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

The science and practice of proportionality in AI risk evaluations

A global challenge in artificial intelligence (AI) regulation lies in achieving effective risk management without compromising innovation and technical progress. The European Union (EU) Artificial Intelligence Act represents the first regulatory attempt worldwide to navigate this tension in the form of a binding, risk-based framework. In August 2025, obligations for providers of general-purpose AI (GPAI) models under the EU AI Act entered into application. They require providers of the most advanced GPAI models to evaluate possible systemic risks stemming from their models. This raises the regulatory challenge of ensuring that the evaluations provide meaningful risk information without imposing excessive burden on providers. The principle of proportionality, a binding requirement under EU law, requires the regulator to calibrate its actions to their intended objectives. The application of proportionality to model evaluations for AI risk opens opportunities to develop scientific methods that operationalize such calibration within concrete evaluation practices.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Frontier AI Auditing: Toward Rigorous Third-Party Assessment of Safety and Security Practices at Leading AI Companies

We outline a vision for frontier AI auditing, which we define as rigorous third-party verification of frontier AI developers' safety and security claims, and evaluation of their systems and practices against relevant standards, based on deep, secure access to non-public information. Frontier AI audits should not be limited to a company's publicly deployed products, but should instead consider the full range of organization-level safety and security risks, including internal deployment of AI systems, information security practices, and safety decision-making processes. We describe four AI Assurance Levels (AALs), the higher levels of which provide greater confidence in audit findings. We recommend AAL-1 as a baseline for frontier AI generally, and AAL-2 as a near-term goal for the most advanced subset of frontier AI developers. Achieving the vision we outline will require (1) ensuring high quality standards for frontier AI auditing, so it does not devolve into a checkbox exercise or lag behind changes in the industry; (2) growing the ecosystem of audit providers at a rapid pace without compromising quality; (3) accelerating adoption of frontier AI auditing by clarifying and strengthening incentives; and (4) achieving technical readiness for high AI Assurance Levels so they can be applied when needed.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Preliminary suggestions for rigorous GPAI model evaluations

This document presents a preliminary compilation of general-purpose AI (GPAI) evaluation practices that may promote internal validity, external validity and reproducibility. It includes suggestions for human uplift studies and benchmark evaluations, as well as cross-cutting suggestions that may apply to many different evaluation types. Suggestions are organised across four stages in the evaluation life cycle: design, implementation, execution and documentation. Drawing from established practices in machine learning, statistics, psychology, economics, biology and other fields recognised to have important lessons for AI evaluation, these suggestions seek to contribute to the conversation on the nascent and evolving field of the science of GPAI evaluations. The intended audience of this document includes providers of GPAI models presenting systemic risk (GPAISR), for whom the EU AI Act lays out specific evaluation requirements; third-party evaluators; policymakers assessing the rigour of evaluations; and academic researchers developing or conducting GPAI evaluations.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Recommendations and Reporting Checklist for Rigorous & Transparent Human Baselines in Model Evaluations

In this position paper, we argue that human baselines in foundation model evaluations must be more rigorous and more transparent to enable meaningful comparisons of human vs. AI performance, and we provide recommendations and a reporting checklist towards this end. Human performance baselines are vital for the machine learning community, downstream users, and policymakers to interpret AI evaluations. Models are often claimed to achieve "super-human" performance, but existing baselining methods are neither sufficiently rigorous nor sufficiently well-documented to robustly measure and assess performance differences. Based on a meta-review of the measurement theory and AI evaluation literatures, we derive a framework with recommendations for designing, executing, and reporting human baselines. We synthesize our recommendations into a checklist that we use to systematically review 115 human baselines (studies) in foundation model evaluations and thus identify shortcomings in existing baselining methods; our checklist can also assist researchers in conducting human baselines and reporting results. We hope our work can advance more rigorous AI evaluation practices that can better serve both the research community and policymakers. Data is available at: https://github.com/kevinlwei/human-baselines

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

In Which Areas of Technical AI Safety Could Geopolitical Rivals Cooperate?

International cooperation is common in AI research, including between geopolitical rivals. While many experts advocate for greater international cooperation on AI safety to address shared global risks, some view cooperation on AI with suspicion, arguing that it can pose unacceptable risks to national security. However, the extent to which cooperation on AI safety poses such risks, as well as provides benefits, depends on the specific area of cooperation. In this paper, we consider technical factors that impact the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, focusing on the degree to which such cooperation can advance dangerous capabilities, result in the sharing of sensitive information, or provide opportunities for harm. We begin by why nations historically cooperate on strategic technologies and analyse current US-China cooperation in AI as a case study. We further argue that existing frameworks for managing associated risks can be supplemented with consideration of key risks specific to cooperation on technical AI safety research. Through our analysis, we find that research into AI verification mechanisms and shared protocols may be suitable areas for such cooperation. Through this analysis we aim to help researchers and governments identify and mitigate the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, so that the benefits of cooperation can be fully realised.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

GPAI Evaluations Standards Taskforce: Towards Effective AI Governance

General-purpose AI evaluations have been proposed as a promising way of identifying and mitigating systemic risks posed by AI development and deployment. While GPAI evaluations play an increasingly central role in institutional decision- and policy-making -- including by way of the European Union AI Act's mandate to conduct evaluations on GPAI models presenting systemic risk -- no standards exist to date to promote their quality or legitimacy. To strengthen GPAI evaluations in the EU, which currently constitutes the first and only jurisdiction that mandates GPAI evaluations, we outline four desiderata for GPAI evaluations: internal validity, external validity, reproducibility, and portability. To uphold these desiderata in a dynamic environment of continuously evolving risks, we propose a dedicated EU GPAI Evaluation Standards Taskforce, to be housed within the bodies established by the EU AI Act. We outline the responsibilities of the Taskforce, specify the GPAI provider commitments that would facilitate Taskforce success, discuss the potential impact of the Taskforce on global AI governance, and address potential sources of failure that policymakers should heed.

cs.CY↗