arXiv subjects

Patrick Mellacher

Publications and source records attributed to Patrick Mellacher.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2023

Growth, Inequality and Declining Business Dynamism in a Unified Schumpeter Mark I + II Model

I develop a simple Schumpeterian agent-based model where the entry and exit of firms, their productivity and markup, the birth of new industries and the social structure of the population are endogenous and use it to study the causes of rising inequality and "declining business dynamism" since the 1980s. My hybrid model combines features of i) the so-called Schumpeter Mark I (centering around the entrepreneur), ii) the Mark II model (emphasizing the innovative capacities of firms), and iii) Cournot competition, with firms using OLS learning to estimate the market environment and the behavior of their competitors. A scenario which is quantitatively calibrated to US data on growth and inequality replicates a large number of stylized facts regarding the industry life-cycle, growth, inequality and all ten stylized facts on "declining business dynamism" proposed by Akcigit and Ates (AEJ:Macro, 2021). Counterfactual simulations show that antitrust policy is highly effective at combatting inequality and increasing business dynamism and growth, but is subject to a conflict of interest between workers and firm owners, as GDP and wages grow at the expense of profits. Technological factors, on the other hand, are much less effective in combatting declining business dynamism in my model.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2023

The Impact of Corona Populism: Empirical Evidence from Austria and Theory

I study the co-evolution between public opinion and party policy in situations of crises by investigating a policy U-turn of a major Austrian right-wing party (FPOE) during the Covid-19 pandemic. My analysis suggests the existence of both i) a "Downsian" effect, which causes voters to adapt their party preferences based on policy congruence and ii) a "party identification" effect, which causes partisans to realign their policy preferences based on "their" party's platform. Specifically, I use individual-level panel data to show that i) "corona skeptical" voters who did not vote for the FPOE in the pre-Covid-19 elections of 2019 were more likely to vote for the party after it embraced "corona populism", and ii) beliefs of respondents who declared that they voted for the FPOE in 2019 diverged from the rest of the population in three out of four health-dimensions only after the turn, causing them to underestimate the threat posed by Covid-19 compared to the rest of the population. Using aggregate-level panel data, I study whether the turn has produced significant behavioral differences which could be observed in terms of reported cases and deaths per capita. Paradoxically, after the turn the FPOE vote share is significantly positively correlated with deaths per capita, but not with the reported number of infections. I hypothesize that this due to a self-selection bias in testing, which causes a correlation between the number of "corona skeptics" and the share of unreported cases after the turn. I find empirical support for this hypothesis in individual-level data from a Covid-19 prevalence study that involves information about participants' true vs. reported infection status. I finally study a simple heterogeneous mixing epidemiological model and show that a testing bias can indeed explain the apparent paradox of an increase in deaths without an increase in reported cases.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2021

Endogenous viral mutations, evolutionary selection, and containment policy design

How will the novel coronavirus evolve? I study a simple epidemiological model, in which mutations may change the properties of the virus and its associated disease stochastically and antigenic drifts allow new variants to partially evade immunity. I show analytically that variants with higher infectiousness, longer disease duration, and shorter latent period prove to be fitter. "Smart" containment policies targeting symptomatic individuals may redirect the evolution of the virus, as they give an edge to variants with a longer incubation period and a higher share of asymptomatic infections. Reduced mortality, on the other hand, does not per se prove to be an evolutionary advantage. I then implement this model as an agent-based simulation model in order to explore its aggregate dynamics. Monte Carlo simulations show that a) containment policy design has an impact on both speed and direction of viral evolution, b) the virus may circulate in the population indefinitely, provided that containment efforts are too relaxed and the propensity of the virus to escape immunity is high enough, and crucially c) that it may not be possible to distinguish between a slowly and a rapidly evolving virus by looking only at short-term epidemiological outcomes. Thus, what looks like a successful mitigation strategy in the short run, may prove to have devastating long-run effects. These results suggest that optimal containment policy must take the propensity of the virus to mutate and escape immunity into account, strengthening the case for genetic and antigenic surveillance even in the early stages of an epidemic.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2021

Opinion Dynamics with Conflicting Interests

I develop a rather simple agent-based model to capture a co-evolution of opinion formation, political decision making and economic outcomes. I use this model to study how societies form opinions if their members have opposing interests. Agents are connected in a social network and exchange opinions, but differ with regard to their interests and ability to gain information about them. I show that inequality in information and economic resources can have a drastic impact on aggregated opinion. In particular, my model illustrates how a tiny, but well-informed minority can influence group decisions to their favor. This effect is amplified if these agents are able to command more economic resources to advertise their views and if they can target their advertisements efficiently, as made possible by the rise of information technology. My results contribute to the understanding of pressing questions such as climate change denial and highlight the dangers that economic and information inequality can pose for democracies.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2020

Cooperation in the Age of COVID-19: Evidence from Public Goods Games

Does COVID-19 change the willingness to cooperate? Four Austrian university courses in economics play a public goods game in consecutive semesters on the e-learning platform Moodle: two of them in the year before the crisis, one immediately after the beginning of the first lockdown in March 2020 and the last one in the days before the announcement of the second lockdown in October 2020. Between 67% and 76% of the students choose to cooperate, i.e. contribute to the public good, in the pre-crisis year. Immediately after the imposition of the lockdown, 71% choose to cooperate. Seven months into the crisis, however, cooperation drops to 43%. Depending on whether two types of biases resulting from the experimental design are eliminated or not, probit and logit regressions show that this drop is statistically significant at the 0.05 or the 0.1 significance level.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2020

COVID-Town: An Integrated Economic-Epidemiological Agent-Based Model

I develop a novel macroeconomic epidemiological agent-based model to study the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic under varying policy scenarios. Agents differ with regard to their profession, family status and age and interact with other agents at home, work or during leisure activities. The model allows to implement and test actually used or counterfactual policies such as closing schools or the leisure industry explicitly in the model in order to explore their impact on the spread of the virus, and their economic consequences. The model is calibrated with German statistical data on time use, demography, households, firm demography, employment, company profits and wages. I set up a baseline scenario based on the German containment policies and fit the epidemiological parameters of the simulation to the observed German death curve and an estimated infection curve of the first COVID-19 wave. My model suggests that by acting one week later, the death toll of the first wave in Germany would have been 180% higher, whereas it would have been 60% lower, if the policies had been enacted a week earlier. I finally discuss two stylized fiscal policy scenarios: procyclical (zero-deficit) and anticyclical fiscal policy. In the zero-deficit scenario a vicious circle emerges, in which the economic recession spreads from the high-interaction leisure industry to the rest of the economy. Even after eliminating the virus and lifting the restrictions, the economic recovery is incomplete. Anticyclical fiscal policy on the other hand limits the economic losses and allows for a V-shaped recovery, but does not increase the number of deaths. These results suggest that an optimal response to the pandemic aiming at containment or holding out for a vaccine combines early introduction of containment measures to keep the number of infected low with expansionary fiscal policy to keep output in lower risk sectors high.

econ.TH↗