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Patrick Spiesberger

Publications and source records attributed to Patrick Spiesberger.

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Accountable Transaction Inclusion Lists: Enhancing Ethereum's Censorship Resistance

In Ethereum, transaction inclusion is rarely in question; what matters is the delay until inclusion. Currently, block builders could exercise censorship across consecutive blocks, threatening time-critical applications, such as on-chain auctions. To mitigate this risk, existing proposals such as FOCIL, scheduled for deployment in late 2026, assign a committee to list transactions for mandatory inclusion. However, no committee member is held accountable for the actual inclusion of the transactions: an adversary can bribe the entire committee to omit any transaction for less than 2 Euro per block under current conditions. We argue that accountability, i.e., requiring all exclusion decisions to be publicly disclosed and verifiably complete, with violations attributable to a specific party, substantially raises censorship costs. To this end, we propose Fair Forward Inclusion Lists (FairFIL) as an accountable censorship resistance mechanism for Ethereum. In FairFIL, every builder must publish all transactions the builder chooses to censor, subject to a protocol-anchored policy; a committee verifies the completeness and validity of this disclosure. The subsequent builder must include these transactions, forfeiting the full block reward upon any omission. Therefore, under FairFIL, extending censorship beyond a single slot requires an assembler to forfeit a full block reward. We show that compliance is rational for all participants within our behavior model. Our empirical evaluation on Ethereum mainnet indicates that multi-block censorship costs one order of magnitude more than under existing proposals, while leaving the builder's MEV extraction freedom largely intact. Initial measurements further suggest that the mempool consistency FairFIL requires is met in practice.

cs.DC

Why Ethereum Needs Fairness Mechanisms that Do Not Depend on Participants' Altruism

Ethereum's ideal of censorship resistance, together with related fairness properties, is undermined in practice, motivating fairness mechanisms that aim to restore these properties. Several of these mechanisms hand control over block contents to a committee of proposers under a 1-of-n honest assumption: at least one committee member complies with the mechanism even when deviating would increase personal revenue. We refer to such proposers as altruistic. Yet prior work shows that roughly 91 percent of blocks are constructed by centralized block-building services that demonstrably take user-adverse actions for financial gain; the responsible proposers sign these blocks blindly, without any means of intervention. A common reading of this figure is that 9 percent of proposers forgo these gains and act altruistically. Our empirical analysis of the full year 2025 shows that this share is far smaller: at most 1.55 percent of proposers can plausibly be regarded as altruistic, whereas the remaining 98.45 percent of proposers exhibit observable non-altruistic behavior. We interpret 1.55 percent as an upper bound on the prevalence of altruistic proposers. These results imply that committee-based fairness mechanisms that rely on altruistic members would require substantially larger committees than currently proposed. This raises concerns about their practical viability and motivates mechanisms in which fair behavior is the rational choice.

cs.DC