arXiv subjects

Paul Montague

Publications and source records attributed to Paul Montague.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Halt Fast! Early Stopping for Certified Robustness

Randomized Smoothing (RS) provides rigorous robustness guarantees for neural networks without architectural constraints, yet its adoption is limited by extreme computational costs. Standard RS requires tens of thousands of model evaluations per input and forces practitioners to commit to fixed sample sizes a priori. In this work, we present a novel meta-learning framework for anytime-valid certified robustness that adaptively deploys computational resources. By using a lightweight meta-learner to predict image-specific priors for a sequential E-process, we achieve a 20-fold reduction in sample complexity compared to traditional methods while maintaining rigorous statistical guarantees. Beyond raw efficiency, we demonstrate how anytime-validity enables adaptively allocating compute based upon application-specific risk thresholds, a form of resource triage impossible under classic certification frameworks. That this is achievable while also providing similar certification performance demonstrates that our approach provides a pathway for real-time, safety-critical certification deployments.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

What Was That Again? Certified Robustness for Automatic Speech Recognition

Automatic Speech Recognition systems are notoriously both sensitive to adversarial and benign perturbations. While this has been repeatedly demonstrated using reference datasets, detecting such behaviors in deployed systems is incredibly challenging, due to the absence of oracle knowledge of the true transcription. We demonstrate that employing a certification-inspired mechanism can significantly decrease WER, increase recall, and decrease the Spearman correlation between confidence and WER. We achieve this through a dual-gate diagnostic pipeline: a Two-Sided Atomic Audit that accumulates statistical wealth to certify both token existence and adversarial exclusion, and a Rank-Based Tournament that selects the winning sequence. Our evaluations across four diverse architectures demonstrate up to a 55% relative reduction in Word Error Rate, while also providing granular word- and sentence-level certifications to enhance acoustic security.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Room for Error: Large-Scale Simulation of Over-the-Air Acoustic Attacks

While voice control is rapidly becoming a ubiquitous vector of human-AI communication, the risks facing these systems remain poorly understood. This is, in part, a product of the difficulties in scaling strictly digital adversarial workflows to the physical world. These scale barriers have led the community to abstract away key acoustic factors relating to detectability and the influence of geometry on acoustics. These methodological and metrological shortcomings undermine our understanding of risk. We illuminate these issues through real-world testing, conceptual discussions, and a novel, high-throughput reality simulation framework. By testing over 8 million adversarial evaluations, we demonstrate that acoustic awareness yields relative Word Error Rate increases of up to 94.5\% under Whisper and wav2vec. We employ this framework to explore a formalize and operationalize a Dual-Form Signal to Noise Ratio to decouple source stealth from victim attack efficacy, resolving a crucial limitation in current works. This lays the groundwork for repeatable, verifiable research that embraces, rather than abstracts, the acoustic environment.

cs.SD↗

arXiv2026

Semantic Robustness Certification for Vision-Language Models

Vision-language models (VLMs) are now widely used in downstream tasks. However, real-world applications often expose VLMs to distribution shifts induced by semantic variation (e.g., shape, size, and style). Robustness certification determines if a model's prediction changes when transformations are applied to its input. While most certification frameworks study geometric or pixel-level transformations over inputs, this work proposes a novel framework that enables certifying VLM robustness under semantic-level transformations. Leveraging the open-vocabulary capability of VLMs, we use text prompts as semantic proxies to construct transformations parameterized by an extent that controls the degree of semantic variation. By characterizing the VLM decision boundary in closed form, our framework quantitatively certifies extent intervals for which the predicted class remains unchanged under the semantic transformation. Our framework is the first to certify VLM robustness under semantic-level variations without requiring additional data for each variation, making it practical to apply. Experiments on both synthetic and real-world data show that our framework enables certifying robustness under diverse semantic variations across scenarios.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Hearing the Unspoken: Language Model Priors for Acoustic Adversarial Attacks

Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) systems operating in real-time settings must process acoustic input under strict temporal constraints, where transcription decisions are inherently made on incomplete information. This causal constraint serves as an information bottleneck on attackers, significantly limiting attack performance. Our new Semantic Gambit attack breaks this causal limitation by augmenting the adversary with predictive context derived from a Large Language Model in real-time. Our experiments show that this form of augmentation can elevate the corpus-level Word Error Rate to 35.6% -- a three-fold increase over the current state-of-the-art. Ultimately, this work reveals how common, low-latency LLM tooling can be exploited to systematically subvert real-time ASR pipelines.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Free Lunch for Pass@$k$? Low Cost Diverse Sampling for Diffusion Language Models

Diverse outputs in text generation are necessary for effective exploration in complex reasoning tasks, such as code generation and mathematical problem solving. Such Pass@$k$ problems benefit from distinct candidates covering the solution space. However, traditional sampling approaches often waste computational resources on repetitive failure modes. While Diffusion Language Models have emerged as a competitive alternative to the prevailing Autoregressive paradigm, they remain susceptible to this redundancy, with independent samples frequently collapsing into similar modes. To address this, we propose a training free, low cost intervention to enhance generative diversity in Diffusion Language Models. Our approach modifies intermediate samples in a batch sequentially, where each sample is repelled from the feature space of previous samples, actively penalising redundancy. Unlike prior methods that require retraining or beam search, our strategy incurs negligible computational overhead, while ensuring that each sample contributes a unique perspective to the batch. We evaluate our method on the HumanEval and GSM8K benchmarks using the LLaDA-8B-Instruct model. Our results demonstrate significantly improved diversity and Pass@$k$ performance across various temperature settings. As a simple modification to the sampling process, our method offers an immediate, low-cost improvement for current and future Diffusion Language Models in tasks that benefit from diverse solution search. We make our code available at https://github.com/sean-lamont/odd.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Certified but Fooled! Breaking Certified Defences with Ghost Certificates

Certified defenses promise provable robustness guarantees. We study the malicious exploitation of probabilistic certification frameworks to better understand the limits of guarantee provisions. Now, the objective is to not only mislead a classifier, but also manipulate the certification process to generate a robustness guarantee for an adversarial input certificate spoofing. A recent study in ICLR demonstrated that crafting large perturbations can shift inputs far into regions capable of generating a certificate for an incorrect class. Our study investigates if perturbations needed to cause a misclassification and yet coax a certified model into issuing a deceptive, large robustness radius for a target class can still be made small and imperceptible. We explore the idea of region-focused adversarial examples to craft imperceptible perturbations, spoof certificates and achieve certification radii larger than the source class ghost certificates. Extensive evaluations with the ImageNet demonstrate the ability to effectively bypass state-of-the-art certified defenses such as Densepure. Our work underscores the need to better understand the limits of robustness certification methods.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

3D-Prover: Diversity Driven Theorem Proving With Determinantal Point Processes

A key challenge in automated formal reasoning is the intractable search space, which grows exponentially with the depth of the proof. This branching is caused by the large number of candidate proof tactics which can be applied to a given goal. Nonetheless, many of these tactics are semantically similar or lead to an execution error, wasting valuable resources in both cases. We address the problem of effectively pruning this search, using only synthetic data generated from previous proof attempts. We first demonstrate that it is possible to generate semantically aware tactic representations which capture the effect on the proving environment, likelihood of success, and execution time. We then propose a novel filtering mechanism which leverages these representations to select semantically diverse and high quality tactics, using Determinantal Point Processes. Our approach, 3D- Prover, is designed to be general, and to augment any underlying tactic generator. We demonstrate the effectiveness of 3D-Prover on the miniF2F and LeanDojo benchmarks by augmenting popular open source proving LLMs. We show that our approach leads to an increase in the overall proof rate, as well as a significant improvement in the tactic success rate, execution time and diversity. We make our code available at https://github.com/sean-lamont/3D-Prover.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Position: Certified Robustness Does Not (Yet) Imply Model Security

While certified robustness is widely promoted as a solution to adversarial examples in Artificial Intelligence systems, significant challenges remain before these techniques can be meaningfully deployed in real-world applications. We identify critical gaps in current research, including the paradox of detection without distinction, the lack of clear criteria for practitioners to evaluate certification schemes, and the potential security risks arising from users' expectations surrounding ``guaranteed" robustness claims. These create an alignment issue between how certifications are presented and perceived, relative to their actual capabilities. This position paper is a call to arms for the certification research community, proposing concrete steps to address these fundamental challenges and advance the field toward practical applicability.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Multi-level Certified Defense Against Poisoning Attacks in Offline Reinforcement Learning

Similar to other machine learning frameworks, Offline Reinforcement Learning (RL) is shown to be vulnerable to poisoning attacks, due to its reliance on externally sourced datasets, a vulnerability that is exacerbated by its sequential nature. To mitigate the risks posed by RL poisoning, we extend certified defenses to provide larger guarantees against adversarial manipulation, ensuring robustness for both per-state actions, and the overall expected cumulative reward. Our approach leverages properties of Differential Privacy, in a manner that allows this work to span both continuous and discrete spaces, as well as stochastic and deterministic environments -- significantly expanding the scope and applicability of achievable guarantees. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that our approach ensures the performance drops to no more than $50\%$ with up to $7\%$ of the training data poisoned, significantly improving over the $0.008\%$ in prior work~\citep{wu_copa_2022}, while producing certified radii that is $5$ times larger as well. This highlights the potential of our framework to enhance safety and reliability in offline RL.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Fox in the Henhouse: Supply-Chain Backdoor Attacks Against Reinforcement Learning

The current state-of-the-art backdoor attacks against Reinforcement Learning (RL) rely upon unrealistically permissive access models, that assume the attacker can read (or even write) the victim's policy parameters, observations, or rewards. In this work, we question whether such a strong assumption is required to launch backdoor attacks against RL. To answer this question, we propose the \underline{S}upply-\underline{C}h\underline{a}in \underline{B}ackdoor (SCAB) attack, which targets a common RL workflow: training agents using external agents that are provided separately or embedded within the environment. In contrast to prior works, our attack only relies on legitimate interactions of the RL agent with the supplied agents. Despite this limited access model, by poisoning a mere $3\%$ of training experiences, our attack can successfully activate over $90\%$ of triggered actions, reducing the average episodic return by $80\%$ for the victim. Our novel attack demonstrates that RL attacks are likely to become a reality under untrusted RL training supply-chains.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Erasing Undesirable Concepts in Diffusion Models with Adversarial Preservation

Diffusion models excel at generating visually striking content from text but can inadvertently produce undesirable or harmful content when trained on unfiltered internet data. A practical solution is to selectively removing target concepts from the model, but this may impact the remaining concepts. Prior approaches have tried to balance this by introducing a loss term to preserve neutral content or a regularization term to minimize changes in the model parameters, yet resolving this trade-off remains challenging. In this work, we propose to identify and preserving concepts most affected by parameter changes, termed as \textit{adversarial concepts}. This approach ensures stable erasure with minimal impact on the other concepts. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method using the Stable Diffusion model, showing that it outperforms state-of-the-art erasure methods in eliminating unwanted content while maintaining the integrity of other unrelated elements. Our code is available at https://github.com/tuananhbui89/Erasing-Adversarial-Preservation.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Fantastic Targets for Concept Erasure in Diffusion Models and Where To Find Them

Concept erasure has emerged as a promising technique for mitigating the risk of harmful content generation in diffusion models by selectively unlearning undesirable concepts. The common principle of previous works to remove a specific concept is to map it to a fixed generic concept, such as a neutral concept or just an empty text prompt. In this paper, we demonstrate that this fixed-target strategy is suboptimal, as it fails to account for the impact of erasing one concept on the others. To address this limitation, we model the concept space as a graph and empirically analyze the effects of erasing one concept on the remaining concepts. Our analysis uncovers intriguing geometric properties of the concept space, where the influence of erasing a concept is confined to a local region. Building on this insight, we propose the Adaptive Guided Erasure (AGE) method, which \emph{dynamically} selects optimal target concepts tailored to each undesirable concept, minimizing unintended side effects. Experimental results show that AGE significantly outperforms state-of-the-art erasure methods on preserving unrelated concepts while maintaining effective erasure performance. Our code is published at {https://github.com/tuananhbui89/Adaptive-Guided-Erasure}.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Slice+Slice Baby: Generating Last-Level Cache Eviction Sets in the Blink of an Eye

An essential step for mounting cache attacks is finding eviction sets, collections of memory locations that contend on cache space. On Intel processors, one of the main challenges for identifying contending addresses is the sliced cache design, where the processor hashes the physical address to determine where in the cache a memory location is stored. While past works have demonstrated that the hash function can be reversed, they also showed that it depends on physical address bits that the adversary does not know. In this work, we make three main contributions to the art of finding eviction sets. We first exploit microarchitectural races to compare memory access times and identify the cache slice to which an address maps. We then use the known hash function to both reduce the error rate in our slice identification method and to reduce the work by extrapolating slice mappings to untested memory addresses. Finally, we show how to propagate information on eviction sets across different page offsets for the hitherto unexplored case of non-linear hash functions. Our contributions allow for entire LLC eviction set generation in 0.7 seconds on the Intel i7-9850H and 1.6 seconds on the i9-10900K, both using non-linear functions. This represents a significant improvement compared to state-of-the-art techniques taking 9x and 10x longer, respectively.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Hiding and Recovering Knowledge in Text-to-Image Diffusion Models via Learnable Prompts

Diffusion models have demonstrated remarkable capability in generating high-quality visual content from textual descriptions. However, since these models are trained on large-scale internet data, they inevitably learn undesirable concepts, such as sensitive content, copyrighted material, and harmful or unethical elements. While previous works focus on permanently removing such concepts, this approach is often impractical, as it can degrade model performance and lead to irreversible loss of information. In this work, we introduce a novel concept-hiding approach that makes unwanted concepts inaccessible to public users while allowing controlled recovery when needed. Instead of erasing knowledge from the model entirely, we incorporate a learnable prompt into the cross-attention module, acting as a secure memory that suppresses the generation of hidden concepts unless a secret key is provided. This enables flexible access control -- ensuring that undesirable content cannot be easily generated while preserving the option to reinstate it under restricted conditions. Our method introduces a new paradigm where concept suppression and controlled recovery coexist, which was not feasible in prior works. We validate its effectiveness on the Stable Diffusion model, demonstrating that hiding concepts mitigate the risks of permanent removal while maintaining the model's overall capability.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

On the Credibility of Backdoor Attacks Against Object Detectors in the Physical World

Object detectors are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. In contrast to classifiers, detectors possess unique characteristics, architecturally and in task execution; often operating in challenging conditions, for instance, detecting traffic signs in autonomous cars. But, our knowledge dominates attacks against classifiers and tests in the "digital domain". To address this critical gap, we conducted an extensive empirical study targeting multiple detector architectures and two challenging detection tasks in real-world settings: traffic signs and vehicles. Using the diverse, methodically collected videos captured from driving cars and flying drones, incorporating physical object trigger deployments in authentic scenes, we investigated the viability of physical object-triggered backdoor attacks in application settings. Our findings revealed 8 key insights. Importantly, the prevalent "digital" data poisoning method for injecting backdoors into models does not lead to effective attacks against detectors in the real world, although proven effective in classification tasks. We construct a new, cost-efficient attack method, dubbed MORPHING, incorporating the unique nature of detection tasks; ours is remarkably successful in injecting physical object-triggered backdoors, even capable of poisoning triggers with clean label annotations or invisible triggers without diminishing the success of physical object triggered backdoors. We discovered that the defenses curated are ill-equipped to safeguard detectors against such attacks. To underscore the severity of the threat and foster further research, we, for the first time, release an extensive video test set of real-world backdoor attacks. Our study not only establishes the credibility and seriousness of this threat but also serves as a clarion call to the research community to advance backdoor defenses in the context of object detection.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

EaTVul: ChatGPT-based Evasion Attack Against Software Vulnerability Detection

Recently, deep learning has demonstrated promising results in enhancing the accuracy of vulnerability detection and identifying vulnerabilities in software. However, these techniques are still vulnerable to attacks. Adversarial examples can exploit vulnerabilities within deep neural networks, posing a significant threat to system security. This study showcases the susceptibility of deep learning models to adversarial attacks, which can achieve 100% attack success rate (refer to Table 5). The proposed method, EaTVul, encompasses six stages: identification of important samples using support vector machines, identification of important features using the attention mechanism, generation of adversarial data based on these features using ChatGPT, preparation of an adversarial attack pool, selection of seed data using a fuzzy genetic algorithm, and the execution of an evasion attack. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of EaTVul, achieving an attack success rate of more than 83% when the snippet size is greater than 2. Furthermore, in most cases with a snippet size of 4, EaTVul achieves a 100% attack success rate. The findings of this research emphasize the necessity of robust defenses against adversarial attacks in software vulnerability detection.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Et Tu Certifications: Robustness Certificates Yield Better Adversarial Examples

In guaranteeing the absence of adversarial examples in an instance's neighbourhood, certification mechanisms play an important role in demonstrating neural net robustness. In this paper, we ask if these certifications can compromise the very models they help to protect? Our new \emph{Certification Aware Attack} exploits certifications to produce computationally efficient norm-minimising adversarial examples $74 \%$ more often than comparable attacks, while reducing the median perturbation norm by more than $10\%$. While these attacks can be used to assess the tightness of certification bounds, they also highlight that releasing certifications can paradoxically reduce security.

cs.LG↗