arXiv subjects

Pawel Sobkowicz

Publications and source records attributed to Pawel Sobkowicz.

23 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2003

Effect of leader's strategy on opinion formation in networked societies

The work investigates the influence of leader's strategy on opinion formation in artificial networked societies. The strength of the social influence is assumed to be dictated by distance from one agent to another, as well as individual strengths of the agents. The leader is assumed to have much greater resources, which allows him to tune the way he influences the other agents. We study various strategies of using these resources to optimize the conditions needed to `convince' the whole society to leader's opinion. The flexibility of the model allows it to be used in studies of political, social and marketing influence and opinion formation.

cond-mat.dis-nn↗

arXiv2003

Opinion formation in networked societies with strong leaders

Recent studies show that many types of human social activities, from scientific collaborations to sexual contacts, can be understood in terms of complex network of interactions. Such networking paradigm allows to model many aspects of social behaviour with relatively simple computer models. The present work investigates the influence of single leaders on opinion formation within simulations of agent based artificial networked societies. Several types of network systems (among them random networks, highly clustered, small world and scale-free) are studied. The strength of the social influence of individuals is assumed to be dictated by distance from an agent to another, as well as individual strengths of the agents. We study the effect of different topologies on the conditions of general acceptance of leader's opinion by the society.

cond-mat.dis-nn↗

arXiv2003

Analysis of Norms Game in networked societies

Norms, defined as generally accepted behaviour in societies without central authority (and thus distinguished from laws), are very powerful mechanism leading to coherent behaviour of the society members. This paper examines, within a simple numerical simulation, the various effects that may lead to norm formation and stability. The approach has been first used by Axelrod, who proposed two step model of norm and meta-norm enforcement. We present here an extension and detailed analysis of the original work, as well as several new ideas that may bear on the norm establishment mechanisms in societies. It turns out that a relatively simple model for simulated norm enforcement predicts persistent norm breaking even when it is associated with high punishment levels. The key factors appear to be the combination of the level of penalty for breaking the norm and proximity of norm enforcers. We also study a totally different mechanism of norm establishment, without meta-norms but using instead the direct bonus mechanism to norm-enforcers.

cond-mat.dis-nn↗

arXiv2003

Comments on evolution of cooperation: evolutionary stability in enhanced Dove-Hawk model

One of the best examples of traditional analysis of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) is provided by the so called Dove-Hawk model. In this paper we present several enhancements to the model aimed at describing the evolution of cooperative behavior. In addition to Doves and Hawks we introduce several groups of Cooperators, who act as Doves within their own group, but as Hawks outside it. This allows to study how cooperating groups may grow and achieve stability within a nonrepeating evolutionary games framework. Depending on initial conditions, the final stable population may have one, all-encompassing Cooperator population or several competing cliques. After taking into account that Cooperators bear costs necessary to recognize members of one's own group it is possible to see populations where Cooperators eventually lose against Hawks or populations where several cliques of Cooperators coexist with a Hawk population.

cond-mat.dis-nn↗

arXiv2003

Comments on evolution of cooperation: assortative encounters with selfknowledge

The theoretical description of the evolution of cooperation presented by Bergstrom based on assortative matching with partner choice allows to model the population dynamics in a game of Nonrepetitive Prisoners Dilemma. In this paper we present a short analysis of asymmetric effects brought into the game by self knowledge of the participants, that is the knowledge of one's own strategy. Within the same conceptual framework as introduced by Bergstrom inclusion of selfknowledge leads to different behaviour of the assortativity index and changes in payoffs for different strategies.

cond-mat.dis-nn↗