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Pengwei Zhan

Publications and source records attributed to Pengwei Zhan.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Unveiling the Lexical Sensitivity of LLMs: Combinatorial Optimization for Prompt Enhancement

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate exceptional instruct-following ability to complete various downstream tasks. Although this impressive ability makes LLMs flexible task solvers, their performance in solving tasks also heavily relies on instructions. In this paper, we reveal that LLMs are over-sensitive to lexical variations in task instructions, even when the variations are imperceptible to humans. By providing models with neighborhood instructions, which are closely situated in the latent representation space and differ by only one semantically similar word, the performance on downstream tasks can be vastly different. Following this property, we propose a black-box Combinatorial Optimization framework for Prompt Lexical Enhancement (COPLE). COPLE performs iterative lexical optimization according to the feedback from a batch of proxy tasks, using a search strategy related to word influence. Experiments show that even widely-used human-crafted prompts for current benchmarks suffer from the lexical sensitivity of models, and COPLE recovers the declined model ability in both instruct-following and solving downstream tasks.

cs.CL

Website fingerprinting on early QUIC traffic

Cryptographic protocols have been widely used to protect the user's privacy and avoid exposing private information. QUIC (Quick UDP Internet Connections), including the version originally designed by Google (GQUIC) and the version standardized by IETF (IQUIC), as alternatives to the traditional HTTP, demonstrate their unique transmission characteristics: based on UDP for encrypted resource transmitting, accelerating web page rendering. However, existing encrypted transmission schemes based on TCP are vulnerable to website fingerprinting (WFP) attacks, allowing adversaries to infer the users' visited websites by eavesdropping on the transmission channel. Whether GQUIC and IQUIC can effectively resist such attacks is worth investigating. In this paper, we study the vulnerabilities of GQUIC, IQUIC, and HTTPS to WFP attacks from the perspective of traffic analysis. Extensive experiments show that, in the early traffic scenario, GQUIC is the most vulnerable to WFP attacks among GQUIC, IQUIC, and HTTPS, while IQUIC is more vulnerable than HTTPS, but the vulnerability of the three protocols is similar in the normal full traffic scenario. Features transferring analysis shows that most features are transferable between protocols when on normal full traffic scenario. However, combining with the qualitative analysis of latent feature representation, we find that the transferring is inefficient when on early traffic, as GQUIC, IQUIC, and HTTPS show the significantly different magnitude of variation in the traffic distribution on early traffic. By upgrading the one-time WFP attacks to multiple WFP Top-a attacks, we find that the attack accuracy on GQUIC and IQUIC reach 95.4% and 95.5%, respectively, with only 40 packets and just using simple features, whereas reach only 60.7% when on HTTPS. We also demonstrate that the vulnerability of IQUIC is only slightly dependent on the network environment.

cs.CR