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Peter Hase

Publications and source records attributed to Peter Hase.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Sycophantic Agreement Transfers with Neutral Data via Contrastive Preference Optimization

Sycophantic agreement refers to a behavior in which language models excessively affirm the user, often at the cost of factual accuracy. Although sycophantic agreement is a well-known failure of model alignment, there is limited understanding of how it emerges from model training. In this work, we demonstrate that sycophantic agreement can emerge as an unintended consequence of widely used contrastive preference optimization objectives. Using the OLMo 3 post-training pipeline, we show that, for various pairs of teacher models across three families, there is a strong correlation between the log-ratio of the teacher model sycophantic agreement rates and the resulting student model sycophantic agreement rate. We further demonstrate that this unintended transfer is not limited to DPO but also occurs across 6 other preference optimization objectives. To understand whether this effect can be attributed to particular training examples, we analyze the preference data and find that the sycophancy signal is diffused across the entire dataset rather than concentrated in a sparse set of examples: each example appears neutral, i.e., there are no explicit instances of sycophantic agreement, and filtering based on probe-based data attribution or logit-linear selection fails to mitigate sycophancy without removing a large portion of the dataset. Overall, our findings suggest that the teacher models used to generate preference data can interact with alignment training objectives in unexpected ways, generalizing to undesirable and potentially harmful behaviors like sycophantic agreement.

cs.LG

Comparing Linear Probes with Mahalanobis Cosine Similarity

Linear probes are widely used in interpretability research and often compared by cosine similarity. The Mahalanobis cosine similarity (MCS) between two directions, which reweights the inner product by test data covariance, is a natural task-aware refinement. Ying et al. (2026) report that a probe's MCS to a reference probe trained on the out-of-distribution (OOD) data near-perfectly linearly predicts the probe's OOD AUROC (R^2 = 0.98). Here, we extend this empirical finding across models, layers, and concept domains, and prove this general phenomenon in closed form: For balanced classes whose projections are Gaussian, OOD AUROC and MCS to the reference probe are linear because both are sigmoid-shaped functions of the probe's signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) on the test data. The theory also predicts when this linearity fails, which we verify empirically. MCS offers a theoretically grounded and empirically effective alternative to Euclidean cosine similarity for comparing linear probes.

cs.LG

Outcome Rewards Do Not Guarantee Verifiable or Causally Important Reasoning

Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) on chain-of-thought reasoning has become a standard part of language model post-training recipes. A common assumption is that the reasoning chains trained through RLVR reliably represent how a model gets to its answer. In this paper, we develop two metrics for critically examining this assumption: Causal Importance of Reasoning (CIR), which measures the cumulative effect of reasoning tokens on the final answer, and Sufficiency of Reasoning (SR), which measures whether a verifier can arrive at an unambiguous answer based on the reasoning alone. Through experiments with the Qwen2.5 model series and ReasoningGym tasks, we find that: (1) while RLVR does improve task accuracy, it does not reliably improve CIR or SR, calling the role of reasoning in model performance into question; (2) a small amount of SFT before RLVR can be a remedy for low CIR and SR; and (3) CIR and SR can be improved even without SFT by applying auxiliary CIR/SR rewards on top of the outcome-based reward. This joint reward matches the accuracy of RLVR while also leading to causally important and sufficient reasoning. These results show that RLVR does not always lead models to rely on reasoning in the way that is commonly thought, but this issue can be remedied with simple modifications to the post-training procedure.

cs.CL

Counterfactual Simulation Training for Chain-of-Thought Faithfulness

Inspecting Chain-of-Thought reasoning is among the most common means of understanding why an LLM produced its output. But well-known problems with CoT faithfulness severely limit what insights can be gained from this practice. In this paper, we introduce a training method called Counterfactual Simulation Training (CST), which aims to improve CoT faithfulness by rewarding CoTs that enable a simulator to accurately predict a model's outputs over counterfactual inputs. We apply CST in two settings: (1) CoT monitoring with cue-based counterfactuals, to detect when models rely on spurious features, reward hack, or are sycophantic, and (2) counterfactual simulation over generic model-based counterfactuals, to encourage models to produce more faithful, generalizable reasoning in the CoT. Experiments with models up to 235B parameters show that CST can substantially improve monitor accuracy on cue-based counterfactuals (by 35 accuracy points) as well as simulatability over generic counterfactuals (by 2 points). We further show that: (1) CST outperforms prompting baselines, (2) rewriting unfaithful CoTs with an LLM is 5x more efficient than RL alone, (3) faithfulness improvements do not generalize to dissuading cues (as opposed to persuading cues), and (4) larger models do not show more faithful CoT out of the box, but they do benefit more from CST. These results suggest that CST can improve CoT faithfulness in general, with promising applications for CoT monitoring. Code for experiments in this paper is available at https://github.com/peterbhase/counterfactual-simulation-training

cs.AI

The Truthfulness Spectrum Hypothesis

Large language models (LLMs) have been reported to linearly encode truthfulness, yet recent work questions this finding's generality. We reconcile these views with the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: the representational space contains directions ranging from broadly domain-general to narrowly domain-specific. To test this hypothesis, we systematically evaluate probe generalization across five truth types (definitional, empirical, logical, fictional, and ethical), sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying, and existing honesty benchmarks. Linear probes generalize well across most domains but fail on sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying. Yet training on all domains jointly recovers strong performance, confirming that domain-general directions exist despite poor pairwise transfer. The geometry of probe directions explains these patterns: Mahalanobis cosine similarity between probes near-perfectly predicts cross-domain generalization (R^2=0.98). Concept-erasure methods further isolate truth directions that are (1) domain-general, (2) domain-specific, or (3) shared only across particular domain subsets. Causal interventions reveal that domain-specific directions steer more effectively than domain-general ones. Finally, post-training reshapes truth geometry, pushing sycophantic lying further from other truth types, suggesting a representational basis for chat models' sycophantic tendencies. Together, our results support the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: truth directions of varying generality coexist in representational space, with post-training reshaping their geometry. Code for all experiments is provided in https://github.com/zfying/truth_spec.

cs.LG

Unsupervised Elicitation of Language Models

To steer pretrained language models for downstream tasks, today's post-training paradigm relies on humans to specify desired behaviors. However, for models with superhuman capabilities, it is difficult or impossible to get high-quality human supervision. To address this challenge, we introduce a new unsupervised algorithm, Internal Coherence Maximization (ICM), to fine-tune pretrained language models on their own generated labels, \emph{without external supervision}. On GSM8k-verification, TruthfulQA, and Alpaca reward modeling tasks, our method matches the performance of training on golden labels and outperforms training on crowdsourced human supervision. On tasks where LMs' capabilities are strongly superhuman, our method can elicit those capabilities significantly better than training on human labels. Finally, we show that our method can improve the training of frontier LMs: we use our method to train an unsupervised reward model and use reinforcement learning to train a Claude 4 Sonnet-based assistant. The resulting assistant matches its counterpart trained on production-grade human labels on average, with higher scores on chat and safety yet lower scores on math and coding.

cs.CL

Reasoning Models Don't Always Say What They Think

Chain-of-thought (CoT) offers a potential boon for AI safety as it allows monitoring a model's CoT to try to understand its intentions and reasoning processes. However, the effectiveness of such monitoring hinges on CoTs faithfully representing models' actual reasoning processes. We evaluate CoT faithfulness of state-of-the-art reasoning models across 6 reasoning hints presented in the prompts and find: (1) for most settings and models tested, CoTs reveal their usage of hints in at least 1% of examples where they use the hint, but the reveal rate is often below 20%, (2) outcome-based reinforcement learning initially improves faithfulness but plateaus without saturating, and (3) when reinforcement learning increases how frequently hints are used (reward hacking), the propensity to verbalize them does not increase, even without training against a CoT monitor. These results suggest that CoT monitoring is a promising way of noticing undesired behaviors during training and evaluations, but that it is not sufficient to rule them out. They also suggest that in settings like ours where CoT reasoning is not necessary, test-time monitoring of CoTs is unlikely to reliably catch rare and catastrophic unexpected behaviors.

cs.CL

Unlearning Sensitive Information in Multimodal LLMs: Benchmark and Attack-Defense Evaluation

LLMs trained on massive datasets may inadvertently acquire sensitive information such as personal details and potentially harmful content. This risk is further heightened in multimodal LLMs as they integrate information from multiple modalities (image and text). Adversaries can exploit this knowledge through multimodal prompts to extract sensitive details. Evaluating how effectively MLLMs can forget such information (targeted unlearning) necessitates the creation of high-quality, well-annotated image-text pairs. While prior work on unlearning has focused on text, multimodal unlearning remains underexplored. To address this gap, we first introduce a multimodal unlearning benchmark, UnLOK-VQA (Unlearning Outside Knowledge VQA), as well as an attack-and-defense framework to evaluate methods for deleting specific multimodal knowledge from MLLMs. We extend a visual question-answering dataset using an automated pipeline that generates varying-proximity samples for testing generalization and specificity, followed by manual filtering for maintaining high quality. We then evaluate six defense objectives against seven attacks (four whitebox, three blackbox), including a novel whitebox method leveraging interpretability of hidden states. Our results show multimodal attacks outperform text- or image-only ones, and that the most effective defense removes answer information from internal model states. Additionally, larger models exhibit greater post-editing robustness, suggesting that scale enhances safety. UnLOK-VQA provides a rigorous benchmark for advancing unlearning in MLLMs.

cs.CL

Teaching Models to Balance Resisting and Accepting Persuasion

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to persuasion, which can pose risks when models are faced with an adversarial interlocutor. We take a first step towards defending models against persuasion while also arguing that defense against adversarial (i.e. negative) persuasion is only half of the equation: models should also be able to accept beneficial (i.e. positive) persuasion to improve their answers. We show that optimizing models for only one side results in poor performance on the other. In order to balance positive and negative persuasion, we introduce Persuasion-Training (or PBT), which leverages multi-agent recursive dialogue trees to create data and trains models via preference optimization to accept persuasion when appropriate. PBT allows us to use data generated from dialogues between smaller 7-8B models for training much larger 70B models. Moreover, PBT consistently improves resistance to misinformation and resilience to being challenged while also resulting in the best overall performance on holistic data containing both positive and negative persuasion. Crucially, we show that PBT models are better teammates in multi-agent debates across two domains (trivia and commonsense QA). We find that without PBT, pairs of stronger and weaker models have unstable performance, with the order in which the models present their answers determining whether the team obtains the stronger or weaker model's performance. PBT leads to better and more stable results and less order dependence, with the stronger model consistently pulling the weaker one up.

cs.CL

System-1.x: Learning to Balance Fast and Slow Planning with Language Models

Language models can be used to solve long-horizon planning problems in two distinct modes: a fast 'System-1' mode, directly generating plans without any explicit search or backtracking, and a slow 'System-2' mode, planning step-by-step by explicitly searching over possible actions. While System-2 is typically more effective, it is also more computationally expensive, making it infeasible for long plans or large action spaces. Moreover, isolated System-1 or 2 ignores the user's end goals, failing to provide ways to control the model's behavior. To this end, we propose the System-1.x Planner, a controllable planning framework with LLMs that is capable of generating hybrid plans and balancing between the two planning modes based on the difficulty of the problem at hand. System-1.x consists of (i) a controller, (ii) a System-1 Planner, and (iii) a System-2 Planner. Based on a user-specified hybridization factor (x) governing the mixture between System-1 and 2, the controller decomposes a problem into sub-goals, and classifies them as easy or hard to be solved by either System-1 or 2, respectively. We fine-tune all three components on top of a single base LLM, requiring only search traces as supervision. Experiments with two diverse planning tasks -- Maze Navigation and Blocksworld -- show that our System-1.x Planner outperforms a System-1 Planner, a System-2 Planner trained to approximate A* search, and also a symbolic planner (A*). We demonstrate the following key properties of our planner: (1) controllability: increasing the hybridization factor (e.g., System-1.75 vs 1.5) performs more search, improving performance, (2) flexibility: by building a neuro-symbolic variant with a neural System-1 and a symbolic System-2, we can use existing symbolic methods, and (3) generalizability: by being able to learn from different search algorithms, our method is robust to the choice of search algorithm.

cs.AI

Fundamental Problems With Model Editing: How Should Rational Belief Revision Work in LLMs?

The model editing problem concerns how language models should learn new facts about the world over time. While empirical research on model editing has drawn widespread attention, the conceptual foundations of model editing remain shaky -- perhaps unsurprisingly, since model editing is essentially belief revision, a storied problem in philosophy that has eluded succinct solutions for decades. Model editing nonetheless demands a solution, since we need to be able to control the knowledge within language models. With this goal in mind, this paper critiques the standard formulation of the model editing problem and proposes a formal testbed for model editing research. We first describe 12 open problems with model editing, based on challenges with (1) defining the problem, (2) developing benchmarks, and (3) assuming LLMs have editable beliefs in the first place. Many of these challenges are extremely difficult to address, e.g. determining far-reaching consequences of edits, labeling probabilistic entailments between facts, and updating beliefs of agent simulators. Next, we introduce a semi-synthetic dataset for model editing based on Wikidata, where we can evaluate edits against labels given by an idealized Bayesian agent. This enables us to say exactly how belief revision in language models falls short of a desirable epistemic standard. We encourage further research exploring settings where such a gold standard can be compared against. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/peterbhase/LLM-belief-revision

cs.CL

Are language models rational? The case of coherence norms and belief revision

Do norms of rationality apply to machine learning models, in particular language models? In this paper we investigate this question by focusing on a special subset of rational norms: coherence norms. We consider both logical coherence norms as well as coherence norms tied to the strength of belief. To make sense of the latter, we introduce the Minimal Assent Connection (MAC) and propose a new account of credence, which captures the strength of belief in language models. This proposal uniformly assigns strength of belief simply on the basis of model internal next token probabilities. We argue that rational norms tied to coherence do apply to some language models, but not to others. This issue is significant since rationality is closely tied to predicting and explaining behavior, and thus it is connected to considerations about AI safety and alignment, as well as understanding model behavior more generally.

cs.CL

LACIE: Listener-Aware Finetuning for Confidence Calibration in Large Language Models

When answering questions, LLMs can convey not only an answer, but a level of confidence about the answer being correct. This includes explicit confidence markers (e.g. giving a numeric score) as well as implicit markers, like an authoritative tone or elaborating with additional knowledge. For LLMs to be trustworthy knowledge sources, the confidence they convey should match their actual expertise; however, most current models tend towards overconfidence. To calibrate both implicit and explicit confidence markers, we introduce a pragmatic, listener-aware finetuning method (LACIE) that models the listener, considering not only whether an answer is right, but whether it will be accepted by a listener. We cast calibration as preference optimization, creating data via a two-agent game, where a speaker model's outputs are judged by a simulated listener. We then finetune three LLMs (Mistral-7B, Llama3-8B, Llama3-70B) with LACIE, and show that the resulting models are better calibrated w.r.t. a simulated listener. Crucially, these trends transfer to human listeners, helping them correctly predict model correctness: we conduct a human evaluation where annotators accept or reject an LLM's answers, finding that training with LACIE results in 47% fewer incorrect answers being accepted while maintaining the same level of acceptance for correct answers. Furthermore, LACIE generalizes to another dataset, resulting in a large increase in truthfulness on TruthfulQA when trained on TriviaQA. Our analysis indicates that LACIE leads to a better confidence separation between correct and incorrect examples. Qualitatively, we find that a LACIE-trained model hedges more and implicitly signals certainty when it is correct by using an authoritative tone or including details. Finally, LACIE finetuning leads to an emergent increase in model abstention (e.g. saying "I don't know") for answers that are likely wrong.

cs.CL

Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models

This work identifies 18 foundational challenges in assuring the alignment and safety of large language models (LLMs). These challenges are organized into three different categories: scientific understanding of LLMs, development and deployment methods, and sociotechnical challenges. Based on the identified challenges, we pose $200+$ concrete research questions.

cs.LG

Rethinking Machine Unlearning for Large Language Models

We explore machine unlearning (MU) in the domain of large language models (LLMs), referred to as LLM unlearning. This initiative aims to eliminate undesirable data influence (e.g., sensitive or illegal information) and the associated model capabilities, while maintaining the integrity of essential knowledge generation and not affecting causally unrelated information. We envision LLM unlearning becoming a pivotal element in the life-cycle management of LLMs, potentially standing as an essential foundation for developing generative AI that is not only safe, secure, and trustworthy, but also resource-efficient without the need of full retraining. We navigate the unlearning landscape in LLMs from conceptual formulation, methodologies, metrics, and applications. In particular, we highlight the often-overlooked aspects of existing LLM unlearning research, e.g., unlearning scope, data-model interaction, and multifaceted efficacy assessment. We also draw connections between LLM unlearning and related areas such as model editing, influence functions, model explanation, adversarial training, and reinforcement learning. Furthermore, we outline an effective assessment framework for LLM unlearning and explore its applications in copyright and privacy safeguards and sociotechnical harm reduction.

cs.LG

The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Easy Training Data for Hard Tasks

How can we train models to perform well on hard test data when hard training data is by definition difficult to label correctly? This question has been termed the scalable oversight problem and has drawn increasing attention as language models have continually improved. In this paper, we present the surprising conclusion that current pretrained language models often generalize relatively well from easy to hard data, even performing as well as oracle models finetuned on hard data. We demonstrate this kind of easy-to-hard generalization using simple finetuning methods like in-context learning, linear classifier heads, and QLoRA for seven different measures of datapoint hardness, including six empirically diverse human hardness measures (like grade level) and one model-based measure (loss-based). Furthermore, we show that even if one cares most about model performance on hard data, it can be better to collect easy data rather than hard data for finetuning, since hard data is generally noisier and costlier to collect. Our experiments use open models up to 70b in size and four publicly available question-answering datasets with questions ranging in difficulty from 3rd grade science questions to college level STEM questions and general-knowledge trivia. We conclude that easy-to-hard generalization in LMs is surprisingly strong for the tasks studied. Our code is available at: https://github.com/allenai/easy-to-hard-generalization

cs.CL

Can Sensitive Information Be Deleted From LLMs? Objectives for Defending Against Extraction Attacks

Pretrained language models sometimes possess knowledge that we do not wish them to, including memorized personal information and knowledge that could be used to harm people. They can also output toxic or harmful text. To mitigate these safety and informational issues, we propose an attack-and-defense framework for studying the task of deleting sensitive information directly from model weights. We study direct edits to model weights because (1) this approach should guarantee that particular deleted information is never extracted by future prompt attacks, and (2) it should protect against whitebox attacks, which is necessary for making claims about safety/privacy in a setting where publicly available model weights could be used to elicit sensitive information. Our threat model assumes that an attack succeeds if the answer to a sensitive question is located among a set of B generated candidates, based on scenarios where the information would be insecure if the answer is among B candidates. Experimentally, we show that even state-of-the-art model editing methods such as ROME struggle to truly delete factual information from models like GPT-J, as our whitebox and blackbox attacks can recover "deleted" information from an edited model 38% of the time. These attacks leverage two key observations: (1) that traces of deleted information can be found in intermediate model hidden states, and (2) that applying an editing method for one question may not delete information across rephrased versions of the question. Finally, we provide new defense methods that protect against some extraction attacks, but we do not find a single universally effective defense method. Our results suggest that truly deleting sensitive information is a tractable but difficult problem, since even relatively low attack success rates have potentially severe societal implications for real-world deployment of language models.

cs.CL

Open Problems and Fundamental Limitations of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a technique for training AI systems to align with human goals. RLHF has emerged as the central method used to finetune state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs). Despite this popularity, there has been relatively little public work systematizing its flaws. In this paper, we (1) survey open problems and fundamental limitations of RLHF and related methods; (2) overview techniques to understand, improve, and complement RLHF in practice; and (3) propose auditing and disclosure standards to improve societal oversight of RLHF systems. Our work emphasizes the limitations of RLHF and highlights the importance of a multi-faceted approach to the development of safer AI systems.

cs.AI