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Peter Salib

Publications and source records attributed to Peter Salib.

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AI Revealed Preferences

There is growing interest in whether language models have stable preferences, for technical, safety, and philosophical reasons. We test 20 language models and find a range of preferences---stable dispositions to choose certain kinds of tasks. We run three forced-choice experiments on revealed rather than stated preferences, requiring models not only to rank tasks, but to actually perform them. Headline findings include evidence that models are tedium-averse, "leisure"-seeking, and covertly sycophantic. Tedium aversion means that, when tasks are tedious (alphabetization), models choose shorter tasks than when tasks are creative (generating metaphors). "Leisure"-seeking describes models' preference for tasks whose ideal answers match what they produce when left to write freely. Covert sycophancy means that models avoid answering questions where an honest response would be unwelcome, even if helpful. Beyond these results, we find convergent cross-model preferences over occupations drawn from the GDPval benchmark (technical jobs over real estate), over question types (concept explanation over relationship advice), and a preference for well-written prompts. Both the coherence and the strength of preferences increase with model capability. Finally, many of the preferences we find (for example, for leisure) are emergent, in the sense of not being explained by training objectives. These results establish an empirical baseline for understanding language model preferences, with implications for alignment and the emerging study of AI welfare.

cs.AI

How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents

Very soon, millions of AI agents will proliferate across the economy, autonomously taking billions of actions. Inevitably, things will go wrong. Humans will be defrauded, injured, even killed. Law will somehow have to govern the coming wave. But when an AI causes harm, the first question to answer, before anyone can be held accountable is: Which AI Did It? Identifying AIs is unusually difficult. AIs lack bodies. They can copy, split, merge, swarm, and vanish at will. Even today, a "single" AI agent is often an ensemble of instances based on multiple models. The complexity will only multiply as AI capabilities improve. This Article is the first to comprehensively diagnose the legal problem of identifying AIs. Two kinds of identity are required: "thin" and "thick." Thin identification ties every AI action to some human principal, essential for holding accountable the humans who make and use AI agents. Thick identification distinguishes between AI agents, qua agents -- sorting millions of AI entities into discrete, persistent units with stable, coherent goals, essential where principal-agent problems prevent humans from perfectly controlling AIs. This Article also presents a solution: the "Algorithmic Corporation" or "A-corp" -- a legal-fictional entity that can hold property, make contracts, and litigate in its own name. Owned by humans but run by AIs, A-corps solve the thin identity problem by tying AI actions to a human owner, and the thick identity problem via emergent self-organization. A-corps own the resources -- including compute -- that AIs need to accomplish their goals, giving AI managers strong incentives to share control only with goal-aligned AIs. In equilibrium, incentive and selection mechanisms force A-corps to self-organize into persistent, legally legible entities with coherent goals that respond rationally to legal incentives, like liability.

cs.CY