arXiv subjects

Peter Tankov

Publications and source records attributed to Peter Tankov.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Fast and slow mean-field games

We propose a framework for constructing approximate Nash equilibria in mean-field games (MFG) with common noise based on a two-time-scale structure. In our model, the common noise is carried by a fast variable evolving under ergodic dynamics, while the slow variable is either optimally controlled or stopped. The fast variable enters the dynamics of the slow one through the drift coefficient. The key idea is to construct an approximation to the solution of the full MFG with common noise using an ``effective'' MFG without common noise, where the coefficients are averaged with respect to the stationary measure of the fast-scale process. We construct an explicit $\varepsilon$-MFG equilibrium for the full MFG from the equilibrium for the effective MFG with randomized control and stopping. To this end, we obtain new results on existence of MFG equilibria with randomized stopping. We rely on strong convergence results for two-scale diffusions under structural assumptions on the MFG, and show that the time-scale separation parameter controls the error in the Nash equilibrium condition.

math.OC↗

arXiv2025

Propagation of carbon price shocks through the value chain: the mean-field game of defaults

We introduce a new mean-field game framework to analyze the impact of carbon pricing in a multi-sector economy with defaultable firms. Each sector produces a homogeneous good, with its price endogenously determined through market clearing. Firms act as price takers and maximize profits by choosing an optimal allocation of inputs-including labor, emissions, and intermediate goods from other sectors-while interacting through the endogenous sectoral price. Firms also choose their default timing to maximize shareholder value. Formally, we model the economy as an optimal stopping mean-field game within each sector. The resulting system of coupled mean-field games admits a linear programming formulation that characterizes Nash equilibria in terms of population measure flows. We prove the existence of a linear programming Nash equilibrium and establish uniqueness of the associated price system. Numerical illustrations are presented for firms with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions. In a stylized single-sector economy, carbon price shocks induce substitution between emissions and labor. In a three-sector economy, the manufacturing sector faces consumer demand and requires inputs from a brown sector, which can be increasingly replaced by green-sector goods as carbon prices rise. These experiments reveal that carbon price shocks can generate substantial spillover effects along the value chain, underscoring the importance of sectoral interdependencies in shaping effective decarbonization pathways.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2025

Climate Finance Bench

Climate Finance Bench introduces an open benchmark that targets question-answering over corporate climate disclosures using Large Language Models. We curate 33 recent sustainability reports in English drawn from companies across all 11 GICS sectors and annotate 330 expert-validated question-answer pairs that span pure extraction, numerical reasoning, and logical reasoning. Building on this dataset, we propose a comparison of RAG (retrieval-augmented generation) approaches. We show that the retriever's ability to locate passages that actually contain the answer is the chief performance bottleneck. We further argue for transparent carbon reporting in AI-for-climate applications, highlighting advantages of techniques such as Weight Quantization.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

A model of strategic sustainable investment

We study a problem of optimal irreversible investment and emission reduction formulated as a nonzero-sum dynamic game between an investor with environmental preferences and a firm. The game is set in continuous time on an infinite-time horizon. The firm generates profits with a stochastic dynamics and may spend part of its revenues towards emission reduction (e.g., renovating the infrastructure). The firm's objective is to maximize the discounted expectation of a function of its profits. The investor participates in the profits, may decide to invest to support the firm's production capacity and uses a profit function which accounts for both financial and environmental factors. Nash equilibria of the game are obtained via a system of variational inequalities. We formulate a general verification theorem for this system in a diffusive setup and construct an explicit solution in the zero-noise limit. Our explicit results and numerical approximations show that both the investor's and the firm's optimal actions are triggered by moving boundaries that increase with the total amount of emission abatement.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2024

Price impact and long-term profitability of energy storage

We study the price impact of storage facilities in electricity markets and analyze the long-term profitability of these facilities in prospective scenarios of energy transition. To this end, we begin by characterizing the optimal operating strategy for a stylized storage system, assuming an arbitrary exogenous price process. Following this, we determine the equilibrium price in a market comprising storage systems (acting as price takers), renewable energy producers, and conventional producers with a defined supply function, all driven by an exogenous demand process. The price process is characterized as a solution to a fully coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations, for which we establish existence and uniqueness under appropriate assumptions. We finally illustrate the impact of storage on intraday electricity prices through numerical examples and show how the revenues of storage agents may evolve in prospective energy transition scenarios from RTE, the French energy electricity network operator, taking into account both the increasing penetration of renewable energies and the self-cannibalization effect of growing storage capacity. We find that both the average revenues and the interquantile ranges increase in all scenarios, highlighting higher expected profits and higher risk for storage assets.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2024

Optimal stopping and divestment timing under scenario ambiguity and learning

Aiming to analyze the impact of environmental transition on the value of assets and on asset stranding, we study optimal stopping and divestment timing decisions for an economic agent whose future revenues depend on the realization of a scenario from a given set of possible futures. Since the future scenario is unknown and the probabilities of individual prospective scenarios are ambiguous, we adopt the smooth model of decision making under ambiguity aversion of Klibanoff et al (2005), framing the optimal divestment decision as an optimal stopping problem with learning under ambiguity aversion. We then prove a minimax result reducing this problem to a series of standard optimal stopping problems with learning. The theory is illustrated with two examples: the problem of optimally selling a stock with ambiguous drift, and the problem of optimal divestment from a coal-fired power plant under transition scenario ambiguity.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2023

A mean-field game model of electricity market dynamics

We develop a model for the long-term dynamics of electricity market, based on mean-field games of optimal stopping. Our paper extends the recent contribution [A\"id, Ren\'e, Roxana Dumitrescu, and Peter Tankov, ``The entry and exit game in the electricity markets: A mean-field game approach." Journal of Dynamics \& Games 8.4 (2021): 331] in several ways, making the model much more realistic, especially for describing the medium-term impacts of energy transition on electricity markets. In particular, we allow for an arbitrary number of technologies with endogenous fuel prices and enable the agents to both invest and divest. This makes it possible to describe the role of gas generation as a medium-term substitute for coal, to be replaced by renewable generation in the long term, and enables us to model the events like the 2022 energy price crisis.

math.OC↗

arXiv2023

Decarbonization of financial markets: a mean-field game approach

We develop a financial market model in which a large population of firms chooses dynamic emission strategies under climate transition risk, interacting with both environmentally concerned and neutral investors. Firms face a trade-off between financial returns and environmental performance, while their decisions are coupled through an equilibrium stochastic discount factor determined by investors' portfolio allocations. The framework is formulated as a mean-field game, for which we establish existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium among firms. We propose a convergent numerical scheme to compute the equilibrium and use it to study how climate transition risk and green-minded investors affect decarbonization dynamics and asset prices. Our results show that uncertainty about future climate risks and policies increases aggregate emissions and widens valuation spreads between green and brown firms. Although environmentally concerned investors can partially offset these effects by raising the cost of capital for high-emission firms and incentivizing emission reductions, policy uncertainty weakens their impact. Even a large share of green-minded investors is insufficient to reverse emission growth when future climate policies are unclear, highlighting the crucial role of credible and predictable climate policy in enabling financial markets to support decarbonization.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2022

Energy transition under scenario uncertainty: a mean-field game of stopping with common noise

We study the impact of transition scenario uncertainty, namely that of future carbon price and electricity demand, on the pace of decarbonization of the electricity industry. To this end, we develop a theory of optimal stopping mean-field games with non-Markovian common noise and partial observation. For mathematical tractability, the theory is formulated in discrete time and with common noise restricted to a finite probability space. We prove the existence of Nash equilibria for this game using the linear programming approach. We then apply the general theory to build a discrete time model for the long-term dynamics of the electricity market subject to common random shocks affecting the carbon price and the electricity demand. We consider two classes of agents: conventional producers and renewable producers. The former choose an optimal moment to exit the market and the latter choose an optimal moment to enter the market by investing into renewable generation. The agents interact through the market price determined by a merit order mechanism with an exogenous stochastic demand. We illustrate our model by an example inspired by the UK electricity market, and show that scenario uncertainty leads to significant changes in the speed of replacement of conventional generators by renewable production.

math.OC↗

arXiv2022

Optimal Exploration of an Exhaustible Resource with Stochastic Discoveries

The standard Hotelling model assumes that the stock of an exhaustible resource is known. We expand on the model by Arrow and Chang that introduced stochastic discoveries and for the first time completely solve such a model using impulse control. The model has two state variables: the "proven" reserves as well as a finite unexplored area available for exploration with constant marginal cost, resulting in a Poisson process of new discoveries. We prove that a frontier of critical levels of "proven" reserves exists, above which exploration is stopped, and below which it happens at infinite speed. This frontier is increasing in the explored area, and higher "proven" reserve levels along this critical threshold are indicative of more scarcity, not less. In this stochastic generalization of Hotelling's rule, the expected shadow price of reserves rises at the rate of interest across exploratory episodes. However, the actual trajectories of prices realized prior to exhaustion of the exploratory area may jump up or down upon exploration. Conditional on non-exhaustion, expected price arises at a rate bounded above by the rate of interest, consistent with most empirical tests based on observed price histories.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2022

Linear Programming Fictitious Play algorithm for Mean Field Games with optimal stopping and absorption

We develop the fictitious play algorithm in the context of the linear programming approach for mean field games of optimal stopping and mean field games with regular control and absorption. This algorithm allows to approximate the mean field game population dynamics without computing the value function by solving linear programming problems associated with the distributions of the players still in the game and their stopping times/controls. We show the convergence of the algorithm using the topology of convergence in measure in the space of subprobability measures, which is needed to deal with the lack of continuity of the flows of measures. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the convergence of the algorithm.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

Decision making with dynamic probabilistic forecasts

We consider a sequential decision making process, such as renewable energy trading or electrical production scheduling, whose outcome depends on the future realization of a random factor, such as a meteorological variable. We assume that the decision maker disposes of a dynamically updated probabilistic forecast (predictive distribution) of the random factor. We propose several stochastic models for the evolution of the probabilistic forecast, and show how these models may be calibrated from ensemble forecasts, commonly provided by weather centers. We then show how these stochastic models can be used to determine optimal decision making strategies depending on the forecast updates. Applications to wind energy trading are given.

q-fin.TR↗

arXiv2021

Hedging under rough volatility

In this chapter we first briefly review the existing approaches to hedging in rough volatility models. Next, we present a simple but general result which shows that in a one-factor rough stochastic volatility model, any option may be perfectly hedged with a dynamic portfolio containing the underlying and one other asset such as a variance swap. In the final section we report the results of a back-test experiment using real data, where VIX options are hedged with a forward variance swap. In this experiment, using a rough volatility model allows to almost completely remove the bias and reduce the overall hedging error by a factor of 27% compared to traditional diffusion-based models.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2020

Control and optimal stopping Mean Field Games: a linear programming approach

We develop the linear programming approach to mean-field games in a general setting. This relaxed control approach allows to prove existence results under weak assumptions, and lends itself well to numerical implementation. We consider mean-field game problems where the representative agent chooses both the optimal control and the optimal time to exit the game, where the instantaneous reward function and the coefficients of the state process may depend on the distribution of the other agents. Furthermore, we establish the equivalence between mean-field games equilibria obtained by the linear programming approach and the ones obtained via the controlled/stopped martingale approach, another relaxation method used in a few previous papers in the case when there is only control.

math.OC↗

arXiv2020

Price formation and optimal trading in intraday electricity markets with a major player

We study price formation in intraday electricity markets in the presence of intermittent renewable generation. We consider the setting where a major producer may interact strategically with a large number of small producers. Using stochastic control theory we identify the optimal strategies of agents with market impact and exhibit the Nash equilibrium in closed form in the asymptotic framework of mean field games with a major player. This is a companion paper to [F\'eron, Tankov, and Tinsi, Price formation and optimal trading in intraday electricity markets, arXiv:2009.04786, 2020], where a similar model is developed in the setting of identical agents.

q-fin.PR↗

arXiv2020

Price formation and optimal trading in intraday electricity markets

We develop a tractable equilibrium model for price formation in intraday electricity markets in the presence of intermittent renewable generation. Using stochastic control theory, we identify the optimal strategies of agents with market impact and exhibit the Nash equilibrium in closed form for a finite number of agents as well as in the asymptotic framework of mean field games. Our model reproduces the empirical features of intraday market prices, such as increasing price volatility at the approach of the delivery date and the correlation between price and renewable infeed forecasts, and relates these features with market characteristics like liquidity, number of agents, and imbalance penalty.

q-fin.PR↗

arXiv2020

The entry and exit game in the electricity markets: a mean-field game approach

We develop a model for the industry dynamics in the electricity market, based on mean-field games of optimal stopping. In our model, there are two types of agents: the renewable producers and the conventional producers. The renewable producers choose the optimal moment to build new renewable plants, and the conventional producers choose the optimal moment to exit the market. The agents interact through the market price, determined by matching the aggregate supply of the two types of producers with an exogenous demand function. Using a relaxed formulation of optimal stopping mean-field games, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium and the uniqueness of the equilibrium price process. An empirical example, inspired by the UK electricity market is presented. The example shows that while renewable subsidies clearly lead to higher renewable penetration, this may entail a cost to the consumer in terms of higher peakload prices. In order to avoid rising prices, the renewable subsidies must be combined with mechanisms ensuring that sufficient conventional capacity remains in place to meet the energy demand during peak periods.

math.OC↗

arXiv2019

e4clim 1.0 : The Energy for CLimate Integrated Model: Description and Application to Italy

We develop an open-source Python software integrating flexibility needs from Variable Renewable Energies (VREs) in the development of regional energy mixes. It provides a flexible and extensible tool to researchers/engineers, and for education/outreach. It aims at evaluating and optimizing energy deployment strategies with high shares of VRE; assessing the impact of new technologies and of climate variability; conducting sensitivity studies. Specifically, to limit the algorithm's complexity, we avoid solving a full-mix cost-minimization problem by taking the mean and variance of the renewable production-demand ratio as proxies to balance services. Second, observations of VRE technologies being typically too short or nonexistent, the hourly demand and production are estimated from climate time-series and fitted to available observations. We illustrate e4clim's potential with an optimal recommissioning-study of the 2015 Italian PV-wind mix testing different climate-data sources and strategies and assessing the impact of climate variability and the robustness of the results.

stat.AP↗