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Philipp Binfet

Publications and source records attributed to Philipp Binfet.

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On the (non-)resilience of encrypted controllers to covert attacks

The security of networked control systems (NCS) is receiving increasing attention from both cyber-security and system-theoretic perspectives. The former focuses on classical IT security goals such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability of process data, while the latter investigates tailored attacks (and detection schemes), including covert and zero-dynamics attacks. Confidentiality in control systems can, for instance, be achieved by securely outsourcing the evaluation of the controller to third-party platforms, such as cloud services. The underlying technology enabling such secure computation often is homomorphic encryption (HE). Recent works in encrypted control have proposed modifications to underlying HE schemes to achieve not only confidentiality but also resilience to certain types of integrity attacks. While extensions in this direction are desirable in principle, we show that the integrity problem in encrypted control cannot be solved by public-key HE schemes alone due to their inherent malleability. In other words, the same homomorphisms that enable encrypted control in the first place can be leveraged not only constructively but also destructively. More precisely, we demonstrate that NCS are vulnerable to covert attacks, even when encrypted control is employed. Remarkably, this remains possible without knowledge of an unencrypted model. Yet, resilience to such attacks can still be achieved through complementary techniques. We present an approach based on verifiable computation that integrates with modern homomorphic cryptosystems and is asymptotically secure while incurring no communication overhead.

cs.CR

Towards privacy-preserving cooperative control via encrypted distributed optimization

Cooperative control is crucial for the effective operation of dynamical multi-agent systems. Especially for distributed control schemes, it is essential to exchange data between the agents. This becomes a privacy threat if the data is sensitive. Encrypted control has shown the potential to address this risk and ensure confidentiality. However, existing approaches mainly focus on cloud-based control and distributed schemes are restrictive. In this paper, we present a novel privacy-preserving cooperative control scheme based on encrypted distributed optimization. More precisely, we focus on a secure distributed solution of a general consensus problem, which has manifold applications in cooperative control, by means of the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). As a unique feature of our approach, we explicitly take into account the common situation that local decision variables contain copies of quantities associated with neighboring agents and ensure the neighbor's privacy. We show the effectiveness of our method based on a numerical case study dealing with the formation of mobile robots.

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Privacy-Preserving Power Flow Analysis via Secure Multi-Party Computation

Smart grids feature a bidirectional flow of electricity and data, enhancing flexibility, efficiency, and reliability in increasingly volatile energy grids. However, data from smart meters can reveal sensitive private information. Consequently, the adoption of smart meters is often restricted via legal means and hampered by limited user acceptance. Since metering data is beneficial for fault-free grid operation, power management, and resource allocation, applying privacy-preserving techniques to smart metering data is an important research problem. This work addresses this by using secure multi-party computation (SMPC), allowing multiple parties to jointly evaluate functions of their private inputs without revealing the latter. Concretely, we show how to perform power flow analysis on cryptographically hidden prosumer data. More precisely, we present a tailored solution to the power flow problem building on an SMPC implementation of Newtons method. We analyze the security of our approach in the universal composability framework and provide benchmarks for various grid types, threat models, and solvers. Our results indicate that secure multi-party computation can be able to alleviate privacy issues in smart grids in certain applications.

cs.CR

Encrypted system identification as-a-service via reliable encrypted matrix inversion

Encrypted computation opens up promising avenues across a plethora of application domains, including machine learning, health-care, finance, and control. Arithmetic homomorphic encryption, in particular, is a natural fit for cloud-based computational services. However, computations are essentially limited to polynomial circuits, while comparisons, transcendental functions, and iterative algorithms are notoriously hard to realize. Against this background, the paper presents an encrypted system identification service enabled by a reliable encrypted solution to least squares problems. More precisely, we devise an iterative algorithm for matrix inversion and present reliable initializations as well as certificates for the achieved accuracy without compromising the privacy of provided I/O-data. The effectiveness of the approach is illustrated with three popular identification tasks.

cs.CR

On the security of randomly transformed quadratic programs for privacy-preserving cloud-based control

Control related data, such as system states and inputs or controller specifications, is often sensitive. Meanwhile, the increasing connectivity of cloud-based or networked control results in vast amounts of such data, which poses a privacy threat, especially when evaluation on external platforms is considered. In this context, a cipher based on a random affine transformation gained attention, which is supposed to enable privacy-preserving evaluations of quadratic programs (QPs) with little computational overhead compared to other methods. This paper deals with the security of such randomly transformed QPs in the context of model predictive control (MPC). In particular, we show how to construct attacks against this cipher and thereby underpin concerns regarding its security in a practical setting. To this end, we exploit invariants under the transformations and common specifications of MPC-related QPs. Our numerical examples then illustrate that these two ingredients suffice to extract information from ciphertexts.

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Cryptanalysis of Random Affine Transformations for Encrypted Control

Cloud-based and distributed computations are of growing interest in modern control systems. However, these technologies require performing computations on not necessarily trustworthy platforms and, thus, put the confidentiality of sensitive control-related data at risk. Encrypted control has dealt with this issue by utilizing modern cryptosystems with homomorphic properties, which allow a secure evaluation at the cost of an increased computation or communication effort (among others). Recently, a cipher based on a random affine transformation gained attention in the encrypted control community. Its appeal stems from the possibility to construct security providing homomorphisms that do not suffer from the restrictions of ``conventional'' approaches. This paper provides a cryptanalysis of random affine transformations in the context of encrypted control. To this end, a deterministic and probabilistic variant of the cipher over real numbers are analyzed in a generalized setup, where we use cryptographic definitions for security and attacker models. It is shown that the deterministic cipher breaks under a known-plaintext attack, and unavoidably leaks information of the closed-loop, which opens another angle of attack. For the probabilistic variant, statistical indistinguishability of ciphertexts can be achieved, which makes successful attacks unlikely. We complete our analysis by investigating a floating point realization of the probabilistic random affine transformation cipher, which unfortunately suggests the impracticality of the scheme if a security guarantee is needed.

cs.CR