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Phu-Quy Nguyen-Lam

Publications and source records attributed to Phu-Quy Nguyen-Lam.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

Payoff scaling shapes cooperation in LLM agents across languages

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents that negotiate, coordinate, and make decisions on behalf of human users. Understanding how they cooperate is therefore important for AI governance and machine behaviour research. We examine two factors: payoff magnitude and interaction language. Classical game theory predicts that multiplying all payoffs by a positive constant should not change behaviour because the underlying strategic incentives remain unchanged. We test this prediction using five widely adopted commercial LLMs playing an iterated prisoner's dilemma across ten payoff scales and five languages (English, French, Vietnamese, Chinese and Arabic). Contrary to theoretical expectations, changing only the numerical scale of payoffs substantially alters cooperation. Models respond differently, often in opposite directions, meaning that averages across models can conceal important behavioural heterogeneity. Sensitivity to payoff scale also depends strongly on prompt language. Moreover, payoff scale modifies the effects of persona instructions: at sub-unit stakes, where no payoff shown exceeds 1, all five models cooperate more under a selfish than a cooperative persona, whereas Claude and Gemini reverse this pattern at larger scales. These findings show that cooperation measures depend critically on payoff scale and language and should not be treated as fixed model traits.

cs.AI↗

Cooperation Without Adaptation: LLM Agents in a Collective-Risk Dilemma

Language-model agents are increasingly deployed to act on behalf of people in settings where individual decisions shape shared outcomes. We examine whether five production models adapt their contributions to changing risks and partner behaviour, or instead follow a relatively fixed strategy. In a collective-risk dilemma game (CRG), six players contribute to a shared pool over ten rounds; if the pool falls short of its target, a catastrophe may destroy their remaining resources. Four models contributed approximately an equal share at every positive risk level, and four of the five also contributed when risk was zero, even though contributing could not improve their payoff. Explicitly stating that only the agent's own payoff mattered reduced zero-risk contributions for most models, while a more neutral prompt did not. Several models correctly identified which action offered the higher expected payoff at different risk levels, yet their contributions changed little. Against fixed partners, no model consistently chose the payoff-maximising response, and in mixed-model groups, a single agent's shortfall in the final round could cause an otherwise successful group to fail. Payoff-based selection also depended on population composition: in a single six-agent group, it favoured the model that contributed least and reduced group success, whereas in larger, randomly mixed populations, it favoured an exact fair-share model at moderate and high risk. These findings show that cooperative self-play alone is not evidence of strategic adaptability. Consistent with a machine-behaviour approach, evaluations of agents in multi-agent systems should test how they respond to incentives, partner actions, and population composition.

cs.GT↗

EvoQRE: Modeling Bounded Rationality in Safety-Critical Traffic Simulation via Evolutionary Quantal Response Equilibrium

Existing traffic simulation frameworks for autonomous vehicles typically rely on imitation learning or game-theoretic approaches that solve for Nash or coarse correlated equilibria, implicitly assuming perfectly rational agents. However, human drivers exhibit bounded rationality, making approximately optimal decisions under cognitive and perceptual constraints. We propose EvoQRE, a principled framework for modeling safety-critical traffic interactions as general-sum Markov games solved via Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) and evolutionary game dynamics. EvoQRE integrates a pre-trained generative world model with entropy-regularized replicator dynamics, capturing stochastic human behavior while maintaining equilibrium structure. We provide rigorous theoretical results, proving that the proposed dynamics converge to Logit-QRE under a two-timescale stochastic approximation with an explicit convergence rate of O(log k / k^{1/3}) under weak monotonicity assumptions. We further extend QRE to continuous action spaces using mixture-based and energy-based policy representations. Experiments on the Waymo Open Motion Dataset and nuPlan benchmark demonstrate that EvoQRE achieves state-of-the-art realism, improved safety metrics, and controllable generation of diverse safety-critical scenarios through interpretable rationality parameters.

cs.RO↗

Unlocking Compositional Generalization in Continual Few-Shot Learning

Object-centric representations promise a key property for few-shot learning: Rather than treating a scene as a single unit, a model can decompose it into individual object-level parts that can be matched and compared across different concepts. In practice, this potential is rarely realized. Continual learners either collapse scenes into global embeddings, or train with part-level matching objectives that tie representations too closely to seen patterns, leaving them unable to generalize to truly novel concepts. In this paper, we identify this fundamental structural conflict and pioneer a new paradigm that strictly decouples representation learning from compositional inference. Leveraging the inherent patch-level semantic geometry of self-supervised Vision Transformers (ViTs), our framework employs a dual-phase strategy. During training, slot representations are optimized entirely toward holistic class identity, preserving highly generalizable, object-level geometries. At inference, preserved slots are dynamically composed to match novel scenes. We demonstrate that this paradigm offers dual structural benefits: The frozen backbone naturally prevents representation drift, while our lightweight, holistic optimization preserves the features' capacity for novel-concept transfer. Extensive experiments validate this approach, achieving state-of-the-art unseen-concept generalization and minimal forgetting across standard continual learning benchmarks.

cs.LG↗

Understanding LLM Agent Behaviours via Game Theory: Strategy Recognition, Biases and Multi-Agent Dynamics

As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly operate as autonomous decision-makers in interactive and multi-agent systems and human societies, understanding their strategic behaviour has profound implications for safety, coordination, and the design of AI-driven social and economic infrastructures. Assessing such behaviour requires methods that capture not only what LLMs output, but the underlying intentions that guide their decisions. In this work, we extend the FAIRGAME framework to systematically evaluate LLM behaviour in repeated social dilemmas through two complementary advances: a payoff-scaled Prisoners Dilemma isolating sensitivity to incentive magnitude, and an integrated multi-agent Public Goods Game with dynamic payoffs and multi-agent histories. These environments reveal consistent behavioural signatures across models and languages, including incentive-sensitive cooperation, cross-linguistic divergence and end-game alignment toward defection. To interpret these patterns, we train traditional supervised classification models on canonical repeated-game strategies and apply them to FAIRGAME trajectories, showing that LLMs exhibit systematic, model- and language-dependent behavioural intentions, with linguistic framing at times exerting effects as strong as architectural differences. Together, these findings provide a unified methodological foundation for auditing LLMs as strategic agents and reveal systematic cooperation biases with direct implications for AI governance, collective decision-making, and the design of safe multi-agent systems.

cs.MA↗