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Phuong Duy Huynh

Publications and source records attributed to Phuong Duy Huynh.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

The Anatomy of Address Poisoning on Ethereum: Funding Mechanisms, Scam Signatures, and Laundering via Tornado Cash

Address-Poisoning Transfer (APT) is a prevalent blockchain phishing scam in which a scammer poisons a victim's address book by generating a transfer with a phishing address that looks similar to a benign address that the victim has previously interacted with. Although simple, APT phishing attacks have cost users millions of dollars in recent years, which has captured the attention of the research community (Ye et al. WWW'24, Guan-Li CCS'24, Chen et al. NDSS'25, Tsuchiya et al. USENIX'25). In this work, we go beyond detection and investigate three important and underexplored aspects of APT: scam funding mechanisms, scam signatures, and scam proceeds laundering via public services. In particular, we propose five families of scam signatures that capture key aspects of APT operations, which are useful for address clustering. We also conduct the first investigation into usage of Tornado Cash for funding APTs and laundering scam proceeds.

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Serial Scammers and Attack of the Clones: How Scammers Coordinate Multiple Rug Pulls on Decentralized Exchanges

We explored the ubiquitous phenomenon of serial scammers, each of whom deployed dozens to thousands of addresses to conduct a series of similar Rug Pulls on popular decentralized exchanges. We first constructed two datasets of around 384,000 scammer addresses behind all one-day Simple Rug Pulls on Uniswap (Ethereum) and Pancakeswap (BSC), and identified distinctive scam patterns including star, chain, and major (scam-funding) flow. These patterns, which collectively cover about $40\%$ of all scammer addresses in our datasets, reveal typical ways scammers run multiple Rug Pulls and organize the money flow among different addresses. We then studied the more general concept of scam cluster, which comprises scammer addresses linked together via direct ETH/BNB transfers or behind the same scam pools. We found that scam token contracts are highly similar within each cluster (average similarities $>70\%$) and dissimilar across different clusters (average similarities $<30\%$), corroborating our view that each cluster belongs to the same scammer/scam organization. Lastly, we analyze the scam profit of individual scam pools and clusters, employing a novel cluster-aware profit formula that takes into account the important role of wash traders. The analysis shows that the existing formula inflates the profit by at least $32\%$ on Uniswap and $24\%$ on Pancakeswap.

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From Programming Bugs to Multimillion-Dollar Scams: An Analysis of Trapdoor Tokens on Uniswap

We investigate in this work a recently emerged type of scam ERC-20 token called Trapdoor, which has cost investors billions of US dollars on Uniswap, the largest decentralised exchange on Ethereum, from 2020 to 2023. In essence, Trapdoor tokens allow users to buy but preventing them from selling by embedding logical bugs and/or owner-only features in their smart contracts. By manually inspecting a number of Trapdoor samples, we established the first systematic classification of Trapdoor tokens and a comprehensive list of techniques that scammers used to embed and conceal malicious codes, accompanied by a detailed analysis of representative scam contracts. In particular, we developed TrapdoorAnalyser, a fine-grained detection tool that generates and crosschecks the error-log of a buy-and-sell test and the list of embedded Trapdoor indicators from a contract-semantic check to reliably identify a Trapdoor token. TrapdoorAnalyser not only outperforms the state-of-the-art commercial tool GoPlus in accuracy, but also provides traces of malicious code with a full explanation, which most of the existing tools lack. Using TrapdoorAnalyser, we constructed the very first dataset of about 30,000 Trapdoor and non-Trapdoor tokens on UniswapV2, which allows us to train several machine learning algorithms that can detect with very high accuracy even Trapdoor tokens with no available Solidity source codes.

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Improving the Accuracy of Transaction-Based Ponzi Detection on Ethereum

The Ponzi scheme, an old-fashioned fraud, is now popular on the Ethereum blockchain, causing considerable financial losses to many crypto investors. A few Ponzi detection methods have been proposed in the literature, most of which detect a Ponzi scheme based on its smart contract source code. This contract-code-based approach, while achieving very high accuracy, is not robust because a Ponzi developer can fool a detection model by obfuscating the opcode or inventing a new profit distribution logic that cannot be detected. On the contrary, a transaction-based approach could improve the robustness of detection because transactions, unlike smart contracts, are harder to be manipulated. However, the current transaction-based detection models achieve fairly low accuracy. In this paper, we aim to improve the accuracy of the transaction-based models by employing time-series features, which turn out to be crucial in capturing the life-time behaviour a Ponzi application but were completely overlooked in previous works. We propose a new set of 85 features (22 known account-based and 63 new time-series features), which allows off-the-shelf machine learning algorithms to achieve up to 30% higher F1-scores compared to existing works.

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