arXiv subjects

Pier Giuseppe Sessa

Publications and source records attributed to Pier Giuseppe Sessa.

26 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2020

Mixed Strategies for Robust Optimization of Unknown Objectives

We consider robust optimization problems, where the goal is to optimize an unknown objective function against the worst-case realization of an uncertain parameter. For this setting, we design a novel sample-efficient algorithm GP-MRO, which sequentially learns about the unknown objective from noisy point evaluations. GP-MRO seeks to discover a robust and randomized mixed strategy, that maximizes the worst-case expected objective value. To achieve this, it combines techniques from online learning with nonparametric confidence bounds from Gaussian processes. Our theoretical results characterize the number of samples required by GP-MRO to discover a robust near-optimal mixed strategy for different GP kernels of interest. We experimentally demonstrate the performance of our algorithm on synthetic datasets and on human-assisted trajectory planning tasks for autonomous vehicles. In our simulations, we show that robust deterministic strategies can be overly conservative, while the mixed strategies found by GP-MRO significantly improve the overall performance.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

No-Regret Learning from Partially Observed Data in Repeated Auctions

We study a general class of repeated auctions, such as the ones found in electricity markets, as multi-agent games between the bidders. In such a repeated setting, bidders can adapt their strategies online based on the data observed in the previous auction rounds. Moreover, if no-regret algorithms are employed by the bidders to update their strategies, the game is known to converge to a coarse-correlated equilibrium, which generalizes the notion of Nash equilibrium to a probabilistic view of the auction state. Well-studied no-regret algorithms depend on the feedback information available at every round, and can be mainly distinguished as bandit (or payoff-based), and full-information. However, the information structure found in auctions lies in between these two models, since participants can often obtain partial observations of their utilities under different strategies. To this end, we modify existing bandit algorithms to exploit such additional information. Specifically, we utilize the feedback information that bidders can obtain when their bids are not accepted, and build a more accurate estimator of the utility vector. This results in improved regret guarantees compared to standard bandit algorithms. Moreover, we propose a heuristic method for auction settings where the proposed algorithm is not directly applicable. Finally, we demonstrate our findings on case studies based on realistic electricity market models.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

No-Regret Learning in Unknown Games with Correlated Payoffs

We consider the problem of learning to play a repeated multi-agent game with an unknown reward function. Single player online learning algorithms attain strong regret bounds when provided with full information feedback, which unfortunately is unavailable in many real-world scenarios. Bandit feedback alone, i.e., observing outcomes only for the selected action, yields substantially worse performance. In this paper, we consider a natural model where, besides a noisy measurement of the obtained reward, the player can also observe the opponents' actions. This feedback model, together with a regularity assumption on the reward function, allows us to exploit the correlations among different game outcomes by means of Gaussian processes (GPs). We propose a novel confidence-bound based bandit algorithm GP-MW, which utilizes the GP model for the reward function and runs a multiplicative weight (MW) method. We obtain novel kernel-dependent regret bounds that are comparable to the known bounds in the full information setting, while substantially improving upon the existing bandit results. We experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of GP-MW in random matrix games, as well as real-world problems of traffic routing and movie recommendation. In our experiments, GP-MW consistently outperforms several baselines, while its performance is often comparable to methods that have access to full information feedback.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

Bounding Inefficiency of Equilibria in Continuous Actions Games using Submodularity and Curvature

Games with continuous strategy sets arise in several machine learning problems (e.g. adversarial learning). For such games, simple no-regret learning algorithms exist in several cases and ensure convergence to coarse correlated equilibria (CCE). The efficiency of such equilibria with respect to a social function, however, is not well understood. In this paper, we define the class of valid utility games with continuous strategies and provide efficiency bounds for their CCEs. Our bounds rely on the social function being a monotone DR-submodular function. We further refine our bounds based on the curvature of the social function. Furthermore, we extend our efficiency bounds to a class of non-submodular functions that satisfy approximate submodularity properties. Finally, we show that valid utility games with continuous strategies can be designed to maximize monotone DR-submodular functions subject to disjoint constraints with approximation guarantees. The approximation guarantees we derive are based on the efficiency of the equilibria of such games and can improve the existing ones in the literature. We illustrate and validate our results on a budget allocation game and a sensor coverage problem.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions over Continuous Goods

This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome in order to obtain higher collective utility. Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we show that coalition-proof outcomes are achieved if the submitted bids are convex and the constraint sets are of a polymatroid-type. These conditions, however, do not capture the complexity of the general class of reverse auctions under consideration. By relaxing the property of incentive-compatibility, we investigate further payment rules that are coalition-proof without any extra conditions on the submitted bids and the constraint sets. Since calculating the payments directly for these mechanisms is computationally difficult for auctions involving many participants, we present two computationally efficient methods. Our results are verified with several case studies based on electricity market data.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Exploiting structure of chance constrained programs via submodularity

We introduce a novel approach to reduce the computational effort of solving mixed-integer convex chance constrained programs through the scenario approach. Instead of reducing the number of required scenarios, we directly minimize the computational cost of the scenario program. We exploit the problem structure by efficiently partitioning the constraint function and considering a multiple chance constrained program that gives the same probabilistic guarantees as the original single chance constrained problem. We formulate the problem of finding the optimal partition, a partition achieving the lowest computational cost, as an optimization problem with nonlinear objective and combinatorial constraints. By using submodularity of the support rank of a set of constraints, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm to find suboptimal solutions to this partitioning problem and we give approximation guarantees for special classes of cost metrics. We illustrate that the resulting computational cost savings can be arbitrarily large and demonstrate our approach on two case studies from production and multi-agent planning.

math.OC↗

arXiv2018

From Uncertainty Data to Robust Policies for Temporal Logic Planning

We consider the problem of synthesizing robust disturbance feedback policies for systems performing complex tasks. We formulate the tasks as linear temporal logic specifications and encode them into an optimization framework via mixed-integer constraints. Both the system dynamics and the specifications are known but affected by uncertainty. The distribution of the uncertainty is unknown, however realizations can be obtained. We introduce a data-driven approach where the constraints are fulfilled for a set of realizations and provide probabilistic generalization guarantees as a function of the number of considered realizations. We use separate chance constraints for the satisfaction of the specification and operational constraints. This allows us to quantify their violation probabilities independently. We compute disturbance feedback policies as solutions of mixed-integer linear or quadratic optimization problems. By using feedback we can exploit information of past realizations and provide feasibility for a wider range of situations compared to static input sequences. We demonstrate the proposed method on two robust motion-planning case studies for autonomous driving.

math.OC↗

arXiv2016

Exploring Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism for Electricity Markets

Control reserves are power generation or consumption entities that ensure balance of supply and demand of electricity in real-time. In many countries, they are operated through a market mechanism in which entities provide bids. The system operator determines the accepted bids based on an optimization algorithm. We develop the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for these electricity markets. We show that all advantages of the VCG mechanism including incentive compatibility of the equilibria and efficiency of the outcome can be guaranteed in these markets. Furthermore, we derive conditions to ensure collusion and shill bidding are not profitable. Our results are verified with numerical examples.

cs.GT↗