arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Pierre Lescanne.
Escalation is the fact that in a game (for instance an auction), the agents play forever. It is not necessary to consider complex examples to establish its rationality. In particular, the $0,1$-game is an extremely simple infinite game in which escalation arises naturally and rationally. In some sense, it can be considered as the paradigm of escalation. Through an example of economic games, we show the benefit economics can take of coinduction.
We introduce the \emph{resource control cube}, a system consisting of eight intuitionistic lambda calculi with either implicit or explicit control of resources and with either natural deduction or sequent calculus. The four calculi of the cube that correspond to natural deduction have been proposed by Kesner and Renaud and the four calculi that correspond to sequent lambda calculi are introduced in this paper. The presentation is parameterized with the set of resources (weakening or contraction), which enables a uniform treatment of the eight calculi of the cube. The simply typed resource control cube, on the one hand, expands the Curry-Howard correspondence to intuitionistic natural deduction and intuitionistic sequent logic with implicit or explicit structural rules and, on the other hand, is related to substructural logics. We propose a general intersection type system for the resource control cube calculi. Our main contribution is a characterisation of strong normalisation of reductions in this cube. First, we prove that typeability implies strong normalisation in the ''natural deduction base" of the cube by adapting the reducibility method. We then prove that typeability implies strong normalisation in the ''sequent base" of the cube by using a combination of well-orders and a suitable embedding in the ''natural deduction base". Finally, we prove that strong normalisation implies typeability in the cube using head subject expansion. All proofs are general and can be made specific to each calculus of the cube by instantiating the set of resources.
As we show using the notion of equilibrium in the theory of infinite sequential games, bubbles and escalations are rational for economic and environmental agents, who believe in an infinite world. This goes against a vision of a self regulating, wise and pacific economy in equilibrium. In other words, in this context, equilibrium is not a synonymous of stability. We attempt to draw from this statement methodological consequences and a new approach to economics. To the mindware of economic agents (a concept due to cognitive psychology) we propose to add coinduction to properly reason on infinite games. This way we refine the notion of rationality.
As we show by using notions of equilibrium in infinite sequential games, crashes or financial escalations are rational for economic or environmental agents, who have a vision of an infinite world. This contradicts a picture of a self-regulating, wise and pacific economic world. In other words, in this context, equilibrium is not synonymous of stability. We try to draw, from this statement, methodological consequences and new ways of thinking, especially in economic game theory. Among those new paths, coinduction is the basis of our reasoning in infinite games.
We present a calculus providing a Curry-Howard correspondence to classical logic represented in the sequent calculus with explicit structural rules, namely weakening and contraction. These structural rules introduce explicit erasure and duplication of terms, respectively. We present a type system for which we prove the type-preservation under reduction. A mutual relation with classical calculus featuring implicit structural rules has been studied in detail. From this analysis we derive strong normalisation property.
We present several results on counting untyped lambda terms, i.e., on telling how many terms belong to such or such class, according to the size of the terms and/or to the number of free variables.
The aim of this of this paper is to study infinite games and to prove formally some properties in this framework. As a consequence we show that the behavior (the madness) of people which leads to speculative crashes or escalation can be fully rational. Indeed it proceeds from the statement that resources are infinite. The reasoning is based on the concept of coinduction conceived by computer scientists to model infinite computations and used by economic agents unknowingly. When used consciously, this concept is not as simple as induction and we could paraphrase Newton: "Modeling the madness of people is more difficult than modeling the motion of planets".
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its connection with the same concept for finite games) to study carefully and formally the infinite games especially those called dollar auctions, which are considered as the paradigm of escalation. Unlike what is commonly admitted, we show that, provided one assumes that the other agent will always stop, bidding is rational, because it results in a subgame perfect equilibrium. We show that this is not the only rational strategy profile (the only subgame perfect equilibrium). Indeed if an agent stops and will stop at every step, we claim that he is rational as well, if one admits that his opponent will never stop, because this corresponds to a subgame perfect equilibrium. Amazingly, in the infinite dollar auction game, the behavior in which both agents stop at each step is not a Nash equilibrium, hence is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, hence is not rational.
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its connection with the same concept for finite games) to study carefully and formally the infinite games especially those called dollar auctions, which are considered as the paradigm of escalation. Unlike what is commonly admitted, we show that, provided one assumes that the other agent will always stop, bidding is rational, because it results in a subgame perfect equilibrium. We show that this is not the only rational strategy profile (the only subgame perfect equilibrium). Indeed if an agent stops and will stop at every step, we claim that he is rational as well, if one admits that his opponent will never stop, because this corresponds to a subgame perfect equilibrium. Amazingly, in the infinite dollar auction game, the behavior in which both agents stop at each step is not a Nash equilibrium, hence is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, hence is not rational.
An abstraction of normal form games is proposed, called Feasibility/Desirability Games (or FD Games in short). FD Games can be seen from three points of view: as a new presentation of games in which Nash equilibria can be found, as choice models in microeconomics or as a model of evolution in games.
Finite objects and more specifically finite games are formalized using induction, whereas infinite objects are formalized using coinduction. In this article, after an introduction to the concept of coinduction, we revisit on infinite (discrete) extensive games the basic notions of game theory. Among others, we introduce a definition of Nash equilibrium and a notion of subgame perfect equilibrium for infinite games. We use those concepts to analyze well known infinite games, like the dollar auction game and the centipede game and we show that human behaviors that are often considered as illogic are perfectly rational, if one admits that human agents reason coinductively.
We introduce the concept of Conversion/Preference Games, or CP games for short. CP games generalize the standard notion of strategic games. First we exemplify the use of CP games. Second we formally introduce and define the CP-games formalism. Then we sketch two `real-life' applications, namely a connection between CP games and gene regulation networks, and the use of CP games to formalize implied information in Chinese Wall security. We end with a study of a particular fixed-point construction over CP games and of the resulting existence of equilibria in possibly infinite games.
In order to better understand reasoning involved in analyzing infinite games in extensive form, we performed experiments in the proof assistant Coq that are reported here.
This paper presents experiments on common knowledge logic, conducted with the help of the proof assistant Coq. The main feature of common knowledge logic is the eponymous modality that says that a group of agents shares a knowledge about a certain proposition in a inductive way. This modality is specified by using a fixpoint approach. Furthermore, from these experiments, we discuss and compare the structure of theorems that can be proved in specific theories that use common knowledge logic. Those structures manifests the interplay between the theory (as implemented in the proof assistant Coq) and the metatheory.
Common Knowledge Logic is meant to describe situations of the real world where a group of agents is involved. These agents share knowledge and make strong statements on the knowledge of the other agents (the so called \emph{common knowledge}). But as we know, the real world changes and overall information on what is known about the world changes as well. The changes are described by dynamic logic. To describe knowledge changes, dynamic logic should be combined with logic of common knowledge. In this paper we describe experiments which we have made about the integration in a unique framework of common knowledge logic and dynamic logic in the proof assistant \Coq. This results in a set of fully checked proofs for readable statements. We describe the framework and how a proof can be