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Pierre-Louis Roman

Publications and source records attributed to Pierre-Louis Roman.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

Fast Byzantine Total Order Broadcast

This paper presents Flutter, the first Byzantine Total Order Broadcast implementation with a broadcast-to-delivery latency of $2\Delta + \epsilon$ time units, $\Delta$ being the message delay and $\epsilon$ an arbitrarily small constant margin, when all processes are correct, the network is synchronous, hence local clocks are well-synchronized. Under the same conditions, state-of-the-art protocols require at least $3\Delta$ time units in practical deployments where clients differ from servers. We prove Flutter's good-case latency is quasi-optimal, meaning it cannot be improved upon by any finite amount. Flutter is deterministic, leaderless, and signature-free hence quantum-resilient; it assumes partial synchrony and at least $5f + 1$ servers, where $f$ bounds the number of faults. Under the hood, Flutter builds upon Blink, a novel Binary Consensus implementation with Representative Validity, whose fast path enables decisions in $\Delta$ time units when all correct servers propose the same value.

cs.DC

Chop Chop: Byzantine Atomic Broadcast to the Network Limit

At the heart of state machine replication, the celebrated technique enabling decentralized and secure universal computation, lies Atomic Broadcast, a fundamental communication primitive that orders, authenticates, and deduplicates messages. This paper presents Chop Chop, a Byzantine Atomic Broadcast system that uses a novel authenticated memory pool to amortize the cost of ordering, authenticating and deduplicating messages, achieving "line rate" (i.e., closely matching the complexity of a protocol that does not ensure any ordering, authentication or Byzantine resilience) even when processing messages as small as 8 bytes. Chop Chop attains this performance by means of a new form of batching we call distillation. A distilled batch is a set of messages that are fast to authenticate, deduplicate, and order. Batches are distilled using a novel interactive protocol involving brokers, an untrusted layer of facilitating processes between clients and servers. In a geo-distributed deployment of 64 medium-sized servers, Chop Chop processes 43,600,000 messages per second with an average latency of 3.6 seconds. Under the same conditions, state-of-the-art alternatives offer two orders of magnitude less throughput for the same latency. We showcase three simple Chop Chop applications: a Payment system, an Auction house and a "Pixel war" game, respectively achieving 32, 2.3 and 35 million operations per second.

cs.DC

SurferMonkey: A Decentralized Anonymous Blockchain Intercommunication System via Zero Knowledge Proofs

Blockchain intercommunication systems enable the exchanges of messages between blockchains. This interoperability promotes innovation, unlocks liquidity and access to assets. However, blockchains are isolated systems that originally were not designed for interoperability. This makes cross-chain communication, or bridges for short, insecure by nature. More precisely, cross-chain systems face security challenges in terms of selfish rational players such as maximal extractable value (MEV) and censorship. We propose to solve these challenges using zero knowledge proofs (ZKPs) for cross-chain communication. Securing cross-chain communication is remarkably more complex than securing single-chain events as such a system must preserve user security against both on- and off-chain analysis. To achieve this goal, we propose the following pair of contributions: the DACT protocol and the SurferMonkey infrastructure that supports the DACT protocol. The DACT protocol is a global solution for the anonymity and security challenges of agnostic blockchain intercommunication. DACT breaks on- and off-chain analysis thanks to the use of ZKPs. SurferMonkey is a decentralized infrastructure that implements DACT in practice. Since SurferMonkey works at the blockchain application layer, any decentralized application (dApp) can use SurferMonkey to send any type of message to a dApp on another blockchain. With SurferMonkey, users can neither be censored nor be exposed to MEV. By applying decentralized proactive security, we obtain resilience against selfish rational players, and raise the security bar against cyberattacks. We have implemented a proof of concept (PoC) of SurferMonkey by reverse engineering Tornado Cash and by applying IDEN3 ZKP circuits. SurferMonkey enables new usecases, ranging from anonymous voting and gaming, to a new phase of anonymous decentralized finance (aDeFi).

cs.CR

Carbon: Scaling Trusted Payments with Untrusted Machines

This paper introduces Carbon, a high-throughput system enabling asynchronous (safe) and consensus-free (efficient) payments and votes within a dynamic set of clients. Carbon is operated by a dynamic set of validators that may be reconfigured asynchronously, offering its clients eclipse resistance as well as lightweight bootstrap. Carbon offers clients the ability to select validators by voting them in and out of the system thanks to its novel asynchronous and stake-less voting mechanism. Carbon relies on an asynchronous and deterministic implementation of Byzantine reliable broadcast that uniquely leverages a permissionless set of untrusted servers, brokers, to slash the cost of client authentication inherent to Byzantine fault tolerant systems. Carbon is able to sustain a throughput of one million payments per second in a geo-distributed environment, outperforming the state of the art by three orders of magnitude with equivalent latencies.

cs.DC

Dietcoin: shortcutting the Bitcoin verification process for your smartphone

Blockchains have a storage scalability issue. Their size is not bounded and they grow indefinitely as time passes. As of August 2017, the Bitcoin blockchain is about 120 GiB big while it was only 75 GiB in August 2016. To benefit from Bitcoin full security model, a bootstrapping node has to download and verify the entirety of the 120 GiB. This poses a challenge for low-resource devices such as smartphones. Thankfully, an alternative exists for such devices which consists of downloading and verifying just the header of each block. This partial block verification enables devices to reduce their bandwidth requirements from 120 GiB to 35 MiB. However, this drastic decrease comes with a safety cost implied by a partial block verification. In this work, we enable low-resource devices to fully verify subchains of blocks without having to pay the onerous price of a full chain download and verification; a few additional MiB of bandwidth suffice. To do so, we propose the design of diet nodes that can securely query full nodes for shards of the UTXO set, which is needed to perform full block verification and can otherwise only be built by sequentially parsing the chain.

cs.DC