arXiv subjects

Pieter Kleer

Publications and source records attributed to Pieter Kleer.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Robust Optimality of Bundling Goods Beyond Finite Variance

When selling many goods with independent valuations, we develop a distributionally robust framework, consisting of a two-player game between seller and nature. The seller has only limited knowledge about the value distribution. The seller selects a revenue-maximizing mechanism, after which nature chooses a revenue-minimizing distribution from all distributions that comply with the limited knowledge. When the seller knows the mean and variance of valuations, bundling is known to be an asymptotically optimal deterministic mechanism, achieving a normalized revenue close to the mean. Moving beyond this variance assumption, we assume knowledge of the mean absolute deviation (MAD), accommodating more dispersion and heavy-tailed valuations with infinite variance. We show for a large range of MAD values that bundling remains optimal, but the seller can only guarantee a revenue strictly smaller than the mean. Another noteworthy finding is indifference to the order of play, as both the max-min and min-max versions of the problem yield identical values. This contrasts with deterministic mechanisms and the separate sale of goods, where the order of play significantly impacts outcomes. We further underscore the universality of the optimal bundling price by demonstrating its efficacy in optimizing not only absolute revenue but also the absolute regret and ratio objective among all bundling prices

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Distributionally robust monopoly pricing: Switching from low to high prices in volatile markets

Problem definition: Traditional monopoly pricing assumes sellers have full information about consumer valuations. We consider monopoly pricing under limited information, where a seller only knows the mean, variance and support of the valuation distribution. The objective is to maximize expected revenue by selecting the optimal fixed price. Methodology/results: We adopt a distributionally robust framework, where the seller considers all valuation distributions that comply with the limited information. We formulate a maximin problem which seeks to maximize expected revenue for the worst-case valuation distribution. The minimization problem that identifies the worst-case valuation distribution is solved using primal-dual methods, and in turn leads to an explicitly solvable maximization problem. This yields a closed-form optimal pricing policy and a new fundamental principle prescribing when to use low and high robust prices. Managerial implications: We show that the optimal policy switches from low to high prices when variance becomes sufficiently large, yielding significant performance gains compared with existing robust prices that generally decay with market uncertainty. This presents guidelines for when the seller should switch from targeting mass markets to niche markets. Similar guidelines are obtained for delay-prone services with rational utility-maximizing customers, underlining the universality and wide applicability of the novel pricing policy.

math.OC↗

arXiv2025

Robust Competitive Ratio for Deterministic Monopoly Pricing

We study deterministic monopoly pricing under partial knowledge of the market, where the seller has access only to summary statistics of the valuation distribution, such as the mean, dispersion, and maximum value. Using tools from distributionally robust optimization and max-min analysis, we evaluate pricing strategies based on their competitive ratio (CR). We characterize the worst-case market scenario consistent with the available information and provide a complete solution for minimizing the CR. Our analysis also covers optimal pricing under various measures of dispersion, including variance and fractional moments. Interestingly, we find that the worst-case market for CR coincides with that for expected revenue. Using proof techniques tailored to the CR framework, we further examine how dispersion and maximum valuation influence optimal deterministic pricing. These results offer practical guidance for setting robust prices when market information is limited.

math.OC↗

arXiv2025

Bayesian Optimal Stopping with Maximum Value Knowledge

We consider an optimal stopping problem with n correlated offers where the goal is to design a (randomized) stopping strategy that maximizes the expected value of the offer in the sequence at which we stop. Instead of assuming to know the complete correlation structure, which is unrealistic in practice, we only assume to have knowledge of the distribution of the maximum value of the sequence, and want to analyze the worst-case correlation structure whose maximum follows this distribution. This can be seen as a trade-off between the setting in which no distributional information is known, and the Bayesian setting in which the (possibly correlated) distributions of all the individual offers are known. As our first main result we show that a deterministic threshold strategy using the monopoly price of the distribution of the maximum value is asymptotically optimal assuming that the expectation of the maximum value grows sublinearly in n. In our second main result, we further tighten this bound by deriving a tight quadratic convergence guarantee for sufficiently smooth distributions of the maximum value. Our results also give rise to a more fine-grained picture regarding prophet inequalities with correlated values, for which distribution-free bounds often only yield a performance guarantee that is of the order 1/n.

math.OC↗

arXiv2024

Distribution-free expectation operators for robust pricing and stocking with heavy-tailed demand

We obtain distribution-free bounds for various fundamental quantities used in probability theory by solving optimization problems that search for extreme distributions among all distributions with the same mean and dispersion. These sharpest possible bounds depend only on the mean and dispersion of the driving random variable. We solve the optimization problems by a novel yet elementary technique that reduces the set of all candidate solutions to two-point distributions. We consider a general dispersion measure, with variance, mean absolute deviation and power moments as special cases. We apply the bounds to robust newsvendor stocking and monopoly pricing, generalizing foundational mean-variance works. This shows how pricing and order decisions respond to increased demand uncertainty, including scenarios where dispersion information allows for heavy-tailed demand distributions.

math.OC↗

arXiv2023

Approximate Sampling and Counting of Graphs with Near-Regular Degree Intervals

The approximate uniform sampling of graphs with a given degree sequence is a well-known, extensively studied problem in theoretical computer science and has significant applications, e.g., in the analysis of social networks. In this work we study an extension of the problem, where degree intervals are specified rather than a single degree sequence. We are interested in sampling and counting graphs whose degree sequences satisfy the degree interval constraints. A natural scenario where this problem arises is in hypothesis testing on social networks that are only partially observed. In this work, we provide the first fully polynomial almost uniform sampler (FPAUS) as well as the first fully polynomial randomized approximation scheme (FPRAS) for sampling and counting, respectively, graphs with near-regular degree intervals, in which every node $i$ has a degree from an interval not too far away from a given $d \in \N$. In order to design our FPAUS, we rely on various state-of-the-art tools from Markov chain theory and combinatorics. In particular, we provide the first non-trivial algorithmic application of a breakthrough result of Liebenau and Wormald (2017) regarding an asymptotic formula for the number of graphs with a given near-regular degree sequence. Furthermore, we also make use of the recent breakthrough of Anari et al. (2019) on sampling a base of a matroid under a strongly log-concave probability distribution. As a more direct approach, we also study a natural Markov chain recently introduced by Rechner, Strowick and Müller-Hannemann (2018), based on three simple local operations: Switches, hinge flips, and additions/deletions of a single edge. We obtain the first theoretical results for this Markov chain by showing it is rapidly mixing for the case of near-regular degree intervals of size at most one.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2022

Optimal Stopping Theory for a Distributionally Robust Seller

Sellers in online markets face the challenge of determining the right time to sell in view of uncertain future offers. Classical stopping theory assumes that sellers have full knowledge of the value distributions, and leverage this knowledge to determine stopping rules that maximize expected welfare. In practice, however, stopping rules must often be determined under partial information, based on scarce data or expert predictions. Consider a seller that has one item for sale and receives successive offers drawn from some value distributions. The decision on whether or not to accept an offer is irrevocable, and the value distributions are only partially known. We therefore let the seller adopt a robust maximin strategy, assuming that value distributions are chosen adversarially by nature to minimize the value of the accepted offer. We provide a general maximin solution to this stopping problem that identifies the optimal (threshold-based) stopping rule for the seller for all possible statistical information structures. We then perform a detailed analysis for various ambiguity sets relying on knowledge about the common mean, dispersion (variance or mean absolute deviation) and support of the distributions. We show for these information structures that the seller's stopping rule consists of decreasing thresholds converging to the common mean, and that nature's adversarial response, in the long run, is to always create an all-or-nothing scenario. The maximin solutions also reveal what happens as dispersion or the number of offers grows large.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2021

Primal and Dual Combinatorial Dimensions

We give tight bounds on the relation between the primal and dual of various combinatorial dimensions, such as the pseudo-dimension and fat-shattering dimension, for multi-valued function classes. These dimensional notions play an important role in the area of learning theory. We first review some (folklore) results that bound the dual dimension of a function class in terms of its primal, and after that give (almost) matching lower bounds. In particular, we give an appropriate generalization to multi-valued function classes of a well-known bound due to Assouad (1983), that relates the primal and dual VC-dimension of a binary function class.

math.CO↗

arXiv2021

Sampling hypergraphs with given degrees

There is a well-known connection between hypergraphs and bipartite graphs, obtained by treating the incidence matrix of the hypergraph as the biadjacency matrix of a bipartite graph. We use this connection to describe and analyse a rejection sampling algorithm for sampling simple uniform hypergraphs with a given degree sequence. Our algorithm uses, as a black box, an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ for sampling bipartite graphs with given degrees, uniformly or nearly uniformly, in (expected) polynomial time. The expected runtime of the hypergraph sampling algorithm depends on the (expected) runtime of the bipartite graph sampling algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, and the probability that a uniformly random bipartite graph with given degrees corresponds to a simple hypergraph. We give some conditions on the hypergraph degree sequence which guarantee that this probability is bounded below by a positive constant.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2021

Sampling from the Gibbs Distribution in Congestion Games

Logit dynamics is a form of randomized game dynamics where players have a bias towards strategic deviations that give a higher improvement in cost. It is used extensively in practice. In congestion (or potential) games, the dynamics converges to the so-called Gibbs distribution over the set of all strategy profiles, when interpreted as a Markov chain. In general, logit dynamics might converge slowly to the Gibbs distribution, but beyond that, not much is known about their algorithmic aspects, nor that of the Gibbs distribution. In this work, we are interested in the following two questions for congestion games: i) Is there an efficient algorithm for sampling from the Gibbs distribution? ii) If yes, do there also exist natural randomized dynamics that converges quickly to the Gibbs distribution? We first study these questions in extension parallel congestion games, a well-studied special case of symmetric network congestion games. As our main result, we show that there is a simple variation on the logit dynamics (in which we in addition are allowed to randomly interchange the strategies of two players) that converges quickly to the Gibbs distribution in such games. This answers both questions above affirmatively. We also address the first question for the class of so-called capacitated $k$-uniform congestion games. To prove our results, we rely on the recent breakthrough work of Anari, Liu, Oveis-Gharan and Vinzant (2019) concerning the approximate sampling of the base of a matroid according to strongly log-concave probability distribution.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Switch-based Markov Chains for Sampling Hamiltonian Cycles in Dense Graphs

We consider the irreducibility of switch-based Markov chains for the approximate uniform sampling of Hamiltonian cycles in a given undirected dense graph on $n$ vertices. As our main result, we show that every pair of Hamiltonian cycles in a graph with minimum degree at least $n/2+7$ can be transformed into each other by switch operations of size at most $10$, implying that the switch Markov chain using switches of size at most $10$ is irreducible. As a proof of concept, we also show that this Markov chain is rapidly mixing on dense monotone graphs.

math.CO↗

arXiv2020

Topological Price of Anarchy Bounds for Clustering Games on Networks

We consider clustering games in which the players are embedded in a network and want to coordinate (or anti-coordinate) their strategy with their neighbors. The goal of a player is to choose a strategy that maximizes her utility given the strategies of her neighbors. Recent studies show that even very basic variants of these games exhibit a large Price of Anarchy: A large inefficiency between the total utility generated in centralized outcomes and equilibrium outcomes in which players selfishly try to maximize their utility. Our main goal is to understand how structural properties of the network topology impact the inefficiency of these games. We derive topological bounds on the Price of Anarchy for different classes of clustering games. These topological bounds provide a more informative assessment of the inefficiency of these games than the corresponding (worst-case) Price of Anarchy bounds. As one of our main results, we derive (tight) bounds on the Price of Anarchy for clustering games on Erdős-Rényi random graphs (where every possible edge in the network is present with a fixed probability), which, depending on the graph density, stand in stark contrast to the known Price of Anarchy bounds.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Secretary and Online Matching Problems with Machine Learned Advice

The classical analysis of online algorithms, due to its worst-case nature, can be quite pessimistic when the input instance at hand is far from worst-case. Often this is not an issue with machine learning approaches, which shine in exploiting patterns in past inputs in order to predict the future. However, such predictions, although usually accurate, can be arbitrarily poor. Inspired by a recent line of work, we augment three well-known online settings with machine learned predictions about the future, and develop algorithms that take them into account. In particular, we study the following online selection problems: (i) the classical secretary problem, (ii) online bipartite matching and (iii) the graphic matroid secretary problem. Our algorithms still come with a worst-case performance guarantee in the case that predictions are subpar while obtaining an improved competitive ratio (over the best-known classical online algorithm for each problem) when the predictions are sufficiently accurate. For each algorithm, we establish a trade-off between the competitive ratios obtained in the two respective cases.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2019

Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online

The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the participating agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of general (non-monotone) submodular valuation functions and derive the first truthful, budget-feasible and $O(1)$-approximate mechanisms that run in polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions. Prior to our work, the only $O(1)$-approximation mechanism known for non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value queries. At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good approximation), yet ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly enforce truthfulness). Ours is the first mechanism for the problem where---crucially---the agents are not ordered with respect to their marginal value per cost. This allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online setting as well. To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the case where additional feasibility constraints are present. We obtain $O(p)$-approximation mechanisms for both monotone and non-monotone submodular objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets of a $p$-system. With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known for this setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting that, when one cares about non-trivial approximation guarantees in polynomial time, our results are asymptotically best possible.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Rapid Mixing of the Switch Markov Chain for Strongly Stable Degree Sequences and 2-Class Joint Degree Matrices

The switch Markov chain has been extensively studied as the most natural Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach for sampling graphs with prescribed degree sequences. We use comparison arguments with other, less natural but simpler to analyze, Markov chains, to show that the switch chain mixes rapidly in two different settings. We first study the classic problem of uniformly sampling simple undirected, as well as bipartite, graphs with a given degree sequence. We apply an embedding argument, involving a Markov chain defined by Jerrum and Sinclair (TCS, 1990) for sampling graphs that almost have a given degree sequence, to show rapid mixing for degree sequences satisfying strong stability, a notion closely related to $P$-stability. This results in a much shorter proof that unifies the currently known rapid mixing results of the switch chain and extends them up to sharp characterizations of $P$-stability. In particular, our work resolves an open problem posed by Greenhill (SODA, 2015). Secondly, in order to illustrate the power of our approach, we study the problem of uniformly sampling graphs for which, in addition to the degree sequence, a joint degree distribution is given. Although the problem was formalized over a decade ago, and despite its practical significance in generating synthetic network topologies, small progress has been made on the random sampling of such graphs. The case of a single degree class reduces to sampling of regular graphs, but beyond this almost nothing is known. We fully resolve the case of two degree classes, by showing that the switch Markov chain is always rapidly mixing. Again, we first analyze an auxiliary chain for strongly stable instances on an augmented state space and then use an embedding argument.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2017

Comparing the Switch and Curveball Markov Chains for Sampling Binary Matrices with Fixed Marginals

The Curveball algorithm is a variation on well-known switch-based Markov chain approaches for uniformly sampling binary matrices with fixed row and column sums. Instead of a switch, the Curveball algorithm performs a so-called binomial trade in every iteration of the algorithm. Intuitively, this could lead to a better convergence rate for reaching the stationary (uniform) distribution in certain cases. Some experimental evidence for this has been given in the literature. In this note we give a spectral gap comparison between two switch-based chains and the Curveball chain. In particular, this comparison allows us to conclude that the Curveball Markov chain is rapidly mixing whenever one of the two switch chains is rapidly mixing. Our analysis directly extends to the case of sampling binary matrices with forbidden entries (under the assumption of irreducibility). This in particular captures the case of sampling simple directed graphs with given degrees. As a by-product of our analysis, we show that the switch Markov chain of the Kannan-Tetali-Vempala conjecture only has non-negative eigenvalues if the sampled binary matrices have at least three columns. This shows that the Markov chain does not have to be made lazy, which is of independent interest. We also obtain an improved bound on the smallest eigenvalue for the switch Markov chain studied by Greenhill for uniformly sampling simple directed regular graphs.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2017

Path deviations outperform approximate stability in heterogeneous congestion games

We consider non-atomic network congestion games with heterogeneous players where the latencies of the paths are subject to some bounded deviations. This model encompasses several well-studied extensions of the classical Wardrop model which incorporate, for example, risk-aversion, altruism or travel time delays. Our main goal is to analyze the worst-case deterioration in social cost of a perturbed Nash flow (i.e., for the perturbed latencies) with respect to an original Nash flow. We show that for homogeneous players perturbed Nash flows coincide with approximate Nash flows and derive tight bounds on their inefficiency. In contrast, we show that for heterogeneous populations this equivalence does not hold. We derive tight bounds on the inefficiency of both perturbed and approximate Nash flows for arbitrary player sensitivity distributions. Intuitively, our results suggest that the negative impact of path deviations (e.g., caused by risk-averse behavior or latency perturbations) is less severe than approximate stability (e.g., caused by limited responsiveness or bounded rationality). We also obtain a tight bound on the inefficiency of perturbed Nash flows for matroid congestion games and homogeneous populations if the path deviations can be decomposed into edge deviations. In particular, this provides a tight bound on the Price of Risk-Aversion for matroid congestion games.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

Tight Inefficiency Bounds for Perception-Parameterized Affine Congestion Games

Congestion games constitute an important class of non-cooperative games which was introduced by Rosenthal in 1973. In recent years, several extensions of these games were proposed to incorporate aspects that are not captured by the standard model. Examples of such extensions include the incorporation of risk sensitive players, the modeling of altruistic player behavior and the imposition of taxes on the resources. These extensions were studied intensively with the goal to obtain a precise understanding of the inefficiency of equilibria of these games. In this paper, we introduce a new model of congestion games that captures these extensions (and additional ones) in a unifying way. The key idea here is to parameterize both the perceived cost of each player and the social cost function of the system designer. Intuitively, each player perceives the load induced by the other players by an extent of ρ, while the system designer estimates that each player perceives the load of all others by an extent of σ. The above mentioned extensions reduce to special cases of our model by choosing the parameters ρ and σ accordingly. As in most related works, we concentrate on congestion games with affine latency functions here. Despite the fact that we deal with a more general class of congestion games, we manage to derive tight bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability for a large range of pa- rameters. Our bounds provide a complete picture of the inefficiency of equilibria for these perception-parameterized congestion games. As a result, we obtain tight bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability for the above mentioned extensions. Our results also reveal how one should "design" the cost functions of the players in order to reduce the price of anar- chy.

cs.GT↗