arXiv subjects

Pietro Dall'Ara

Publications and source records attributed to Pietro Dall'Ara.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Coordination in complex environments

Coordination is an important aspect of innovative contexts, where: the more innovative a course of action, the more uncertain its outcome. To study the interplay of coordination and informational ``complexity'', I embed a beauty-contest game into a complex environment. I identify a new conformity phenomenon. This effect may push towards the exploration of unknown alternatives or constitute a status-quo bias, depending on the network structure of players' interactions. In an application, I show that an organization with decentralized authority can implement profit maximization in a sufficiently complex environment.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Persuading an inattentive and privately informed receiver

This paper studies the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly attention effort. A sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment affects the receiver's attention effort, that is, the probability that she updates her beliefs. Persuasion has two margins: an extensive (effort) and an intensive (action). The receiver's utility exhibits a supermodularity property in information and effort. By leveraging this property, we establish an equivalence between experiments and persuasion mechanisms à la Kolotilin et al.~(2017). In applications, the sender's optimal strategy involves censoring favorable states.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Screening in digital monopolies

A defining feature of digital goods is that replication and degradation are costless: once a high-quality good is produced, low-quality versions can be created and distributed at no additional cost. This paper studies quality-based screening in markets for digital goods. Production costs depend only on the highest quality supplied, unlike in standard screening models. The monopolist allocation exhibits two interdependent inefficiencies. First, a productive inefficiency: the monopolist underinvests in the highest quality relative to the efficiency benchmark. Second, due to a distributional inefficiency, certain buyers receive degraded versions of the produced good. Competition exacerbates productive inefficiency, but improves distributional efficiency.

econ.TH↗