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Pietro Ortoleva

Publications and source records attributed to Pietro Ortoleva.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Competing Models

Different agents need to make a prediction. They observe identical data, but have different models: they predict using different explanatory variables. We study which agent believes they have the best predictive ability -- as measured by the smallest subjective posterior mean squared prediction error -- and show how it depends on the sample size. With small samples, we present results suggesting it is an agent using a low-dimensional model. With large samples, it is generally an agent with a high-dimensional model, possibly including irrelevant variables, but never excluding relevant ones. We apply our results to characterize the winning model in an auction of productive assets, to argue that entrepreneurs and investors with simple models will be over-represented in new sectors, and to understand the proliferation of "factors" that explain the cross-sectional variation of expected stock returns in the asset-pricing literature.

econ.TH

Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities

Goods and services -- public housing, medical appointments, schools -- are often allocated to individuals who rank them similarly but differ in their preference intensities. We characterize optimal allocation rules when individual preferences are known and when they are not. Several insights emerge. First-best allocations may involve assigning some agents "lotteries" between high- and low-ranked goods. When preference intensities are private information, second-best allocations always involve such lotteries and, crucially, may coincide with first-best allocations. Furthermore, second-best allocations may entail disposal of services. We discuss a market-based alternative and show how it differs.

econ.TH