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Pinxian Lu

Publications and source records attributed to Pinxian Lu.

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Context-Aware Detection and Victim-Centered Response Generation for Online Harassment in Private Messaging

Online harassment is a widespread social and public health concern, yet most computational approaches for detecting and addressing harassment focus on publicly visible social media content rather than private messaging environments. Private conversations present unique challenges because harmful interactions often unfold through context-dependent, multi-turn exchanges, while victims may lack timely support during moments of harassment. In this study, we investigate how large language models (LLMs) can support both the detection of and response to online harassment in private messaging. Using a dataset of 80,053 Instagram direct messages donated by 26 adolescents aged 12-18, including youth with suicide risk factors, we first construct a human-labeled dataset of online harassment in private conversations and develop a context-aware cascading LLM classification pipeline. The proposed pipeline outperforms baseline toxicity classifiers trained primarily on public social media data. We then develop a victim-centered response framework that produces context-sensitive and psychologically-grounded AI-generated responses to online harassment messages. Human evaluators perceived the AI-generated responses as significantly more helpful than the original participant responses (95% CI: 0.767--0.815, p < .001), particularly in terms of emotional support and de-escalation. Our findings highlight the potential of context-aware and victim-centered AI systems to provide just-in-time support during harassment in private messaging environments.

cs.SI

Echoes of Human Malice in Agents: Benchmarking LLMs for Multi-Turn Online Harassment Attacks

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are powering a growing share of interactive web applications, yet remain vulnerable to misuse and harm. Prior jailbreak research has largely focused on single-turn prompts, whereas real harassment often unfolds over multi-turn interactions. In this work, we present the Online Harassment Agentic Benchmark consisting of: (i) a synthetic multi-turn harassment conversation dataset, (ii) a multi-agent (e.g., harasser, victim) simulation informed by repeated game theory, (iii) three jailbreak methods attacking agents across memory, planning, and fine-tuning, and (iv) a mixed-methods evaluation framework. We utilize two prominent LLMs, LLaMA-3.1-8B-Instruct (open-source) and Gemini-2.0-flash (closed-source). Our results show that jailbreak tuning makes harassment nearly guaranteed with an attack success rate of 95.78--96.89% vs. 57.25--64.19% without tuning in Llama, and 99.33% vs. 98.46% without tuning in Gemini, while sharply reducing refusal rate to 1-2% in both models. The most prevalent toxic behaviors are Insult with 84.9--87.8% vs. 44.2--50.8% without tuning, and Flaming with 81.2--85.1% vs. 31.5--38.8% without tuning, indicating weaker guardrails compared to sensitive categories such as sexual or racial harassment. Qualitative evaluation further reveals that attacked agents reproduce human-like aggression profiles, such as Machiavellian/psychopathic patterns under planning, and narcissistic tendencies with memory. Counterintuitively, closed-source and open-source models exhibit distinct escalation trajectories across turns, with closed-source models showing significant vulnerability. Overall, our findings show that multi-turn and theory-grounded attacks not only succeed at high rates but also mimic human-like harassment dynamics, motivating the development of robust safety guardrails to ultimately keep online platforms safe and responsible.

cs.AI