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Pinyan Lu

Publications and source records attributed to Pinyan Lu.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources
arXiv2024

Incentives for Early Arrival in Cost Sharing

In cooperative games, we study how values created or costs incurred by a coalition are shared among the members within it, and the players may join the coalition in a online manner such as investors invest a startup. Recently, Ge et al. [10] proposed a new property called incentives for early arrival (I4EA) in such games, which says that the online allocation of values or costs should incentivize agents to join early in order to prevent mutual strategic waiting. Ideally, the allocation should also be fair, so that agents arriving in an order uniformly at random should expect to get/pay their Shapley values. Ge et al. [10] showed that not all monotone value functions admit such mechanisms in online value sharing games. In this work, we show a sharp contrast in online cost sharing games. We construct a mechanism with all the properties mentioned above, for every monotone cost function. To achieve this, we first solve 0-1 valued cost sharing games with a novel mechanism called Shapley-fair shuffle cost sharing mechanism (SFS-CS), and then extend SFS-CS to a family called generalized Shapley-fair shuffle cost sharing mechanisms (GSFS-CS). The critical technique we invented here is a mapping from one arrival order to another order so that we can directly apply marginal cost allocation on the shuffled orders to satisfy the properties. Finally, we solve general valued cost functions, by decomposing them into 0-1 valued functions in an online fashion.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2024

Coresets for Constrained Clustering: General Assignment Constraints and Improved Size Bounds

Designing small-sized \emph{coresets}, which approximately preserve the costs of the solutions for large datasets, has been an important research direction for the past decade. We consider coreset construction for a variety of general constrained clustering problems. We introduce a general class of assignment constraints, including capacity constraints on cluster centers, and assignment structure constraints for data points (modeled by a convex body $\mathcal{B}$). We give coresets for clustering problems with such general assignment constraints that significantly generalize and improve known results. Notable implications include the first $\varepsilon$-coreset for capacitated and fair $k$-Median with $m$ outliers in Euclidean spaces whose size is $\tilde{O}(m + k^2 \varepsilon^{-4})$, generalizing and improving upon the prior bounds in [Braverman et al., FOCS' 22; Huang et al., ICLR' 23] (for capacitated $k$-Median, the coreset size bound obtained in [Braverman et al., FOCS' 22] is $\tilde{O}(k^3 \varepsilon^{-6})$, and for $k$-Median with $m$ outliers, the coreset size bound obtained in [Huang et al., ICLR' 23]} is $\tilde{O}(m + k^3 \varepsilon^{-5})$), and the first $ε$-coreset of size $\mathrm{poly}(k \varepsilon^{-1})$ for fault-tolerant clustering for various types of metric spaces.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2024

Competitive Auctions with Imperfect Predictions

The competitive auction was first proposed by Goldberg, Hartline, and Wright. In their paper, they introduce the competitive analysis framework of online algorithm designing into the traditional revenue-maximizing auction design problem. While the competitive analysis framework only cares about the worst-case bound, a growing body of work in the online algorithm community studies the learning-augmented framework. In this framework, designers are allowed to leverage imperfect machine-learned predictions of unknown information and pursue better theoretical guarantees when the prediction is accurate(consistency). Meanwhile, designers also need to maintain a nearly-optimal worst-case ratio(robustness). In this work, we revisit the competitive auctions in the learning-augmented setting. We leverage the imperfect predictions of the private value of the bidders and design the learning-augmented mechanisms for several competitive auctions with different constraints, including digital good auctions, limited-supply auctions, and general downward-closed permutation environments. For all these auction environments, our mechanisms enjoy $1$-consistency against the strongest benchmark $OPT$, which is impossible to achieve $O(1)$-competitive without predictions. At the same time, our mechanisms also maintain the $O(1)$-robustness against all benchmarks considered in the traditional competitive analysis. Considering the possible inaccuracy of the predictions, we provide a reduction that transforms our learning-augmented mechanisms into an error-tolerant version, which enables the learning-augmented mechanism to ensure satisfactory revenue in scenarios where the prediction error is moderate.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2024

Sample-Based Matroid Prophet Inequalities

We study matroid prophet inequalities when distributions are unknown and accessible only through samples. While single-sample prophet inequalities for special matroids are known, no constant-factor competitive algorithm with even a sublinear number of samples was known for general matroids. Adding more to the stake, the single-sample version of the question for general matroids has close (two-way) connections with the long-standing matroid secretary conjecture. In this work, we give a $(\frac14 - \varepsilon)$-competitive matroid prophet inequality with only $O_\varepsilon(\mathrm{poly} \log n)$ samples. Our algorithm consists of two parts: (i) a novel quantile-based reduction from matroid prophet inequalities to online contention resolution schemes (OCRSs) with $O_\varepsilon(\log n)$ samples, and (ii) a $(\frac14 - \varepsilon)$-selectable matroid OCRS with $O_\varepsilon(\mathrm{poly} \log n)$ samples which carefully addresses an adaptivity challenge.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2024

Design and Characterization of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Two-Facility Game on a Line

We focus on the problem of placing two facilities along a linear space to serve a group of agents. Each agent is committed to minimizing the distance between her location and the closest facility. A mechanism is an algorithm that maps the reported agent locations to the facility locations. We are interested in mechanisms without money that are deterministic, strategy-proof, and provide a bounded approximation ratio for social cost. It is a fundamental problem to characterize the family of strategy-proof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio. Fotakis and Tzamos already demonstrated that the deterministic strategy-proof mechanisms for the 2-facility game problem are mechanisms with a unique dictator and the leftmost-rightmost mechanism. In this paper, we first present a more refined characterization of the first family. We then reveal three new classes of strategy-proof mechanisms that show the intricacy of structure within this family. This helps us get a more complete picture of the characterization of the 2-facility game problem, and may also have value in understanding and solving more general facility allocation game problems. Besides, based on our refined characterization, we surprisingly find that prediction cannot effectively improve the performance of the mechanism in the two-facility game problem, while this methodology to overcome bad approximation ratio works in many other mechanism design problems. We show that if we require that the mechanism admits a bounded approximation ratio when the prediction is arbitrarily bad, then at the same time, the mechanism can never achieve sublinear approximation ratios even with perfect prediction.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2023

A Hierarchical Destroy and Repair Approach for Solving Very Large-Scale Travelling Salesman Problem

For prohibitively large-scale Travelling Salesman Problems (TSPs), existing algorithms face big challenges in terms of both computational efficiency and solution quality. To address this issue, we propose a hierarchical destroy-and-repair (HDR) approach, which attempts to improve an initial solution by applying a series of carefully designed destroy-and-repair operations. A key innovative concept is the hierarchical search framework, which recursively fixes partial edges and compresses the input instance into a small-scale TSP under some equivalence guarantee. This neat search framework is able to deliver highly competitive solutions within a reasonable time. Fair comparisons based on nineteen famous large-scale instances (with 10,000 to 10,000,000 cities) show that HDR is highly competitive against existing state-of-the-art TSP algorithms, in terms of both efficiency and solution quality. Notably, on two large instances with 3,162,278 and 10,000,000 cities, HDR breaks the world records (i.e., best-known results regardless of computation time), which were previously achieved by LKH and its variants, while HDR is completely independent of LKH. Finally, ablation studies are performed to certify the importance and validity of the hierarchical search framework.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2023

Improved Coresets for Clustering with Capacity and Fairness Constraints

We study coresets for clustering with capacity and fairness constraints. Our main result is a near-linear time algorithm to construct $\tilde{O}(k^2\varepsilon^{-2z-2})$-sized $\varepsilon$-coresets for capacitated $(k,z)$-clustering which improves a recent $\tilde{O}(k^3\varepsilon^{-3z-2})$ bound by [BCAJ+22, HJLW23]. As a corollary, we also save a factor of $k \varepsilon^{-z}$ on the coreset size for fair $(k,z)$-clustering compared to them. We fundamentally improve the hierarchical uniform sampling framework of [BCAJ+22] by adaptively selecting sample size on each ring instance, proportional to its clustering cost to an optimal solution. Our analysis relies on a key geometric observation that reduces the number of total ``effective centers" from [BCAJ+22]'s $\tilde{O}(k^2\varepsilon^{-z})$ to merely $O(k\log \varepsilon^{-1})$ by being able to ``ignore'' all center points that are too far or too close to the ring center.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2023

Auction Design for Value Maximizers with Budget and Return-on-spend Constraints

The paper designs revenue-maximizing auction mechanisms for agents who aim to maximize their total obtained values rather than the classical quasi-linear utilities. Several models have been proposed to capture the behaviors of such agents in the literature. In the paper, we consider the model where agents are subject to budget and return-on-spend constraints. The budget constraint of an agent limits the maximum payment she can afford, while the return-on-spend constraint means that the ratio of the total obtained value (return) to the total payment (spend) cannot be lower than the targeted bar set by the agent. The problem was first coined by [Balseiro et al., EC 2022]. In their work, only Bayesian mechanisms were considered. We initiate the study of the problem in the worst-case model and compare the revenue of our mechanisms to an offline optimal solution, the most ambitious benchmark. The paper distinguishes two main auction settings based on the accessibility of agents' information: fully private and partially private. In the fully private setting, an agent's valuation, budget, and target bar are all private. We show that if agents are unit-demand, constant approximation mechanisms can be obtained; while for additive agents, there exists a mechanism that achieves a constant approximation ratio under a large market assumption. The partially private setting is the setting considered in the previous work [Balseiro et al., EC 2022] where only the agents' target bars are private. We show that in this setting, the approximation ratio of the single-item auction can be further improved, and a $Ω(1/\sqrt{n})$-approximation mechanism can be derived for additive agents.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2023

Variance-Dependent Best Arm Identification

We study the problem of identifying the best arm in a stochastic multi-armed bandit game. Given a set of $n$ arms indexed from $1$ to $n$, each arm $i$ is associated with an unknown reward distribution supported on $[0,1]$ with mean $θ_i$ and variance $σ_i^2$. Assume $θ_1 > θ_2 \geq \cdots \geqθ_n$. We propose an adaptive algorithm which explores the gaps and variances of the rewards of the arms and makes future decisions based on the gathered information using a novel approach called \textit{grouped median elimination}. The proposed algorithm guarantees to output the best arm with probability $(1-δ)$ and uses at most $O \left(\sum_{i = 1}^n \left(\frac{σ_i^2}{Δ_i^2} + \frac{1}{Δ_i}\right)(\ln δ^{-1} + \ln \ln Δ_i^{-1})\right)$ samples, where $Δ_i$ ($i \geq 2$) denotes the reward gap between arm $i$ and the best arm and we define $Δ_1 = Δ_2$. This achieves a significant advantage over the variance-independent algorithms in some favorable scenarios and is the first result that removes the extra $\ln n$ factor on the best arm compared with the state-of-the-art. We further show that $Ω\left( \sum_{i = 1}^n \left( \frac{σ_i^2}{Δ_i^2} + \frac{1}{Δ_i} \right) \ln δ^{-1} \right)$ samples are necessary for an algorithm to achieve the same goal, thereby illustrating that our algorithm is optimal up to doubly logarithmic terms.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2023

Revocable Deep Reinforcement Learning with Affinity Regularization for Outlier-Robust Graph Matching

Graph matching (GM) has been a building block in various areas including computer vision and pattern recognition. Despite recent impressive progress, existing deep GM methods often have obvious difficulty in handling outliers, which are ubiquitous in practice. We propose a deep reinforcement learning based approach RGM, whose sequential node matching scheme naturally fits the strategy for selective inlier matching against outliers. A revocable action framework is devised to improve the agent's flexibility against the complex constrained GM. Moreover, we propose a quadratic approximation technique to regularize the affinity score, in the presence of outliers. As such, the agent can finish inlier matching timely when the affinity score stops growing, for which otherwise an additional parameter i.e. the number of inliers is needed to avoid matching outliers. In this paper, we focus on learning the back-end solver under the most general form of GM: the Lawler's QAP, whose input is the affinity matrix. Especially, our approach can also boost existing GM methods that use such input. Experiments on multiple real-world datasets demonstrate its performance regarding both accuracy and robustness.

cs.CV↗
arXiv2023

Mechanism Design with Predictions

Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well-studied mechanism design settings, we make use of imperfect predictions to design mechanisms that perform much better than traditional mechanisms if the predictions are accurate (consistency), while always retaining worst-case guarantees even with very imprecise predictions (robustness). Furthermore, we refer to the largest prediction error sufficient to give a good performance as the error tolerance of a mechanism, and observe that an intrinsic tradeoff among consistency, robustness and error tolerance is common for mechanism design with predictions.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2022

Bidder Subset Selection Problem in Auction Design

Motivated by practical concerns in the online advertising industry, we study a bidder subset selection problem in single-item auctions. In this problem, a large pool of candidate bidders have independent values sampled from known prior distributions. The seller needs to pick a subset of bidders and run a given auction format on the selected subset to maximize her expected revenue. We propose two frameworks for the subset restrictions: (i) capacity constraint on the set of selected bidders; and (ii) incurred costs for the bidders invited to the auction. For the second-price auction with anonymous reserve (SPA-AR), we give constant approximation polynomial time algorithms in both frameworks (in the latter framework under mild assumptions about the market). Our results are in stark contrast to the previous work of Mehta, Nadav, Psomas, Rubinstein [NeurIPS 2020], who showed hardness of approximation for the SPA without a reserve price. We also give complimentary approximation results for other well-studied auction formats such as anonymous posted pricing and sequential posted pricing. On a technical level, we find that the revenue of SPA-AR as a set function $f(S)$ of its bidders $S$ is fractionally-subadditive but not submodular. Our bidder selection problem with invitation costs is a natural question about (approximately) answering a demand oracle for $f(\cdot)$ under a given vector of costs, a common computational assumption in the literature on combinatorial auctions.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2022

Learning Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions

This paper proves the tight sample complexity of {\sf Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve}, up to a logarithmic factor, for each of all the value distribution families studied in the literature: $[0,\, 1]$-bounded, $[1,\, H]$-bounded, regular, and monotone hazard rate (MHR). Remarkably, the setting-specific tight sample complexity $\mathsf{poly}(\varepsilon^{-1})$ depends on the precision $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$, but not on the number of bidders $n \geq 1$. Further, in the two bounded-support settings, our learning algorithm allows {\em correlated} value distributions. In contrast, the tight sample complexity $\tildeΘ(n) \cdot \mathsf{poly}(\varepsilon^{-1})$ of {\sf Myerson Auction} proved by Guo, Huang and Zhang (STOC~2019) has a nearly-linear dependence on $n \geq 1$, and holds only for {\em independent} value distributions in every setting. We follow a similar framework as the Guo-Huang-Zhang work, but replace their information theoretical arguments with a direct proof.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2022

Better Approximation for Interdependent SOS Valuations

Submodular over signal (SOS) defines a family of interesting functions for which there exist truthful mechanisms with constant approximation to the social welfare for agents with interdependent valuations. The best-known truthful auction is of $4$-approximation and a lower bound of 2 was proved. We propose a new and simple truthful mechanism to achieve an approximation ratio of 3.315.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2022

Tight Revenue Gaps among Multi-Unit Mechanisms

This paper considers Bayesian revenue maximization in the $k$-unit setting, where a monopolist seller has $k$ copies of an indivisible item and faces $n$ unit-demand buyers (whose value distributions can be non-identical). Four basic mechanisms among others have been widely employed in practice and widely studied in the literature: {\sf Myerson Auction}, {\sf Sequential Posted-Pricing}, {\sf $(k + 1)$-th Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve}, and {\sf Anonymous Pricing}. Regarding a pair of mechanisms, we investigate the largest possible ratio between the two revenues (a.k.a.\ the revenue gap), over all possible value distributions of the buyers. Divide these four mechanisms into two groups: (i)~the discriminating mechanism group, {\sf Myerson Auction} and {\sf Sequential Posted-Pricing}, and (ii)~the anonymous mechanism group, {\sf Anonymous Reserve} and {\sf Anonymous Pricing}. Within one group, the involved two mechanisms have an asymptotically tight revenue gap of $1 + Θ(1 / \sqrt{k})$. In contrast, any two mechanisms from the different groups have an asymptotically tight revenue gap of $Θ(\log k)$.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2022

The Price of Stability for First Price Auction

This paper establishes the Price of Stability (PoS) for First Price Auctions, for all equilibrium concepts that have been studied in the literature: Bayes Nash Equilibrium $\subsetneq$ Bayes Correlated Equilibrium $\subsetneq$ Bayes Coarse Correlated Equilibrium} $\bullet$ Bayes Nash Equilibrium: For independent valuations, the tight PoS is $1 - 1/ e^{2} \approx 0.8647$, matching the counterpart Price of Anarchy (PoA) bound \cite{JL22}. For correlated valuations, the tight $\PoS$ is $1 - 1 / e \approx 0.6321$, matching the counterpart PoA bound \cite{ST13,S14}. This result indicates that, in the worst cases, efficiency degradation depends not on different selections among Bayes Nash Equilibria. $\bullet$ Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibrium: For independent or correlated valuations, the tight PoS is always $1 = 100\%$, i.e., no efficiency degradation, different from the counterpart PoA bound $1 - 1 / e \approx 0.6321$ \cite{ST13,S14}. This result indicates that First Price Auctions can be fully efficient when we allow the more general equilibrium concepts.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2021

Oblivious Online Contention Resolution Schemes

Contention resolution schemes (CRSs) are powerful tools for obtaining "ex post feasible" solutions from candidates that are drawn from "ex ante feasible" distributions. Online contention resolution schemes (OCRSs), the online version, have found myriad applications in Bayesian and stochastic problems, such as prophet inequalities and stochastic probing. When the ex ante distribution is unknown, it was unknown whether good CRSs/OCRSs exist with no sample (in which case the scheme is oblivious) or few samples from the distribution. In this work, we give a simple $\frac{1}{e}$-selectable oblivious single item OCRS by mixing two simple schemes evenly, and show, via a Ramsey theory argument, that it is optimal. On the negative side, we show that no CRS or OCRS with $O(1)$ samples can be $Ω(1)$-balanced/selectable (i.e., preserve every active candidate with a constant probability) for graphic or transversal matroids.

cs.DS↗